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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
R. D. TOBIN, ET AL., 
vs. 
tTxiTED BoNn & FINANCE CoRPO-
RATION, a corporation, ET AI..~., 
App·ellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
This was a suit in equity, a derivative action, 
brought by stockholders o~ the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation holding about one-fifth of the outs'tanding 
stock of said corporation. They brought the action on 
behalf of themselves and all other stockholders simi-
larly situated. The suit is against the said corpor-
ation, its officers and directors .and the Beckstead Live-
stock Company, a Wy~oming ·Corporation, the stock of 
which is w·holly owned by the Financ-e Corporation. The 
purpose of the action was and is to have a receiver 
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2 
appointed for the Finance Corporation. The trial Court 
appointed a receiver for said corporation and ordered 
all of the defendants to account for certain items. The 
appeal is from that judgment. 
The appellant, United B,ond and Finance Corpora-
tion, under the name of United States Bond and 
Finance Corporation, was organized as a Utah corpor-
ation on the 20th day of September, 1927, and immedi-
ately thereafter commenced business. The original 
incorporators were W. R. Beckstead, who became Presi-
dent and Director, W. A. Green, Vice-President, Floyd 
S. Bradshaw, Secretary and Treasurer, Leslie D. Spils-
bury, Director, and L. C. Clive, D[rector. The principal 
·place of business of said corporation was at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Stock was sold either £or cash or on an 
installment plan in units, a unit consisting of one share 
of preferred of the par value of $100.00 and one share 
of common voting stock without par value. These units 
originally were sold for $125.00, $100.00 going into the 
treasury of the corporation and $_25.00 to the salesmen 
for commissions. The greater part of the stock sold by 
the corporation in units was sold at this price. As 
originally provided in the Articles of Incorporation there 
was but one class of comm~on stock, and this stock carried 
voting privileges. Later on the Articles of Incorporation 
were amended and provision made for another class of 
non-par common stock known as Class B Common. By 
this amendrnent the original voting stock was designated 
as Class A Common. The Articles were subsequently 
amended to provide for another class of common stock 
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designated as Class AA Comm.on. Neither Class B nor 
Class .. A .. A. Con1mon Stock carried voting privileges. 
After the a1nendments, units of stork ''"'ere sold consisting 
of one share of preferred and one share of either Class 
B Common or one share of Class AA Common. During 
the course of the stock s-elling' campaign the units sold 
variously for $125.00 a unit, $135.00 a unit, and $150.00 
a unit. However, the commission paid to salesmen re-
mained constantly at $25.00 per unit. On units sold for 
any sum in excess of $125.00 a reserve £or common stock 
was set up and maintained by the ·corporation. 
Following the organization of the corp·oration inter-
est bearing bonds were sold either for cash or on an 
installment basis. ..A . t the outset ''T· R. Beckstead and 
Floyd S. Bradsha\v were the leading figures in the cor-
poration's affairs. Bradshaw remained with the cor-
poration but a few months when he withdre\v and sold 
his stock interests to Beckstead. From the first vV. R. 
Beckstead \vas the chief promoter and organizer and the 
chief sales1nan of the corporation. He org&nized its 
stock selling campaign, using his own automobile and 
his own resources to finance the venture. He received 
from the corporation the usual commission of $25.00 per 
unit on the units he sold. From the commission of stock 
salesmen ~operating under him a 21h% overwriting com-
mission was "rithheld \vhich was paid to Beckstead, and 
up until 1931 Beckstead received no salary whatsoever 
from the corporation. As soon as funds began to accum-
ulate in the treasury Beckstead proceeded to invest the 
1noney in accordance with the corporate purposes. He 
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4 
looked after mortgages and s·ecurities acquired by the 
c-orporation and made collections thereon, and did all 
thing-s necessary to keep the assets of the corporation 
invested in interest bearing securities. The stock selling 
campaign ceased in 1931, and thereafter Beckstead re. 
reived a salary for his services from the corporation. 
In 1928 the corporation '\vas authorized to sell its secur. 
i ties and do business in the State of Montana as a 
foreign corporation. A very substantial amount of stock 
was sold in the State of Montana, and at one time the 
corporation had invested in that state approximately 
$80,000.00. In N~ovember, 1936, the corporation with-
drew from that state and its charter to do business there 
was officially cancelled. Prior to withdrawal from the 
state all the property and assets of the corporation 
therein were sold and disposed of s~o that at the time 
of withdrawal the corporation had no property or assets 
within the state whatsoever, neither were there any debts 
or obligations due from it to citizens of that state . 
. During the great depression which commenced in 
1930-1931 and the condition of general unemployment 
which prevailed throughout the intermountain. country 
during that time, many of the investments of the corpora-
tion cea.sed to yield revenue. Mortgagors .could not make 
payments of interest or principal on their 1nortgages, and 
payments on other sec-uri ties like-wise becan1e delinquent. 
As a result of this condition it was necessary for the 
corporation to m-odify its business activities or to suffer 
insolvency, and for that reason the corporation began 
to acquire apartment houses and other income producing 
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property, and in acquiring these properties, Inortgages 
and other securities and properties \Yhich were yielding 
little ~or no revenue were traded and exchanged. At the 
present time the corporation owns. and operates five 
large apartn1ent houses in Salt Lake City and holds a 
contract of sale on another. During this period of 
depressi~on it was impossible for the corporation to pay 
dividends, and the stockholders commenced trading and 
exchanging their stock to stock traders for stock in other 
corporations and other securities and selling it. for what-
ever price could be obtained. As a result of this condi-
tion a large amount of the stock of the corporation came 
into the hands of stock traders and stock brokers and 
these stock traders s~ought a market with the Finance 
Corporation for stock coming into their possession. 
They were \villing to sell the stock for ·a small percentage 
of its par or book value, and it app-earing to the 
corporate officers that the purchase on these favorable 
terms was extremely profitable, much of the stock of the 
corporation was repurchased. In fact, the audits (S·ee 
Exhibit 15, page 4) which are a p.art of the reeo-rds of 
this case on appeal, indicate that the corporation re-
purchased its own outstanding stock of the par value of 
some $203,000 for a consideration of appr~oximately 
$85,000.00. This practice terminated in 1936, with the 
exception of a fevv sea ttered purchases in 1937, 1938 
and 1939. No stock has been reacquired since October 
1939 . 
. Since 1935 the corporation has acquired four large 
livestock ranches in Wyoming, together with. a substantial 
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amount of leased ground, Taylor grazing rights and 
.summer grazing permits on the National forest. In con-
nection with these ranches the ·Corporation owns and 
operates ·over 2,000 head of sheep, a fine herd of approxi-
mately 55 pure bred registered Hereford cattle and 250 
head of high grade Hereford cattle. These ranches are 
being operated in a .. successful and effi·cient manner. 
The title to the property is in the Beckstead Livestock 
Company, .a Wyoming corporation which was organized 
in April of 1938. All ,of the capital stock of the Beck-
stead Livestock C·orporation is owned by the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation. The ranches, grazing 
rights, leased ground, sheep and .cattle are all free and 
.clear of encumbrances with the exception of mortgages 
·on two of the ranches, the total unpaid principal being 
approximately $13,700.00. 
According to the audit of the auditing firm of 
Beesley and Wood, as of the 31st day of December, 1939, 
the Finance Curporation is not only solvent, but has suf-
ficient ass·ets to discharge all liability to stockholders in 
full, to pay all debts and obligations of every kind owed 
by the corporation, and still leave a balance of approxi-
mately $130,000.00. 
These plaintiffs are minority stockholders from the 
State of M~ontana. Their Complaint will be discussed 
in detail hereinafter. Plaintiffs originally -commenced 
proceedings in Montana for appointment of a receiver of 
the corporation, and .a receiver was appointed. Subse-
quent to the appointment of receiver in Montana pro-
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ceedings ancillary thereto 'vere instituted in' Utah and 
Wyoming and ancillary receivers appointed. The orders 
appointing ancillary receivers were sulbsequently vacated 
and set aside upon motion of the Finance Corporation, 
and thereafter this action was commenced. Upon the 
filing of the complaint the Court issued an order citing 
the defendants to appear and show cause if any they had 
why receiver pendente lite be not appointed. The hear-
ing came on in the early part of September, 1940. After 
approximately seventeen days of trial the parties rested 
and the Court took the matter under advisement. There-
after the matter was set down for hearing on its merits 
and by stipulation the evidence received at the hearing 
on citation was received as evidence on the trial. Other 
evidence was offered and finally on the 6th da.y of 
January, 1941, four minutes before the term of ~office of 
the trial Judge expired the findings of fact, decree and 
the order appointing the receiver were signed and filed 
by the C'ourt. The Court in its decree, among other 
things, ordered a purported accounting which will be 
discussed in detail hereinafter. 
D·efendants interposed a moti~on for a new trial .and 
a motion to vacate, annul and set aside the order ap-
pointing receiver. Judgment was stayed pending the 
determination of these motions, and both were by the 
Court denied. Thereafter appellants perfected their 
appeal, tl1e judgiuent heing superseded by a bond in the 
sum of Fifty Thousand and no/100 ($50,000.00) Dollars. 
We have given the foregoing merely as a prelim-
inary statement to inform the Court in a general way of 
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the background of this case and the structure of the 
Finance Corporation. We do not intend to make a state-
ment of all of the evidence· which appears in the some-
what voluminous record for the reason that much of it is 
immaterial and irrelevant, but shall discuss the details 
of the evidence ~only in connection with the argument 
which we shall hereinafter set forth. 
Appellants contend that the judgment and decree 
of the Court should be reverse·d and set aside for the 
reason that said judgment and decree is unsupported by 
pleadings, proof and findings, and is contrary to the law. 
AssiGNMENTs OF ERROR. 
Appellants assign the following err·ors, which are 
relied upon for a reversal of the judgment and decree 
herein: 
1. The trial Court committed reversible error in 
making .and entering its judgme~t and decree on the 
ground and for the reason: 
(a) That said jndgii!ent and decree is not supported 
by the pleadings. 
(b) That said j-udgment and decree is not supported 
by the evidence. 
(c) That said judgment and decree is not supported 
by the· findings and conclusions. 
(d) That said judgment is contrary to law. 
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2. The trial Court committed reversible error in 
making its findings of fact on the ground and for the 
reason: 
(a) That the findings are not supported by the evi-
dence. 
(b) That the findings are not within the Issues 
raised by the pleadings. 
(c) That there is a fatal variance between the find-
ings and complaint. 
(d) That the trial Court failed to find on material 
issues raised by the pleadings. 
3. The trial Court committed reversible error 1n 
the conduct of the trial: 
(a) That by reason of the Court's personal preju-
dice against the Defendants and D:efendants' cause, De-
fendants were not given and afforded a fair and impar-
tial trail, and that said prejudice ·of the Court influenced 
it in making and entering its judgment against Defend-
ants. 
(b) By overruling Defendants' objections to irrele-
vant, incompetent and immaterial evidence. 
(c) By denying Defendants' motion to dismiss made 
at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case. 
(d) By permitting Plaintiffs, over Defendants' ob:-
jection, to amend their Complaint. 
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4. The trial Court committed reversible error in 
overruling Defendants' motion to vacate and set aside 
the order appointing a receiver. 
5. The Court committed reversible erl'ior in overrul-
ing Defendants' motion for a new trial. 
THE JUDGMENT AND DIDCREE OF THE TRIAL COURT 
SH·OULD BE REVERSED AND SET ASIDE FOR THE REASON 
THAT SAID JUDGM'EN.T AND DECREE IS UNSUP·PORTED BY 
PLEADINGS, PROOF AND FINDINGS, AND IS CONTRARY TO 
THE· LAW. 
POINT I. 
RECEIVIDRJSHIP' IS PURELY AN AN'CILLARY REMEDY AND 
I'S NOT AN EQUITAJBLE RIGHT, AN ACTION FOR A REC!IDIVER· 
SHI!P BEING UNKNOWIN TO EITHER LAW OR EQUITY. THE 
J,URISDIGTION OF THE COURT DEPIDNDS UPON THE EXISTENCE 
AND PENDENC'Y OF AN AC'TION FOR THE ENFOROEJMENT OF 
A LEGALLY RECOGNIZED PRIMARY RIGHT TO WHICH RFr 
CEIVERS.HI'P MAY BID NECESSARY OR IN AID THEREOF. 
Section 104-20-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 19-33 
provides: 
"A receiver may be appointed by the court 
in w bich an acti.on is pending or ha.s passed to 
judgment, or by the judge thereof;'' 
and then sets forth ·six subdivisions, enumerating 
grounds upon which receivers may be appointed. None 
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of these are applicable to the case at bar except Subdi-
vision No. 6 which provides as follows: 
·'In all other cases \Yhere receivers have 
heretofore been appointed -by the useages of the 
courts of equity.'' 
Col·u.mbia Tt·ust Co. v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 
et al., 82 Utah 117, 22 Pac. (2d) 164, was an action 
brought to recover for alleged conversion of crops. 
A crop mortgage had been placed on the crops to 
be grown on the premises, and prior thereto the premises 
had been mortgaged to secure payment of a substantial 
indebtedness. An action was brought to foreclose the 
mortgage on the real estate and the crop mortgagee 
was not made a party to the suit. In the suit to foreclose 
the real estate mortgage a petition was filed requesting 
the Court to appoint a receiver to take charge of the 
crop, reciting the facts of the plaintiff '·s interest in the 
property and its inability to care for the crop, and that 
to preserve the same a receiver was necessary. The 
receiver was appointed on the pe'tition. He went into 
posses·sion of the property, harvested the crops, s.old the 
rsame, but made no accounting to the crop mortgagee. 
Hence this action. It was contended that the .appoint-
ment ,of the receiver was void. 
From the opinion we quote as follows: 
'''In support of its position plaintiff urges: 
First, that the order of the court below appoint-
ing Mr. Dix~on as receiver was void and as such 
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subject to attack in this proceeding; and, second, 
t~at the delivery of the chattel or crop mortgag·e 
constituted a constructive severance of the crop, 
and vested in plaintiff a first lien upon such crop 
which lien continued during the period aHowed 
by law for the redemption, of the property, and 
until the issuance of a sheriff's deed. In support 
of its contention that the appointment of Mr. 
Dixon as a receiver was void, appellant cites 
the following cases : State v. Ross, 122 Mo. 435 
2·5 S. W. 94 7, 23 L. R. A. 534; Zuber v. Micma~ 
Gold Mining Co., (C. C.) 180 F. 625; Hermann v. 
Thomas, (Tex .. Civ. App.) 143 S.· W. 195; Con-
tinental Trust Co. v. Brown, (Tex. Civ. App.) 
179 S. ''T· 939; I-Iartnett v. St. Louis !!in. & :Mill. 
Co., 51 ~Iont. 395, 153 P. 437; Price v. Bankers' 
Trust Co., (Mo. Sup.) 178 S. W. 745 ~ Stock-
holders ,of Jefferson County Agricultural 1\ss 'n 
v. Jefferson Agricultural Ass 'n, 155 Iov,ra 634, 
136 N. ''T· 672; Gauer v. Voltz, 190 Ill. App. 189; 
and Davis v~ Alton, J. & P. Ry. Co., 180 Ill. App. 
1. The doctrine announced in the foregoing cases 
is thus stated in Pomeroy's Equity Jurispru-
dence,.Vol. 4 (4th Ed.) Sec. 1539, p. 3613: 'Unless 
authorized by statute, there is no such thing as an 
action brought distinctively for the mere appoint-
Inent of a receiver; to justify the appointn1ent it 
is essential that some proper final relief in equity 
be asked for in the bill which will justify the court 
in proceeding with the case. It follows that it is 
error for the court to appoint a receiver. ,of a 
corporation on its own _petition, alleging its in-
solvency, and it has been held that such a pro-
ceeding is void for want ,of jurisdiction.' " 
·Clark in his "rork, '''The Law of Receivers", 1st 
:Ed., Vol. 1, Pages 54-56, 1f 36, states that: 
"The appointment of a receiver is not an 
equitable right but an equitable remedy. There-
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fore the appointment of a rt>eeiver is not a cause 
of action in itself but the appointn1ent ~of a re-
ceiYer is an act of the court ancillary to pro-
eeedings for the establishn1ent of some right. The 
appointn1ent of a receiver being- an interlocutory 
decree is therefore a temporary expedient~ and 
provisional to son1e other or final determination 
of the Ina tter bY the court. It is not the office of 
a court of equity to appoint receivers as a mode 
of granting ultimate relief. They are appointed 
as a measure ancillarY to the enforcement of some 
recognized equitable· right." (Citing· many au-
thorities). 
Under statutes similar to ours 1nany Courts have 
held that unless the receiver is appointed in an action 
pending in which son1e relief is prayed other than the 
mere appointment of a receiver, the Court is without 
jurisdiction to n1ake such appointment. A leading case 
on this subject is the case of ·Cook v. Leona Mills Lumber 
Cornpany, 106 Ore. 520, 212 Pac. 785 (1923). 
In that case action had been brought for the appoint-
ment of a receiver and no other relief was permissible 
other than the appointment of .a receiver. The Court 
held that the refusal to grant a motion to vacate the 
appointment of the receiver was err~or. In the decision 
it is pointed out that California, Montana, North Dakota 
and Idaho have statutes like the one in Oregon, and which 
are identical "~ith the Utah statutes above quoted. 
~rhe C·ourt cites and quotes cases from these jurisdie-
ti?ns, holding that under statutes of this kind an action 
must be pending for SOID·e other independent and primary 
relief to entitle a party to a receiver. It is also stated 
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that the law of receivership is peculiar in its nature in 
that it belongs to that class of remedies which are wholly 
ancillary or provisional, and that the appointment of a 
receiver does not affect either. directly or indirectly the 
nature of any primary right; that it is merely a. means 
by w hi·ch ·such rights may be preserved, protected or en-
forced in judi,cial proceedings. ·The appointment of a 
receiver does not adjudicate or determine the rights of 
any party to the proceedings, and grants no final relief. 
After reviewing a number of authorities the :Court states: 
'·'Under our code the appointment of a re-
ceiver is an ancillary remedy, in aid of the primary 
object of litigation, and such relief must be germ-
ane to the principal suit, and a. proceeding cannot 
he maintained where the appointment of a receiver 
is the ·sole, primary object. Neither at law nor 
in equity is .an action permissible in which only the 
appointment of a receiver is sought.'' 
In the ·ease of La.umeier v. Su.n-R;a.y Products Com-
pany (Mo.), 50 S. W. (2d) 640, receiver was appointed 
on petition of plaintiffs \vherein, among other things, it 
was alleged that the offi·cers of the corporation were 
guilty of fraud and misma.nagemen t, the allegations being 
general, that the officers had permitted certain people 
to appropriate to themselves, "rithout right, large sums 
of money and other property of great value \Vhich had 
become lost .and wasted, and that the corporation was 
drifting toward insolvency. Other general charges were 
set forth in the complaint. The defendants moved to 
vaeate the order appointing receiver on the ground, 
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among other things, that the Court lacked jurisdiction 
to appoint receiver, the allegations in the complaint being 
insufficient to support any primary cause to which re-
ceivership would be ancillary. 
·The Court held that the allegations with respect to 
diversion of the property and general fraud were insuf-
, ficient and that the complaint stated a cause for receiver-
ship. only, and said: 
"' \\: e find the · settled rule in this and other 
states to be that a eourt of equity has inherent 
power to appoint a reeeiver to take charge of the 
property and affairs of a corporation only when 
such appointment is ancillary to and in aid of an 
action pending for some other purpose, and in 
which there is a prayer for other and final or 
ultimate relief which the court has po,ver and 
jurisdiction to grant. We have recently reviewed 
authorities so holding in State ex rel. Hopke v. 
Mulloy, Judge, et al. (Mo. Sup.) 43 S. W. (2d) 
806. Absent a .cause of action stated in the main 
case, there is no main ease pending, and the court 
is without power or jurisdiction to appoint a re-
ceiver." 
·Citing· many authorities, an1ong them being 
Pomeroy's Eq. Juris. (4th ·Ed) p. 3613, Par. 1;539·; Clark 
on Receivers, P. ·69', Par. 45; Tardy Smith on Receivers 
('2d Ed.), Par. 14, Pages 50, 51; 49 C. J., p. 13,2, Pa.r. 140, 
and concluded; 
''Absent a petition showing the existence of 
and a clear purpose to enforce such independent 
right against proper pa.rties defendant, the court 
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is without power to grant the ancillary relief of 
a. receivership.'' 
It was held in the Montana case of Ha.rtnett, et al., v. 
Sa.int Louis Mining a;nd Milliln.g Company of Montana, 
et al., 15·3 Pac. 437, that there was no such thing in the 
tState of Montana as an a,ction for the appointment of a 
receive!·, that receivership is a provisional rem·edy of 
ancillary chara~cter, allowable only in an action pending 
for so1ne other purpose. Citing Rev. Codes, Paragraph 
66'98 (Identical with our Utah section on receivership 
.hereinabove quoted) ; and First T. S. Bank v. District 
Cou.rt, 50 Mont. 259, 146 Pac. 539; Lyon v. United States 
F. arnd G. Co., 48 Mont. 591, 140 Pac. 86. 
The 'Court expresses the rule : 
''The action pending must. be one for relief 
that could be litigaled between the parties evrJn 
if the application for the appointment be denied, 
and presupposes a. c'omp.Zain.t sufficient to w'arrant 
swch relief.'' (Italics supplied). 
In the .case of Marnn v. German--American lnv .. Co. 
(,Neb.), 97 N. W. 600, a complaint was filed wherein cer-
tain relief was sought, part of the prayer being for the 
appointment of a re-ceiver. No demurrer was interposed, 
but an obje.ction was made to the introduction of evidence 
on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause 
of action. The objection was overruled; the cause tried 
and a receiver appointed. 
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The Court invoked the liberal rule of construction 
in construing· the pleadings, but held that they failed to 
state a cause of action and stated: · 
''By seetion 2'67 of our ,Code of Civil Proce-
dure 'No r-eceiYer shall be appointed except in a 
suit actually commenced and pending;' and it is 
a familiar rule that the a.ction pending must be 
an action for sam~ relief or to enforce some right 
other than the mere appointment of a receiYer. 
In the case hef.ore us no action "~as commenced by 
the plaintiff which can support the receivership 
as a proceeding ancillary thereto. The prayer of 
his petition conclusively shows this. 'A suit ac-
tually com·menced and pending' that will support 
the appointment of a receiver must he one for 
relief that could be litigated between the parties 
even if the application for 'the appointment be 
denied. See Hottenstein v. Conrad, 9 Kan. 438. 
"In Vila Y. Grand Island Electric Light, etc., 
Company, '94 N. ''r· 136, recently decided ·by this 
court, it is said, 'The suit which must be ''actually 
commenced and pending'' as a condition precedent 
·to an appointment of a receiver must be one in 
which the main relief sought is independent of the 
receivership.' And from Barber v. International 
Co., 73 C·onn. 593, 48 Atl. 7·58, the following lan-
guage is quoted with approval: 'It is not the office 
of a ·court of equity to appoint receivers as a mode 
of granting ultimate· relief. They are appointed 
as a measure ancillary to the enforcement of some 
recognized equitable right.' '' 
It was held in the case of Simplw Paper Corpora-
tion v. Sta.ndard C. Box Co. (Mo.), 97 .s. W. (2d) 86'2, 
:that the appointment of receiver is no part of the cause 
of action. It is merely incidental to it. 
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A rather interesting .case which pointedly illustrates 
the proposition that receivership cannot be the ultimate 
and primary relief in aetions wherein a receiver-
ship may be sought is First Na.t. Bank & Trust Co. v. 
York Petroleum Co., et al., 4 F. ~Supp. 16'9. 
In that .case an action was commenced in the State 
·Court of ·Oklahoma against a corporation doing business 
in Oklahoma but chartered under the la.ws of the State 
of New York. The directors were all residents of Okla-
homa and were served with process in thrut state. The 
action was brought for the purpose of procuring a judg-
ment on a promissory note in an amount in excess of 
$124,000.00. Receivership was sought, the directors 
being eha.rged with fraud, mismanagement, dishonesty, 
diversion of assets, and other wrongful conduct. The 
corporation removed the cause to the Federal 1Court on 
the ground that there was a separable controversy and 
diversity of citizenship, the ·plaintiffs being residents of 
Oklahoma and the defendant corporation being a resident 
of N ~w York. The plaintiffs filed a motion in the F·ederal 
C'ourt to rem-and, insisting that the individual defendants 
were residents of ~Oklahoma, and therefore· the ne~c.essary 
diversity of citizenship did not .exist. The plaintiffs 
insisted that the primary eause was for the appointment 
of a receiver, and that the collection of the promissory 
note was incidental thereto. 
In considering this argument the Court stated: 
"Such an .a:rgument is tantamount to saying 
t:Q.a.t ·the re-al purpose of the action is the appoint-
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" ment of a receiYer to recover dissipated assets, 
and that the recovery upon the promissory note 
is merely incidental thereto. It is \Yell established 
that a. receivership is not an independent rem·edy, 
but is purely ancillary to other relief sought . 
. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U. 'S. 491, 43 
S. Ct. 454, 67 L. Ed. 763; Superior Oil·Corporation 
v. Matlock (C. C. A.) 47 F. (2-d) 993; ~~l'artin v. 
Ha.rnag·e, 26 Okl. 790, 110 P. 781, 38 L. R. A. ( N. 
S.) 2'28 ~ ''; agoner Oil & Gas Company v. Marlow, 
137 Okl. 116, 278 P. 29·4. There ·can be no doubt 
but that plaintiff's p-etition is primarily based 
upon its right to recover upon the promissory 
note.'' 
The motion to remand \Yas denied. 
The fundamental importance of the proposition above 
- set forth is further illustrated by a consideration of the 
., many cases wherein a receiver ha.s been appointed upon 
a petition wherein no primary relief is prayed, the pray-
er being merely for receivership, all parties consenting 
- thereto. The Courts have held that even the consent of 
the defendants to such procedure does not confer juris-
diction, and that ~the. 'Court is "\Yithout any jurisdiction 
~ whatsoever to appoint a receiver where su·c:h is the pri-
mary relief sought. 
·The following language in the case of Zwber v. Mic-
mac Gold Mining Company, et al., 180 F'ed. 625, is per~ 
tinent: 
~"Before passing upon these. questions it is 
the duty of the ~court to eonsider the character 
of the bill no \tv before it. Its whole purpose is 
manifestly to obtain a reeeiver. · In this district, 
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in Hutchinson v. American Palace-Car Co. (C. C.) 
104 Fed. 18'2, 185, Judge Putnan1 has stated the 
three essential .conditions·, compliance with which 
is _necessa1·y to justify !the appointment of a re. 
ce1ver: 
" 'First, that the case he fairly ·within the 
jurisdi·ction of the court having in vie·w both the 
limited jurisdiction of federal tribunals and the 
true nature of proceedings in equity; seeond, that 
some proper final relief in equity he asked for in 
the bill which will justify the .court in proceedinO' 
with the case; and, third, that the circumstance~ 
calling for a receiver be of a clear and urgent 
character.' 
''Judge Putnam further ·Observes that upon 
application. for rec.eivership, even though the 
parties have .already agreed upon a re·ceiver, the 
court is not relieved from looking at the question 
of jurisdiction, and the view of obtaining final 
relief, or merely for the purpose of securing a 
receivership for the n1ere sake of a receivership. 
H·e adds that, when the suhje.et-matter is of itself 
of an equitable nature, certain conditions which 
might be .availed of to defeat jurisdiction 1nay be 
waived, .citing Hollins v. Iron Company, 150 U. S. 
3Z1, 14 .Sup. Ct. 127, 37 L. Ed. 1113. But I find no 
conditions stated in that case '\vhich affect in any 
way the ·questions no'\v before me. I~ the case at 
bar there is no final relief asked for in the bill. 
A receivership cannot. he held by this ·court to be 
final relief; and it rcannot be n1ade ·:final by the 
suggestion that the receivers may bring suits, 
and in that way obtain some ultimate relief. The 
purpose of a receivership in equity is to be ancil-
lary to, and in aid of, the primary object of the 
litigation. It cannot be the primary object of the 
litigation. The final relief sought by the bill can-
not be made contingent upon the incidental relief 
of a. receivership.'' 
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\' 
To the san1e effect see Uni.ted Ceme,teries v. S~tro~ther 
" ~ (Mo.), 119 ,s. ,V. (2d) 7·63, "~herein ,the question of juris-
diction was not raised until the cause was presented on 
a.ppe·aL The Court found and held from a consideration 
lt of the .complaint th~at the Trial·Court was ·without juris-
r· di,ction to appoint a receiver. 
In McCu.tcheon v. Su.perior Court ('Cal.),, 24 Pac. 
('2d) 9i1, one of the judges on his own motion vacated an 
~ order theretofore made appointing a receiver and dis-· 
charged said receiver, on the ground that the Court in 
said 'action had no jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. 
l The petitioner sought redre1ss against ·the :Court by-
1 mandamus. The receiver was appointed upon a petition 
~ 
praying for the appointment of a receiver of a corpora-
- tion, and the ·corporation ·and its directors consented 
thereto in open Court. [t appeared from the complaint 
that the primary relief sought was the appointment of a 
receiver. ·Th~ Court therefore held that there was no 
jurisdiction to app·oint a receiver and the appointment 
was void. Mandamus w:as denied. 
The Court stated: 
'''''here a complaint fails to state a cause of 
action an order by the court ·by .which a receiver 
is appointed therein is of no v.aliditr." 
In the case of Nolan v. Guardian C oaZ, and Oil Com-
pa;ny (W. V·a.), 194~8. E. 347, the prayer of the complaint 
prayed that a receiver be .appointed to preserve the prop-
erty of the corporation, and that the corporation be 
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required to furnish a true and correct list of all the 
present stockholders. A demurrer was interposed which 
w;as overruled and receiver appointed. 
After holding that a stockholder could not maintain 
a bill in equity to enforce his right to inspect the books 
and docunien ts .of the ~company, whether the right was 
conferred by statute or regulation, the Court held that 
the primary purpose of the action was receivership, and 
therefore the Court was without jurisdiction to grant 
the pra.y·er of the complaint. 
Th~ judgment of the Trial Court was reversed, and 
the cause remanded, with direction to dismiss the bill. 
A case which is almost on all fours with the case at 
har is Frenoh ·v. ~c. F. & T. C·o. (Ore.), 265 Pac. 443. In 
that .case the Court held that .a receivership could not be 
tiie only relief prayed for. Apparently the primary re-
lief that the plaintiffs desired was an accounting. How-
·ever, the Court points out that ,the plaintiffs made no 
claim tha.t they had ever attempted to see the hooks of 
the corporation, or that an accounting had ever been 
demanded ·Or refused. Hence the rem,edy for accounting 
failed for these reasons, and the only thing left was tlie 
appointment of a receiver, and the Court refused to up-
hold the .appointment of' a receiver made by the lower 
Court. 
Another fine discussion of the principle here set 
forth is found in H oiles v. W a.tkins (Ohio), 157 N. E. 557, 
wherein under statutes exactly like those in the State 
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of lTtah the 1Court held that there \Yas no a~ction for the 
appointment of a receiYer, and that it is not the offiee 
of a Court of equity to appoint a receiver ars a. mode of 
granting ultimate relief. Many .cases are cited therein 
upholding this principle. 
That case is also interesting in that the Court dis-
cusses .the fact that it is necessary in any event that there 
be some evidence of insolvency or imminent danger of 
insolvency, in order to justify the appointment of a. re-
ceiver. 
· The Court observed that no ·ereditor was a party 
to the action; that no judgment had been taken against 
the corporation, and that no levy had been made upon 
any of its assets, and that there was no execution in the 
hands of the officers. The ·Court therefore ~concluded 
that there was no necessity f.or the appointment of a re-
eeiver to preserve the property of the .corporation or to 
prevent its destruction. 
A discussion of this same principle is also contained 
in the case of Myers v. Oxiden.tal Oil Corpor,a;tion, 288 
Fed. 997. 
The case of Parker v. American ~Svulphur & Ferti-
lizer Compamy, (Tex.), 3 ·S. W. (2d) 124, was a.n action 
instituted by minority stockholders wherein receivership 
was sought. Among other things it was alleged that the 
corporation liad little property and no money, and was 
in imminent danger of insolvency; that its right to do 
busineg.s had been forfeited for non-payment of franchise 
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tax, and that the majority stockholders in violation of 
law and their duty, and in fraud of the rights of the 
corporation and s~ockholders as established by former 
judgment of the Court, had entered into contra~ts on 
behalf of said corporation in which they had a personal 
interest, and from which they hoped to derive a personal 
benHfit to themselves. The only prayer was for the ap-
pointment of a· !eceiver, and the Court found that the 
primary purpose of the action appeared to be the ap-
pointment of a receiver. The ·Court held that even though 
fraud was alleged and proved, .and accepting all other 
allegations as true, still .the Court was without jurisdic-
tion to appoint a reeeiver. 
· In the case of Prairie Lea Production Cornpany v. 
Tiller (Tex.), 286 S. W. 63B, an action was brought by 
minority stockholders against a corporation and its di-
rectors and offi.cers, alleging fraud upon and mismanage-
ment of the corporation, praying for an injunction, the 
appointment of a re,ceiver and general relief. 
Among· other things they charged: 1. Fraudulent 
refusal ·Of the president and hoar~ of directors for inore 
than two years to render an accounting to the plaintiffs 
or call a stockholder's meeting. 2. Fraudulent sale of oil. 
3. Conversion by the directors to their own use and bene-
fit of a large amount of the ·c-ompany's assets. 4. Fraudu-
lent misappropriation :by the directors of $20,000. 5. 
F'raud upon the ·corporation in the exe-cution of a corpo-
ration note to a brother of one of the directors. 6. F'raud-
ulent increase in capital stock. 
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Upon these allegations plaintiffs prayed for an ac-. 
counting and a·ppointment of receiver, temporary in-
junction, and for dissolution of the corporation and dis-
tribution of its assets. 
Defendants filed a plea in abatement, the same being 
overruled. They answered by general 'and special ac-
ceptance ap_d by general and special denials. Upon he~r­
ing receiver was appointed and the appeal_ perfected. 
Upon appeal -defendants .contended _that the com-
plaint was not sufficient, and tl!a.t the p-rimary relief 
sought was that of receivership. · 
In passing the C-ourt remarked: 
''It cannot be seriously questioned but that 
the principle purpose of appellee'·s suit was to 
secure the appointment of ·a receiv-er and to take 
the management and control of the corporation's 
property and affairs out of the hands ·of its presi-
dent and board of directors.'' 
The Court discussed the general proposition dis-
cussed hereinabove, and held that Texas was in accord 
with the general rule. 
After expressing grave doubt a.s to the sufficiency 
of. the complaint the 'Court proceeded with the dis-cussion 
of the ·evidence and h-eld that the plaintiffs had not dis-
charged the burden of proof, and that the direct allega-
tions of fraud and misappropriation had been disproved, 
a.nd the .action of th~ board of directors with regard there-
to reasonably explained. 
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The \action of the ·Trial 'C.ourt in appointing a re-
ceive·r wa,s reversed and the cause remanded. 
To the same effect see Rex Refining Compamy v. 
Morris ('Tex.), 72 S. W. (2d) 687. 
An excellent note illustrating and further support-
ing the propositions hereinabove discussed is appended 
to the opinion in the ease of Porter v. Brown, et al., 
(iSouth Carolina), 146 S. E. 810 at page 814. 
It thus appears from the ·authorities cited that the 
burden rests upon the plaintiffs of pleadings, proving 
and esta~blishing an i?dependent cause ·Of .action for some 
primary relief to which receivership 'Can b.e ·ane!illary, 
necessary to, or in aid thereof, before .a receiver will be 
appointed~ This they have failed to do as will more 
fully appear. 
POINT II. 
THE PRiiMARY REMEDY D:IDGRE:ED HEREIN TO WH~CH 
T:HE RECE!IVE!RSHI'P IS ANCILLARY IS TH·E REM.EDY OF AC· 
COU·NTINO, BUT TH'E!RE fS NEI'THER PLEADINGS, FINDINGS 
NOR PROOF TO SUPPORT, SUSTAIN OR WIARRANT THE AC· 
COUNTING DE!GREfEiD. 
We submit that under all the authorities, plaintiffs' 
cause must stand or fall on their independent suit for an 
accounting. If they have not alleged or proved an in-
dependent eause for an accounting the Court is without 
jurisdiction to appoint a receiver. Therefore, it is 
necessary to earefully . examine the pleadings, the 
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whether or not an independent, final and primary cause 
for an aecounting, to 'Yhieh receivership may be ancillary 
in this case, has been alleged, proved or found. 
Clark states the rule in his work on R.eceivers (2nd 
- Edition) in Volume 1, Paragraph 51, Page 58, as follows: 
· ''Such matters as the appointment of a re-
ceiver and the issuing of a. preliminary injunction, 
cannot per .se be the su.bject of .a suit at law or an 
action in equity. ·One who prays for any prelim-
inary or -ancillary relief, such as a receivership, 
may always be challenged as to his alleged cause 
of action, the eause of action being stated in hi·s 
primary suit. If his primary cause fails, his re-
ceivership proceedings must also fail.'' 
That part of the decree whi.ch relates to the account-
ing provides as follows : 
"IT Is F'uRTHER !ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED that the defendants, United Bond and Fin-
ance ·Corpora.tion, a corporation, W. R. Beckstead, 
a.s president of said corporation, B-oyd Evans, a·s 
Secretary of said corporation, W. R. Beckstead, 
Boyd Evans, Leslie. D. Spilsbury, as directors of 
said corporation, W. R. B-eckstead, individually, 
and ~Stella C. ·Beckstead, his wife, and Beckstead 
Livestock Company, a. corporation, be, and they 
are hereby required within thirty days from date 
hereof, to render a full, true and -c-omplete ac-
•Counting for all transactions had respecting the 
forfeiture of installment sales, contracts or stocks 
and bonds and investment units of said corpora-
tion, and for the transactions involving the pur-
chase of the insurance agency and the purcha·se 
of the controlling stock ·of Edward E. Jenkins in 
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the Ashton-Jenkins Company, and for all trans-
actions and money advanced to Beckstead Live-
stock 'Company and for all money and property of 
said corporation used by the defend:ant, ""\Y. R. 
Beckstead and his asso.cia.tes in the acquisition of 
any outstanding· stock of said corporation, and for 
any and all sto-ck cl'aimed to have been issued bv 
said corporation to the said defendants or any o'f 
them.'' 
There are six items for .which the defendants, and all 
of them, are ordered to account. We will eonside~ each 
item of the accounting. sep'arately 'Yith relation to the 
findings, the pleadings and the proof, and will then dis-
cuss these i terns and show ·beyond all doubt that this de-
•cree for aceounting must fail, and that the judgment 
must be reversed. 
1. F'o;aFEITURE OF INSTALLMENTS. 
By the de.c.ree the defendants are ordered to account 
''for all transactions had respecting the forfeiture of 
installment sales, contracts or stocks and bonds and in-
vestment ·units of said corporation.'' 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
It is found that during the early years of the exist-
ence of the said United Bond and Finance ~Corporation, 
stocks tand ~bonds of said corporation were sold under 
installment contracts. ·· That some of the subscribers de-
faulted and the amounts paid by them were forfeited. 
Thait the a.udits p·roduced itn C our:t do not diSialose what 
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happened to the payme'nts so forfeited, and no books were 
produced from which the dis·position of said forfeited 
payments .eould be ascertained. (Finding N-o. 47) 
(lB) PLEADINGS • 
. 
There is absolutely no allegation in the complaint on 
this phase of the accounting order, nor is there any _plead-
ing whatsoever that presents any issue on these install-
ment contr.acts. . 
The audit of 1935, Exhibit_ L-3, at page 7, states as 
follows: 
'·'·Capital surplus has been created by the for-
feiture through cancell'ations of installment pay-
ments made on stock and bond subscriptions. It 
is our understanding that should a subseriber 
whose account has been so cancelled desire to com-
·plete his payments he would be permitted to do 
so and receive full credit for the amount can-
celled \\Then his subscription is paid in full.'' 
·The audit ·Of 1988, Exhibit 14, shows the amount paid 
in on installment payments of all types of stock. 
The audit of 1939, Exhibit 15, states as follows: 
"~Capital surplus of $14,819.55 shows no 
change since 19·36 except for a $25.00 adjustment 
which has been created by the forfeiture through 
cancellation of installment payments made on 
stock and bond subs.criptions. It is our under-
standing that should a subscriber whose account 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
30 
has been so cancelled desire to complete his pay-
ments he would be permitted to do so and receive 
full credit for the amount can-celled.'' 
This exhibit also dis'Closes: 
'·'Installment payments were examined with 
the individual a~ccount cards kept by the com-
pany and were reconciled therewith.'' 
These audits, and ·all of them, show very .clearly that 
in all ·cases \vhere there has been a cancellation of con-
tracts for the installment purchase of stocks that those 
i terns have been entered in the capital surplus. 
The audits certainly disclose what happened to all 
payments made on installment eontrac:ts, those· cancelled 
and forfeited as well as those still ·carried on the books 
of the company as capital liability. 
This matter was not mentioned in the .complaint and 
was first developed on the ·cross examination of Beck-
stead. (R. 1457) 
Beckstead testified in effeet that during the time the 
corporation was engaged in selling its securities a plan 
was followed whereby purchasers could purchase stocks 
and securities on .an installment pl'an. He testified that 
they kept an office card for each such purchase and as 
the money was paid the pa.ymen t \Vonld be recorded on 
the .card and that stock was not issued until the payment~ 
were completed and that a few of these a·ecounts were 
cancelled off for nonpayment. He testified also that the 
hooks and records of the company would . indicate all 
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payments n1ade on such contracts and that the corpora-
tion's records \Yould sho'v the amount of money so col-
lected on installments, those that were cancelled and 
those for 'vhich stack 'vas issued. (R. 1~57-1458) 
·This testimony is uncontradicted, unquestioned and 
unimpeached and is directly contrary to the finding of 
the Court. 
In the face of this testimony th~ Court then makes 
the further finding that no books were produced from 
whieh the disposition of said forfeited payments could 
be ascertained. 
. There is no evidence to support this finding, in fact 
the evidence is to the contrary, the books do sho\v the 
amount .and disposition of this money, and th,ey were 
in court and available for inspection by eourt and counsel. 
(D) DISCUSSION. 
There is no ~vidence in the record, and counsel for 
the plaintiffs have never -contended that there wa.s any 
evidence showing tha-t the individual defendants or the 
Livestock ~Company ever wrongfully received or diverted 
any funds ·Of the corporation resulting from these for-
feitures. The evidence heretofore referred to shows 
beyond any question of a. douht that there has been no 
diversion or eonversion of these funds by any of the 
def en dan ts. 
This evidence is uncontradicted and unquestioned, 
and we are at a loss to understand how the ·Court could 
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ni\ake this a matter of account. We say frankly to the 
·Court that no accounting whatsoever of these funds can 
be made ·except as· heretofore made, shown, and indi-cated 
by the books and records and ·audits of the corporation. 
Attention of the Court is called to the fact that the 
Court made no finding whatsoever to the effe-ct that any 
moneys received on these installment contracts had ever 
been diverted, misappropriated- or unlawfully used by 
any of the defendants. There is no allegation, proof, nor 
finding to ·support this -order to account. 
No- demand was ever made for the production or in-
spection of ·any of the .company's hooks with reference 
to these transactions ; all parties seemed to r.ely, and did 
rely upon the various audits introduced in evidence, and 
now to make this finding ·and this order of accounting 
one of the essential pillars upon which this receivership 
is supported is positively unfair and unjust, and shows 
the extent to which the Court was willing to go in order 
to find some final ·primary remedy to support the order 
appointing a receiver. 
On this first item of account we desire to particular-
ly ·call t~ ~Court's ·attention to the fact that the defend-
ants are not ordered _to account for any money or for 
any property, but are ·Ordered to a.ecount for, of all 
things, ''transactions.'' Just what form of property or 
money .these '' transa·c.tions'' ·Consist of, we .are unable to 
determine. Certainly the Court erred in making this 
order. 
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We cannot understand the finding that the audits 
produced in Court do not disclose what happened to the 
payments so forfeited, and that no books were produced 
from \vhich the disposition of said forfeited payments 
could be ascertained. This finding '"e believe .eonclu-
sively confirms the f.aet that all they are seeking is infor-
mation, and no judgment could be rendered on such basis. 
Withou.t nz.aking any sho1.uifng of money misappropriated 
or tcrongfully diverted ~or that the books and records 
of the compa;ny are inaccurate, or inadequate, the C ourl 
makes this order. It .ca'YI/YI)ot be jwstified nor supp-orted. 
To allow it to u-phold the appointm.ent of a receiver does 
- violence to every sense of justice and right. 
2. PURCHASE oF AsHTON-JENKINs INSURANCE AGENCY. 
The second item for which the defendants are 
- ordered to account is ''for the transactions involving the 
purchase of the insurance agency.'' 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
It is found that Beckstead exchanged property of the· 
< Finance ·Corporation for an assignment of an insurance 
·con tract taken in the name of B-eckstead, said contract 
being assigned to B·eckstead by the Ashton-Jenkins In-
surance :company. It is ·stated that large sums and 
am·ounts of money of the Finance iCorporation were used 
for t~is purpose. It is found in .connection with this 
.. 
··' 
,.. transaction that the ·evidence does not disclose whether 
~ 
profit was gained ·or a. loss sustained by said venture, or 
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whether an accounting was ever made to the Finance 
Corporation. (1See F'indings Nos. 17 and 47) 
(:,B) PLEADINGS. 
There is no allegation in the complaint which raises 
any issue whatS'oever upon this matter. 
· (rC) PROOF. 
The evidence disclosed (R. 1657-16158) that Beckstead 
as the manager of the United Bond and Finance ·Oorpo-
ra tion be~came in teres ted in the purchase of the Ashton-
Jenkins Insurance Agency before the agency was trans-
ferred .to Lauren W. Gibbs, and that an audit was made 
of the affairs -of the insurance company which disclosed 
that they were doing a large and prosperous insurance 
~business, and that Beckstead consulted Mr. Grut and Mr. 
Cosgriff of the Continental Bank with respect to this 
matter and was advised by them to purchase this agency 
and that the Bank was willing to make a. loan to the Fin-
ance Corporation in the am·ount of $50,000.00 for that 
purpose. Later on the United Bond and Finance Corpo-
ration pur·chased the Ashton..,Jenkins Insurance Agency 
and immediately thereafter sold and assigned it to the 
Investors Thrift Company. The Finance Corporation 
paid $12,500.00 f.or this agency. 
Exhibit Y-4 evidences the transaction. It show~ 
. 
that on N ovemher 14, 19,3:2 this .busines was assigned to 
W. R. Beckstead. It also shows that a consideration of 
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$12,500.00 wa.s paid therefor and that on the same day 
\V. R. B·eckstead assigned this business to the Thrift 
Company. The -consideration of $12,500.00 was paid 
with checks of the Finance Corporation. The Thrift 
Company paid to the Finance Corporation $14,000.00 for 
this assignment, the Finance Corporation realizing a. pr.o--
fit of $1500.00 on the deal. 
B~eckstead testified that he '\\ras -a. mediator for the 
three companies involved in the transa.ction and that was 
the reason the assignment was first taken in his own 
name. Before the purchase the Thrift Company agreed 
to pay $14,000.00 to ·the Finan-ce C·orporation for the 
agency providing the Finanee Corporation \vould pur-
chase it for $12,500.00. The Thrift Company gave $3,-
000.00 in paid up building and loan certificates in the 
Colonial Building and Loan Company of Ogden, Utah, 
which .certificates were later .cashed, and in addition the 
Thrift Company agreed to pay to the Finance ·Corpora-
tion $11,000.00 with interest at 7% to be paid in one year. 
The Thrift Company put up $20,000.00 worth of securi-
ties and pledged them with the contract of purchase to 
the Finance Corporation. Later on the $11,000.00 w.as 
paid off by the Thrift ~Company to the Finance ·Corpo-
ration. The assignm·ent \vas made to Beckstead personally 
and he had the advice of c-ounsel during the transaction. 
He never claimed any interest in the contract and did not 
personally receive .any benefit as a result of the trans-
a.ction. (R. 1561-1571 and 1167'1-1673) 
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(D) DISCUSSION-. 
This entire matter was fully explained, and the evi. 
dence conclusively established the fact that no loss or 
. detriment was suffered by the Finane~ Corporation in 
the transaction. In fact, it made a profit of $1,500.00. 
We have never understood the action for an account-
ing to be for ''transactions.'' An accounting is awarded 
where 1noney or property has been 1nisappropriated to 
his own use ·by a fiduciary and for which he has refused 
to aecount. The finding itself destroys any right which 
plaintiff has to require an accounting from the def.end· 
ants, or any of them. The finding is to the effect that 
the evidence does not disclose whether a profit "ras gained 
or a loss sustained by said venture or whether an accDunt-
ing was ever made to the Finance Corporation. 
An aecounting is never ordered unless it be necessary 
to disclose facts not other\\rise available. A finding that 
the evidence does not show whether or not an account-
ing was ever made is in effect a finding that the plaintiffs 
have not sustained the burden of proof "rhich rests upon 
them to show that they were entitled to an ac-counting 
order. 
Appellants' testimony that the books of the Finance 
Corporation .contained a con1plete record of this trans-
action was not disputed or questioned. If that is true 
the books themselves will show whether or not a profit 
or loss ·was sustained, and for this. reason as "rell as 
others this accounting order is c.learly ·erroneous. Even 
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though it should appe.ar fron1 the said books tha.t a. loss 
was sustained there "\Vould ~be no occasion for an account-
ing, proof ·Of loss is no part of an action for an account-
ing. \V e submit that the findings do not sustain an order 
of accounting on this gTound. It is not supported by any 
evidence introduced in this cause and as heretofore 
pointed <>ut there is not one "\vord in the pleadings about 
·- this subject. 
. 
~ 
,. 
There never was even the slightest intimation raised 
that Beckstead qerived any personal gain whatsoever as 
a result of this purchase. There never was any proof 
that he diverted or misappropriated any of the property 
of the United Bond and Finance Corporation to his own 
us~ by reason of these transactions. 
There is no matter concerned with this transaction 
which in any way involves an equitable accounting, there 
is neither allegation nor proof to the effect that there 
is any balance· due to the -corporation or to these plain-
tiffs from the individual defendants resulting from the 
purchase and sale of this insurance agency. Nothing is 
sought by this order ·of accounting ex-cept information,. 
and the lack of information has never been considered 
grounds for an equitable accounting. No demand was 
ever mad~ upon the United B·ond and Finance Corpora-
tion, .or any of its officers, either before the commence-
ment of this action, in the -complaint, or during trial, for 
information concerning this transaction th.a t was not 
readily given either by oral testimony or from th-e hooks 
of the company. No question was ever raised with re-
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speet fo the accuracy or adequacy of the books and ree-
ords of the corporation wherein theg.e trans.actions are 
recorded. 
The Court refused to find that any information had 
ever been withheld from any of the plaintiffs or any other 
stockholder of the United Bond and Finance ·c:orporation. 
3. PuRCHASE OF ~CoNTROLLTING 8TOCK IN AsHTON-
JENKINs CoMPANY. 
The third i tern for which the Court orders the de-
fendants to account is ''for the transactions involving 
the purchase of the controlling stock of Edward E·. J en-
kins in the Ashton-Jenkins Company.'' 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT . 
. Tn this eonneetion it is found that Be·ekstead traded 
and exchanged property owned by the Finance Corpora-
tion, including a ranch ne.ar Ogden, U tRh, to one, Edward 
E. Jenkins, for stock owned by said Jenkins in a corpo-
ration known as Ashton-~J enkins Company, which said 
stock represented the controlling stock in said corpora-
tion, and that thereupon Beckstead became an officer 
tand manager of the said Ashton-Jenkins Company, and 
it is found that the evidence does. not disclose. whether 
a profit was gained or a loss sustained by said venture, 
or whether an aooounting was made to the Finance 
Corporation. It is further found that the purchase of 
said stock in the Ashton-·Jenkins Comp'any wa.s made at 
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~ a time when said latter compa.ny was In financial dif-
~~~· nculties. (Findings Nos. 16 and 47) 
(13) PLEADINGS. 
·,_ There are no allegations in the complaint which pre-
- sent any issue whatsoever on this matter. It is not men-
tioned or suggested by any pleading within the judgment 
r~ roll. 
(C) PROOF. 
The undisputed evidence is that the only property 
-- which \Yas transferred to Jenkins was this ranch. (R. 
r. 1666) 
This transaction was gone into in detail by counsel 
for the plaintiffs and we believe that the following is a. 
fair statement .of the testimony given on this suhject. 
The Finance Corporation traded a ran.ch in ~Ogden, 
"' Utah, to Edward E·. Jenkins for the controlling sto-ck 
interest owned by him in the Ashton-Jenkins Company. 
(IR. 1653) Thereafter, Beckstead had an audit made of 
, ___ the said company and it was discovered that ·there was 
·a deficit in the E·quitable Dif.e Assurance ·Society ac-
counts ·and to pr,ivate investors and mortgage pur-
chasers. This whole transa:ction was rescinded in the 
- spring of 1933 and the United Bond and Finance ·Corpo-
fi ration received back the ran.ch. ('R. 1563-15·67, 16-6-6) 
The testimony discloses that this rescission was 
tf worked out as follows: Mos~ Miller bought _a. home in 
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Normandy Heights with a $7,500.00 mortgage on it. He 
gave J. H. Backman the money to pay this and Backman 
took the money to the Ashton--Jenkins ·Company and paid 
the mortgage off. The Pacifi,c N a.tional Life held this 
mortgage and the Ashton-Jenkins Company_ kept paying 
the interest and othe~ requirements payable on the mort-
gage and never did release it. Miller thpught that the 
mortgage was paid off and the Pacific National Life In-
surance c·ompany thought that the mortgage was still 
in existence. This matter came up at the time of the 
above audit and was one .of the irregularities discovered 
by Beckstead. Miller through an attorney threatened 
J.~nJrins with taking this before the county attorney and 
so Jenkins came to Beckstead and said he would rescind 
the transaction relating to the a·cquisi tion of the Ashton-
Jenkins stock with the unders'tanding that the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation would place a mortgage 
of $5,000.00· on the Ogden ranch and give Miller a third 
mortgage on the Crestholme Apartn1ents for $2,500.00 
and. in consideration Jenkins would credit the second 
mortgage which he held on the Crestholme with $7,500.-
00. The Finan·ce Corporation was paying 81Jt% interes·t 
on this second mortgage. The mortgage to the Pacific 
National Life Insurance C·ompany on the Ogden ranch 
and .the third mortgage to Miller carried 6% interest. 
(R. 16,67) 
. This is the only evidence on this subje·ct, and henre 
the evidence discloses that a res-cission of the whole 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
transaction \\·as effected and that the company suffered 
t~ no loss or detriment because -of this exchange. (R. 1670) 
~~ As to the finding that the evidence does not disclose 
whether an accounting 'Yas made to the Finance ·Corpo-
ration \Ye submit that the above evidence shows that the 
transaction "~as rescinded, and it does n-ot appear that 
an accounting was necessary. As far as the evidence 
_ goes there is nothing to account for now, and as hereto-
- fore suggested even a showing of loss would not justify 
~ or require an accounting. The finding that the evi-
r dence did not disclose whether or not an account-
· ... · 
ing was made to the Finanoe C-orporation ·~s tanta-
mount to finding that the pl~intiffs did not sustain 
·-- the burden of proof which was upon them to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that an accounting 
--- should be had. No mention was made of this stock trans-
action in the complaint. It was first brought into the 
case by questions addressed to B-eckstead on cross ex-
gi • 
am1nation ot after plaintiffs had rested. There was no 
~ showing or suggesti!on made that any evidence or testi-
~~ mony was ·being wi.thheld and every request for facts or 
1 { 
Jli. information was complied with and the_ t~stimony was 
that the hooks of the company contained a complete rec-
~· ord of this transaction. The Court also found that the 
a: purchase of this stock was made at a time when the 
Ashton-Jenkins Comp~ny was in financial dl.ffi~ulty. W-e 
cannot prophesy what couns-el for plaintiff w.ill contend 
for this finding. The evidence dis_closed with certainty 
that Beckstead entered into the transaction in good faith 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
42 
and that it was upon a subsequent audit that the irreg-
ularities were discovered and immediately thereafter a 
rescission of the tr'ansaction was effected. 
The Court evidently had a private opinion with re-
spect to this rna tter as is indica ted by the proceedings 
s'et forth on pages 1657 -165'8 'Of the record. Appellants' 
counsel was examining Beckstead with respect to the 
payment for the audit of the affairs of the Ashton-Jen-
kins 'Company made by Beesley and Wood. The Court 
interrupted and on his ·Own moti·on ·examined Beckstead 
as follows: 
'''Q. You knew .at the time that·you made 
that transaction that Ashton-Jenkins was very 
shakey, just on the verge of receivership~ 
A. I can answer it this 'vay. That before 
that time B'eesley and Wood made a certified audit 
of the brokerage business of the Ashton-.J enkins 
Company and 'l took this matter up with Mr. Joe 
Grut of the C'ontinental National Bank and Mr. 
·Cosgriff and they advised me to buy that broker-
age business and make a loan to the United Bond 
and Finance ·Corporation for $50,-000.00. That 
they were going to pay for this brokerage busi-
ness of Ashton-J·enkins Company. 
The Court: I asked you ahout the Ashton-
Jenkins Company and not the Ashton-Jenkins 
Insurance Oompany. 
A. W eH I was going to say this, that due 
to that audit I believed that the Ashton-Jenkins 
:C'ompany was in pretty good sha·pe. '' 
At page 1659 of the record Beckstead testified in 
effect that bef·ore he purchas·ed the controlling int~erest 
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~ in the Ashton-Jenkins ,C·ompany he had a eonversation 
with Mr. Grut and Mr. Cosgriff of the ·Continental Na-
tional Bank, and that they thought it \vould 1be a good 
- buy and adYised him to buy it. These transactions took 
place in the fall iof 1932~eig·ht years prior to the com-
mencement of this lR\Y suit. 
(D) DISCUSSION. 
i", 
Exactly the same finding was made in connection 
J~ 
.r.. with this matter as was made \vith r·elation to the insur-
ance business, and we submit that the argument made 
_ above with relation to the finding applies t.o this item of 
- accounting. Here again the finding upon which this item 
- of account is based wholly disregards the proof which 
- was to the effect the transaction was rescinded and tha.t 
_ the corporation lost nothing. This evidence has also 
- been heretofore pointed out. 
We submit to the ~Court that the findings do not sup-
' port an order of accounting ·On this item. The proof 
-· completely and thoroughly goes into the transa·c:tion and 
again not one word is said with respect to this rna tter in 
-
the pleadings. 
Again it should be n·oted that the defendants are not 
ordered to aecount for any property or any money, but 
are ordered to account f~or ''transactions.'' The only 
!~ ·evidence with resp.eClt thereto wa·s elicited from W. R. 
B·ecks1tead ·On ·cross and re-direct examination. No evi-
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dence with res.pect to this was introduced on the main 
case of the plaintiffs, and when Mr. Be-ckstead was asked 
about this matter he related the details fully, and from 
his evidence it conclusively appears that he did not per-
sonally benefit fr,om this transa,ction in any way; that 
the defendant United ·Bond and Finance C·orporation 
suffered no detriment from said purchase. As we have 
said on other items heretofore m·entioned, what more 
accounting ean be rendered with respect to this trans-
a-ction than was made during the trial of this cas-e~ A 
full statement was made concerning it, and it was further 
testifi·ed that the books of the company refle-cted the en-
tire transaction. 
Plaintiffs did not show enough interest during the 
trial of this case to ask that the books of the ·Company be 
produced showing . this transaction. Again there has 
been no demand for an ·a.ccounting, and there is no evi-
evidence that if there should be an accounting any bal-
ance could possibly be round owing to the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation. No money was ever involved, 
property was traded for stock, and later the deai res-
cinded and the identical property returned to the cor-
poration. 
Furthermore, how or in what manner could a re-
ceiver be of aid or benefit to the ·Corporation, its stock-
holders or these plaintiffs in this rna tter? 
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4. ll~VEST::\IEXTS IN ,,.,.YOMING RANCH PROPERTY AND 
BECKSTEAD LivESTOCI{ CoMPANY. 
The fourth item for 'vhich the defendants are ordered 
to account is '{for all transa.ctions and m·oney advanced 
to Beckstead Livestoek Company.'' 
In setting forth the findings upon which this order 
is based it will be necessary to set forth the findings on 
- the "Thole subject of investments in Wyoming property 
- and the Beckstead Livestock Company. 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In this connection it is found that in furtherence of 
the scheme of gaining control and ownership of the as-
~ sets of the ~nited Bond and Finance c.orporation Beck-
13 stead traded assets of that corporation for ran.che-s and 
-·~~ property in \\T yoming and caused the deed and: hill of 
sale to be made and delivered to him, and that said deed 
was placed of record June 5, 19'35, and the property 
·· stood of record in the name of Beckstead until April 19, 
... 1938. On th·at date Beckstead caused to be organized 
... the Beckstead Livesto0k Company, and he, Evans and 
Benjamin L. Rich, were made directors of said company, 
the capital of $50,000.00, \\Tas represented by 50,000 shares 
of stock at $1.00 par value per share. One share each was 
issued to Evans and Rich and 49,998 to Be.ckstead, all 
~ without consideration. All .of thes·e shares were then 
~; returned to the Beckstead Livestoc~ Company and they 
were then all issueq to the United Bond and Finance 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
Corporation. It was then found that the said Livestock 
Company is dominated and controll·ed by Beckste:ad. On 
April 19, 19·38, a deed from Becks·tead and his wife to the 
Livestock Company was placed of record conveying all 
of said Wyoming property to 'the said Livestock Com-
pany. It is fuund that Beckstead cla.i~med and asserted 
that said Wyoming properties were his own and were 
being handled and developed for his own personal use 
and benefit. It is then found that large sums and amounts 
of money of the United B,ond and Finance Corporation 
have been invested in the Becks1tead Livestock Company. 
That other properties of the said corporation have been 
ex1changed for property now in the name of the said 
Livestock Company, and the amount invested being in 
ex·cess of $70,000.00. To finance the opera.ti~on of the 
Beckstead Livestock Company sums and amounts of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation have been loaned 
to the Livestock Company, the principal of which is in ex-
cess of $28,000.00, and which is owing and unpaid to the 
said United Bond and Finance C~orporation. The find-
ing is made that Beckstead used the assets of the said 
Rinance C'orporation as his own, and that he is person-
ally interested in ranches. It is found that no proper 
books were kept between these t\vo eompanies until after 
the incorporation of the Livestock Company, and that 
a1ccording to the 1939 audit the Finance Corporation held 
a note for $28,000.00 of the L~ivesto·ok Co~mpany, and that 
on the witness s'tand B·eckstead and Evans were uncer-
tain as to whether this $28,000.00 represented the total 
indebtedness. It is found that the funds ~of the two com· 
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- panies have been coming·led, and the income of the Fin-
ance Corporation has been used to pay the expenses of 
- the ranches, and that the ""ool and lamb crop of the 
Livestock Company have been used to pay taxes and 
other obligations of the Finance Corporation, and that 
because of the jumbling of the a~.eounts it .cannot be as-
~ certained whether the Finance ~Corporation or the Live-
stock Company are being operated at a profit or a loss. 
.. Findings are made that the stock certificates and stubs 
covering the original issue of stock are missing from the 
stock books of the Livestock Company. It was found that 
at the time of the order to show cause all of the stock 
stood in the na·me of the Finance Corporation, and that 
there were no directors. who had qualifying shares, and 
that between then and the trial three qualifying shares 
~ were transferred to Beckste-ad and his associates with-
out consideration, and that they were then surrendered 
back to the United Bond and Finance Corporation. (:See 
__ Findings Nos. 18, 23, 24 and 47) 
(B) PLEADINGS. 
It is alleged that the Finance Corporation entered 
into a contract with Marks for the purchase of Wyoming 
property, and that said corporation turned over about 
$50,000.00 for this purpose. That Beckstead to1ok title 
to tne Wyoming property so a;cquired and entered into 
possession and appropriated it to his ow1'1.A use, a;nd has 
~ failed to accownt therefor. It is further alleged that to 
1 prote·ct himself in said fraudulent acts and to place the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
48 
assets of the Finance 'Corporation beyond the reach of 
the stockholders, Beckstead incorporated in Wyoming 
the Beckstead Livestock Company, and took all of the 
50,000 shares of stock, and now claims all of these shares 
as his own ·exeept dire·c.tor qualifying shares. It is al-
leged that all ·Of the Wyoming property was transferred 
.to the Beckst~ad Livestock c·ompany and the assets of 
the Finance Corporation were used to purchase further 
Wyo·ming ranches, title to which was taken in the name 
of the Livestock ·Company or of Beckstead. It is als·o 
·alleged that B·eckstea.d received the shares of stock in 
the ,Livesto1ck Company ~in consideration of .the property 
of the Finance Corporation, and that t~ey are now being 
held subject to being negotiated beyond the reach of the 
Finan-ce <;.;orporation. 
B·eckstead testified that he took the title to the 
Wyoming property in his own name f.or. t~e reason that 
the Finance Corporation was not qualified to do business 
in Wyoming, and he did not care to domesticate that cor-
poration in Wyoming. On the witness stand he stated 
that he took title as a trustee; that his attitude at all 
tim·es was that all qf this property belonged to the Fin-
ance Corporation, and that he never had any intention 
of appropriating any of it to his -own use or benefit. He 
stated that he never did claim any of this property to 
be his, and that he had always recognized it as being 
property of th~ Finan-ce· Corporation. He stated that 
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:~he may haYe spoken of the raneh as "my ranch'' but it 
l was not 'Yi th any intent to confiscate it. ( R. 1390-1391) 
l 
It is submitted that the overwhehning weight of the 
~ 
evidence corroborates this testimony of Beckstead, and 
· that the· finding made by the Court that Beckstead 
~ claimed or asserted title to this property cannot be sus-
.:: tained in equity and good conscien-ce upon any theory 
or premise. 
'V e will atte1npt to point out wherein the evidence 
~ eorr~oborative of Mr. Beckstead is so conclusive that this 
~ finding of .assert~ion of t-itle must be disregarded. 
From Beckstead's testimony it app-ears that immedi-
- ately after the purchase of. the Wyoming property, be 
and his wife made a deed and bill of sale t.o the Finance 
Corporation conveying all of said Wyoming property to 
the Finance :Corporation. This deed was kept in the 
files of the company and upon incorporation of the Reek-
stead Livestock Comp,any a new deed was ma:de and 
~ executed .by Be-ckstead· and his wife conveying title to 
this property to th~ Beckstead Livestock Company, all 
~ of whose .capita~! stock w.as and is owned by the F~inance 
li Corporation. 
The audits corroborate this testimony of B-eckstead. 
~ In the audit of 19"35, E~ibit L:-3, is found the following 
at p·age 5: 
''The Loan Tree Ranch property is registered 
in the name of W. R. Be·ckstead on the tax notices 
from the Treasurer of Uinta 1County, Wyoming. 
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There is on file, however, in the office -of the com-
pany ·an unrecorded warranty deed dated Mav 
218, 1935, .eovering this property, from W. R. 
Beckstead and Stella Beckstead, his wife, to the 
United ·Bond and F'inance Corporation. Assign-
ments to the company of the Federal Fa:flm Lnan 
and Union Telephone Company stock and bills of 
sale f.or the livestock and equipment from ~Ir. 
Beckstead and his wife are a~lso on file.'' 
The next audit is the aud~t of 1938, Exhibit 14. On 
page 3 is found the ~oll·owing: 
',,'On April 18, 1938, a corporation known as 
Be,ekstead Livestock Company was organized un-
der the laws of the State of Wyoming. Certain 
assets and liabilities carried on the books of the 
United B·ond and F'inance ,c·orporation, and ha.v-
·ing a net hook value of $54,938.54, were exchanged 
for the entire -capitol stock of the Wyoming cor-
pora ti~on. This s.tock has been indorsed in full 
to the United .Bond and Finance Corporation and 
stock certific:a tes have been examined by us as 
well as articles of incorporation, assignments and 
other documents necessary to the consun1mation 
of this deal.'' 
The 19·3'9 audit, Exhibit 15, at page 3 states as fol-
lows: 
''The company held at date of balanc.e sheet 
the ·entire issue of capital stock of the Beckstead 
Livestock Company, a Wyoming ·corporation, as 
evidenced by ce.rtifica te N·o. 6 issued under date 
of March 29, 19·39-, in the name of the United Bonrl 
and Finance ~Corporation. 
''As payment for this stock certain ranch 
properties, together with livestock and equipment 
thereon, were transferred to . the Beckstead Live-
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stock Company by proper .conveyances at book 
values, as sho,vn by United B·ond and Finance 
Corporation records, of $54,129.77, as indica ted 
in the S·chedule above.'' 
:~ Then follows a balance sheet of the Beckstead Live-
.,., 
: stock Company. 
~: 
)!r. Wood on the "~itness stand confirmed the state-
ments made in the two audits made by him in Exhibits 
L-3 and 15. ( R. 1234) 
Exhibit 27 furnishes further documentary proof cor-
- roborating Mr. Beckstead and destroying any evidence 
which supports the findings here being discussed. This 
exhibit consists of the statements of financial .condition 
- mailed to the stockholders each year from 1933-1938, in-
- elusive. The Wyoming property it will be recalled was 
--
[ purchased in 193'5. The statement for that year lists as 
assets of the Finance· C-orporation, ranch property and 
:: ranch livestock, equipment and supplies. The statements 
for 1936 and 1937 also list this same property as assets 
· of the corporation. It will be recalled that in 19·38 the 
B·eckstead Livestock Company was incorporated. There-
fore in the statement for 1938 sent to the stockholders 
the Wyoming property does not appear as r.anc.h prop-
erty and livestock but appears a.s an asset of the cor-
poration in an invest1nent account called '''bonds and 
stocks,'' this being the stock ·of the Beckstead Livestock 
Company which was held at that time as an as'set of the 
Finance Corporation. 
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At R. 1689 Beckstead \Yas asked as to why the state-
ment for 1'938 did not contain a reference to ranch prop-
erty, and he stated· that after the org-anization of the 
Beckstead Livestock C·ompany the Finance Corporation 
owned the Livestock Company stock and not 'the ranch 
and for that reas-on the Wyo1ning- property had been put 
1n the ''stocks and bonds'' invest·m·ent account. 
The statem·ents, Exhibit 27, for the years 19:35, 1936 
and 19·37, \Yere sho'\vn to Mr. Beckstead and he identified 
the reference therein to the ranch property a.s the \Vyo-
ming property. purchaS'ed by the corporation. (R. 1693 
et seq.) 
Mr. Beckstead is further corroborated by the testi-
mony of A. Ezra Gull, commencing at R. 702, '\vherein 
Mr. Gull stated that he had a number of .eonversations 
with Mr. Beckstead regarding the Wyoming prop-erty, 
and that he asked him about the purchase of this prop-
·erty .from Mr. Marks in Wyoming. Mr. B-eckstead ac-
knowledged the deal and Gull asked hin1 whether or not 
this '\Vas a 'vise d·eal and Mr. Beckstead ·stated that he 
thought ~that it ''Tas. Gull asked Beckstead if the prop-
erty belonged to the Finance Corporation and B·e·ckstead 
said that it did. This conversation according to Gull 
took place in May or June of 19:35. About six weeks 
after th.is Mr. Gull again talked with Mr. B1eckst.ead 
and told him that their best information w:as that the 
property was ·not in the na1ne of the Finance Corpora-
tion, and ·Gull asked hi·m in whos·e name this property 
was. Beckstead stated that it was in his own personal 
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not chartered to do business in the State of Wyoming; 
that for it to hold title to pr·operty '"'ould ·be in violation 
of the \Y·~·oming laws, and for that reason he had re-
corded the property in his own name and had then prop-
erly deeded it to the Finance C·orpora.tion, and those 
deeds were in. the files of the .corporation and at the 
pr9per time would be recorded. (R·. 705-706) 
Mr. Beckstead testified that his father before him 
had been in the livestock business and that he· himself 
had worked with livestock a large part of his J,ife~ and 
that he wa.s familiar with the L·oan Tree Country in 
Uinta County from his father's operations there, or near 
there. This showed :Thfr. Beckstead's qualification for 
managing this business. (R. 1384-1385) 
Starting at R. 1386 Beckstead told the reasons for 
his purchase of this Wyoming property. He stated tha.t 
some of the corporation's property was not paying very 
W·ell and that it had some building and loan certificates 
which were fully paid but could not be then liquid,ated 
without a large discount, that the corporation had a 
mortgage on property in the south end of Salt Lake 
County that \Yas not paying and other property that 
wasn't yielding :any in.come, and this property was ex-
changed for the Marks Ranch, including 2HO head of cat-
tle and other personal property. Mr. Beckstead stated 
that he thought a good trade or exchange had been made 
by the Fina.11ee Corporation., At R. 139·2 Be-ckstead 
testified that he ·Considered the Marks ranch worth a lot 
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more than had been paid for it and said that he had had 
several offers to sell it a~d the Finance ·Corporation eould 
have made about $10,000.00 profit on its sale. It is 
significant to note at this point that plaintiffs made no 
effort whatsoever to. pr.ove that the ranch property in 
Wyoming together with the l~ivestock operated in con-
nection therewith was worth less than the .eonsiderati<>n 
paid. Mr. Beckstead stated that he thought it was a good 
venture and pointed out that p-revious to the time this 
was p~urchased in 19·35 the government had gone into 
the mortgage loan business and the Finance Corporation 
was forced to find som·e other business field to enter for 
the reason that the Finance Corporation could not loan 
its money on mortgages and that this ranch investment 
appeared to be a good husiness venture. (R. 139·3) 
The Court finds that on the witness stand B·eckstead 
and Evans were uncertain a.s to 'vhether the $'28,000.00 
indebtedness indicated by the 1939 ~audit was the total 
indebtedness of the Livestock C'ompany to the Finance 
~Corporation. We are unable to find any such statement 
by either Beckstead or Evans in the transcript. 
At R. 1631 Mr. Be·ekstead 's attention was called to 
this $28,000.00 item and w1as asked whether or not that 
wasn't the note that was owing to the Finance Corpora-
tion by the Livestock Company. Mr. Beckstead said 
that he did not know whether that represented one note 
or s;everal notes, and then stated that he didn't see how 
he could testify about the financial statement or some-
I I I 
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thing he hadn't seen, and Mr. Adair agreed with him and 
said: ''I 'vill ask ~lr. Evans about this." 
Mr. Beekstead then stated that :this $28,000.00 item 
included advances and ex.penses that the Fina,nce C·or-
poration paid for and on behalf of the Livestock Cnm-
pany. This item also includes money \advanced for 
capital investment in very substantial amounts. 
The very audit which counsel for plaintiffs showed 
Mr. Beckstead indi!cated that accurate records were being 
kept. Counsel at no time asked that these records be 
produced, but seemed to be satisfied with the response of 
Mr. Beckstead. 
It was found that because of the jumbling .of ac-
counts it could not be ascertained whether th-e F'inance 
Corporation or the Livestock Company are being oper-
ated at a profit or loss. Counsel f.or the plaintiffs re-
quested a profit and loss statement of the Beckstead 
Livestock Company for the year 1939. This was furnished 
to him in very c.oncrete form and exact terms by Exhibit 
38. This exhibit is explained commen,cing with R. 1713. 
We again eall the Court's attention to audits and 
other ·exhibits introduced in evidence from which it ap-
pears that ·Complete and eJract records were kept with 
respect to items of profit and loss and all other items con-
~erning the Finance Corpor:ation and the Livestock Com-
pany. 
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(D) DISCUSSION. 
In p-resenting this fourth item of accounting we have 
discuss-ed fully the findings, the allegations and the proof, 
~-ealizing that many of these matters are perhaps but 
incidental to the a:e:counting order made by the Court for 
the reason that a large part of the trial was devoted to 
this particular phase of the case and !or the further rea-
son that the whole of the transactions involved in the pur-
eha·S·e amd operation of the Beckstead Livestock Company 
involves transactions as between these two corporations. 
The ultimate thing which the Court found with re-
spect to these rna tters was that all of the Wyoming prop-
erties that were pur·cha!sed with Finance Corporation 
assets now rest in the Beckstead Live·stock Compooy, and 
all of the stock of that eompany is now owned by the 
Fiinance c·orporation. Certainly this finding is contrary 
to the allegations of plaintiffs' complaint. 
Apparently the eriticism that the Court has reg-
istered o;n this Wyoming~situation is that funds and assets 
of the Finance Corporation have b~en used by the Live-
stock Company, and that he ·could not determine just 
exactly how much \vas due from the Livestock Company 
to the Finance Corporation, and therefore he wants an 
accounting as between the Finance ~Corporation and .ib 
wholly owned subsidiary. This matter upon which the 
Court bases the decree _for an accounting by the Livestock 
Company is not made an issu·e by the complaint and then\ 
is absolutely no allegation upon said subje·ct. 
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We .submit that the finding of the Court that Beck-
stead and Evans were uncertain as to whether the $28,-
000.00 indebtedness indicated by the 193'9 audit was the 
total indebtedness of the Livestock ·C·ompany to the Fin-
ance Corporation is not supported by the evidence. In 
·any event the fact, if it be a fact, that Beckstead and 
E·vans while on the \Yitness . stand without the re·cords 
before them were uncertain as to the exact amount of the 
indebtedness !Certainly is of no materiality in this case 
as long as the books a.nd records of these companies were 
certain and accura t~ in this regard, and the evidence is 
that they were. 
·One of the most surpr1s1ng findings made by the· 
Court was that no prop.er books were kept petween these 
bwo eompanies until after the incorporation of the Live-
stock ·Company. Just how proper books could he kept 
as between these companies before there were two com-
panies we wil.l l~t counsel explain. The audits introduced 
in evidence and the m·any exhibit)s indicate that the Fin-
ance ·Corporation before the incorporation of the Live...; 
stock Company kept accurate records o.f the ran·ch oper-
ations. Undroubtedly there were .separate accounts as 
to these ranch operations as indicated by the ·~xh'ibits 
and audits. Any que·stion tha.t counsel desired to ask 
in connection with the records was promptly answered 
and records furnished and offered to him during the 
course of this trial. 
Mr: Evans was asked ·on cross examination whether 
or not he had a .sheet showing what the Loan Tree Ranch 
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operation had cost, what had been paid out on the- oper-
ation, and what had been received from it since it was 
acquired 'by Beckstea~d, the Livestock Company or the 
Finance Corp1oration. Mr. ~Evans replied that he had 
not prepared a sheet along that line in regard to the 
Livestock Company but he stated that the books showed 
these items.· He was then asked if it would be much of 
a job to get tha:t information and get it to counsel, and 
he said he did not know. l-Ie had all the records with him. 
(R. 1727) 
The finding in this .case is that no proper boo~s were 
kept; that the accounts w·ere jumbled. Not that any 
money w.as appropriated or misappropriated. What plain-
tiffs' counsel wanted was~ some information. AU they 
asked for was .furnished, and neither they nor the Court 
apparently understood the evidenee. No judgment could 
possibly be rendered on this item of account reg·ardless 
of the accounting or lack of accounting. 
Again we ·suggest that appelloants should not be 
penalized either because respondents or the Court or 
counsel had failed to appreciate and understand the evi-
dence produced or have been disinclined to take advan-
tage ·of offers made in good faith to produce books, rec-
ords and accounts which would ~supply the information 
required by this order. 
No demand wa.s made either p.rior t~o the commenc.e-
ment of this action, in the complaint, or during the trial, 
that information :be given or produ~ced in 1Cnurt concern-
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ing the intercorporate transactions of the Finan·ce Cor-
poration ·and the Livestock Company. 
If it should appear upon an accounting that the Live-
stock 1Company is indebted to the corporati,on would the 
Court enter judgment in favor of the United Bond and 
Finance ·Corporation against the Beckstead Livestock 
Company for ·any halan:ce found d·ue, and if S10 would the 
receiver then lev·y execution upon the property o.f the 
Beckstead Livestock 1Company and isell- it at sheriff's 
sale in .satisfaction of any judgment rendered~ 
The mere statement of this question shows the ab-
solute absurdity of this item 'Of accounting. Here again 
there is no pleading, no proof, no finding that Beckstead 
or any of the other individual defendants benefited by 
these transactions, or that they have now or ever have 
had any of this money •or prop.erty or ''transactions'' 
in their possession and have at any time diverted and 
dissipated the sam~ to their own use. 
The Court also makes a finding that the obtaining of 
the Wyoming property ·by Be.ckstead was in furtherance 
of the scheme of gaining control and ·ownership of the 
assets of the Finance ·C·orporation. The findings them-
selves destroy a.ny ·such inference or ·conclusion. The 
property was purchased with eo.rporate ,assets. The 
Court ·fiound that the property was taken in Beckstead'~ 
name and was later transferred to the Beckstead Live-
stock ·Company; that the Finance Corporation holds all 
of the stock issued by that company. 
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Just how this is in furtherance of a scheme to gain 
personal ·contr,ol and ownership of as-sets we leave to 
res·pondents' counsel for e~planation. 
The Court made the finding· that Beckstead used 
the assets of the Finance Corporation as his own, 
and that he 1s personally interested 1n ranches. 
How thi-s latter eould support an order appointing are-
-eeiver or for an accounting is not apparent. How or 
wherein Beckstead used the assets as his own is not dis-
.closed or explained by the findings, and there is no evi-
dence that he did use these assets as his own. It must 
he remembered that Mr. Beckstead was the general man-
ager of the Finance ICQrporati·on and the Livestock Com-
pany. In his judgment the pur.chase of this Wyoming 
.property was a good investment, as he stated on anum-
ber of occasions during the time he was on the wit-
ne~ss stand and there is nothing in the evidence to show 
either that his judgment was not good or that he acted 
in had faith. There is no evidence that he appropriated 
any of the corporate assets to his own use. The most 
that ·can be claimed from the evidence is that Beckstead 
managed the assets of the corporation, as any general 
manager would do. We submit that a. finding that he 
used these assets as his own cannot be sustained if by 
that is n1eant misappropriation, wrongful diversion, em· 
bezzlement or lar~ceny. The finding that Beckstead is 
personally interested in ranches is undoubtedly based 
on something that .counsel tried on a number of occasions 
to get in the record, that is, that these ranches were a 
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hobbv of Beckstead. Judge ~Schiller, eYidently influ-
tl 
enced by counsel's repeated reference to the ranch ven-
ture as a hobby, states in his decisi,on that W. R. 'Beck-
stead was interested in ranching~ as a hobby. 
'V e refer the Court to ~- 1620, vvherein on cross 
examination of ~Ir. Youngberg, plaintiffs' counsel 
brought out the faet that ~I r. Beekstead spent better than 
half his time at the ranch and that Beckstead \Yas in-
terested in these cattle and this ranch. He then asked 
Youngberg if it was not quite a hobby with Beckstead 
and YDungberg's reply \Yas: "I dron't know it is a hobby; 
it is business.'' 
If Beckstead \vere not interested in these ranches 
and in the welfare of the livestock he "\Yould not be per-
forming his duty as a director. -\Ve sincerely hope 'that 
counsel, because of this interest indicated by Beckstead, 
will not ~claim that he is '~yrongfuily interested in the wel-
fare of this very important investment of the Finance 
Oorpora tion. 
The records and exhibits show that the company now 
operates four ranches in Uinta ~County, Wyoming. That 
in addition to the ranches the company has a. large 
amount of leased gra~ing grounds, important Taylor 
Grazing rights and sun1mer grazing permits ron the Na-
tional F·orest·for 2,000 head of sheep. That the ranches 
are stocked "71th 2,000 high grade sheep and approximate-
ly 350 head of pure bred and high grade Hereford cattle, 
and that the entire indebtedness on this large enterprise 
is less than $14,000.00. 
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W·e feel that the ~Court should take judicial knowl-
edge of the fact that the livestock industry is now com-
ing into a period of splendid prosperity; that wool, lambs 
and beef are commanding what might be termed high 
and exorbitant prices on the market, and that the fore-
sight and wisdom of Beckstead in investing the as·sets 
and money of the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
in this business is now fully shovvn and his judgment 
justified. There is no justification here for accounting or 
reeei ver.ship. 
5. PuRCHASE OF THE ·OuTSTANDING SToCK OF THE 
UNITED BoND AND FINANCE 1C0RPORATION. 
In the fifth i tern of the aecoun ting order the defend-
ants, ·and each of them, are ordered to account' within 
thirty days for ''all money and property of said corpo-
ration used by the defendant, W. R. Beckstead and his 
as'sociates in the a·cquisitiron of any outstanding stock of 
said corporation.'' 
(A) FINDINGs oF FA.cT. 
From a reading of the findings of fact it vvould ap-
pear that the pur·chase of the outstanding stock of the 
United Bond and Finance ·Corporation by the said oor-
pora tion is the main thing that the C:ourt found wrong 
about the ·conduct of its affairs. It appears in the find-
ings time and time again that the purchase of this out-
standing stock was a part of a plan or scheme of Beck-
stead to acquire domination and control .of the ·corpora-
tion and its assets. It appears from the findings that 
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from 1931 to the filing of the ·eompl·aint in this action 
that Beckstead ha·s caused the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation to enter into a plan and scheme to use its 
assets in order to acquire its outstanding stock, and that 
substant~ally all of its voting stock "\Vas thereby acquired. 
It is further found that in this manner Beck·stead ac-
quired all the assets of the corporation ''through the 
use .of'' ·and for the benefit of the stock o'vned and con-
trolled by him. That to .further this plan in which Beck-
stead was to increase his domination and ultimately take 
over the corporate assets, B·eckstead with the a.s·sistance 
of t'he other two directors, Evans and ~Spils bury, has 
used the earning~s and assets of th~ United Bond and 
Finance ·Corporation which has been ac0umulated for 
the payment of dividends, the amount used being ·up-
wards of $85,000.00, in purchasing the said outstanding 
stock of the said corporation. It is further found that 
he has paid this amount to .stockholders and has acquired 
therewith upwards ·Of $211,000.00 of outstanding stock. 
The use of this money and property is described as dis-
·sipation, diversion, etc., and Beckstead's purpose is de-
.g.cribed as that ·of freezing out the stockholders. It is 
also found in this ·connection that this stock has not been 
cancelled ·On the books of the ,company and remains in-
dorsed in blank under the ·control of the defendants. 
(Findings Nos. 11, 14, 19', ·22, 3i2 and 36) 
(B-) PLEADINGS. 
The oniy specific allegation in the entire complaint 
wherein it i~s alleged that any corporate assets were used 
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for the purpose of purchasing the outstanding stock 
'Of the corporation is contained in the second paragraph 
of paragraph ( 10), wherein it is alleged that the pur-
pose of the defendants has been to divert and convert 
the assets and income of . said ·corporation to their own 
use, and among other schemHs used to accomplish said 
purp:ose V\ras the procuring of Finance Corporation stock 
held by Montana stockholders in exchange for certain 
alleged interests in the Tri-Base Oil ·Company, and that 
to aceon1plish that purpose the defendant Beckstead 
caused money of the Finance Corporation in a sum in 
excess of :$100,000.00 to he turned ·over to the defendant 
Pandolfo, and that the 's-cheme was for the .benefit of 
Beckstead and to further his purpose of decreasing the 
outstanding stock and to per.petua te himself in control 
of the ,0orporation, ·and to permanently deprive the 
Montana stockholders of their investment. . 
It is alleged, however, in the first paragraph of para-
graph (10) of the complaint that the defendant W. R. 
Beckstead sinee prior to 1936 entered upon a plan and 
program to advertise the business of the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation among its stockholders so as 
to discourage them and induce them to part. with their 
stock for a nominal·or no consideration, or to ex·change 
the same for stock in other corporations and enterprises 
which he had caused to be ·set up, ''all so that the said 
stock ·Or investment u.nits would -come under his control 
and could be used so as to ena hle him to take over to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
65 
himself the assets held by'' the United Bond ·and Fin-
ance Corporation. 
That after 1nany of the stockholders had exchanged 
their stock for stock in the Investor·s Thrift Company, 
Beckstead fraudulently caused ·s·aid company to be dis-
solved as a corpoi .. ation 'vith no assets and Beckstead 
took and appropriated for his own personal use the Fin-
ance ·Corporation stock ·so exchanged by said stockhold-
ers; that he in a similar ,yay exchanged stock in the 
American Keene Pl·aster and ·Cement ·Company, 'vhich 
was without value, for units in the Finance Corporation, 
and he likewise took and appropriated these units to his 
own use. 
(C) PROOF. 
The records of the Finance ·Corporation disclosed 
that $85,158.84 had heen paid out by the c·orporation to 
purchase $203,087.11 par value of its outstanding stock 
which included preferred stock and all .classes of common 
stock (~Exhi·bit 15, page 4). $78,09·5.34 was paid out for 
this stock between 1933 and 193!6, inclusive. Exhi:bit 16 
shows that $2,097.50 "ras paid for stock in 1937; $3,991.00 
in 1'938; $9715.00 in 193'9; totaling $7 ,063.50. The last 
purchase ·of ·stock was in October, 1'939. 
The first purchase by the Fin~ance Corporation o.f its 
own stock came about as a result of the refinancing oper-
ations of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation. Mr. 
Beekstead testified to this commencing at R. 1271. Previ-
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ous to the ere a tion of the Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
tion the Finance Corporation had made loans secured by 
mortgages. In ·some instan-ces the ·corporation would 
also sell to the borrowers units of investment. In these 
instances the amount of the mortgage would include the 
sum loaned plus the purchase pri,ce of the units. The 
units would a.lso be pledged to the Finance Corporation 
as .collateral. When the Home Loan refinanced these 
loan·s it demanded that the Fin a nee ·Corporation give 
some consideration for the repurchase of the-se units as 
a ·credit on ·the mortgage. In accordance with the demand 
the Finance Cor.por,ation· took hack these units, crediting 
the mortgage with a repurchase price thereon which was 
satisfactory to the Home Loan, and the Finance Cor-
poration w·ould then receive Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration bonds for the balance of said mortgage. 
It was further explained that occasionally a. stock-
holder would eome to the corporation and offer to sell 
his stock outright at a.ny p.riee. T'he ·corporation had 
money -coming in because of the.se refinancing operations 
of the H. '0. L. C., and the .eo·rporartion used some of this 
money to buy the offered stock. (R. 1274) About 90% 
of all stock repurchased was purchased from stockbrokers 
and a num,ber of these were named. ( R. 127'5 et seq.) This 
latter situation developed as a. result of the depression. 
Stock and bond salesmen lost their !business and so start· 
ed to engage in stock and bond trading. As a result of 
this tvading a number of them ·came into possession of 
stock in the Finance ·C·orpora.tion. ('R. 1205 et ·seq.) This 
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stock was offered to the Finanee Corporation and it was 
··~ purchased by said eorpora tion. 
k 
Ray S. Wood, a certified public accountant, testified 
·. that it was .a common practiee for corporations to pur-
- chase their ·O'\\'n stock. He testified that he h~ad had oc-
: ca.sion to become acqua-inted '\Yith this practice and had 
:. been familiar with it over a period of twenty years. He 
:: stated that he had wa te.hed the balanc.e sheets of large 
1 corporations like General ~Iotors, etc., and he had ob-
.: served that they often purchased their own stoek. He 
further testified that this practice was followed hy cor-
porations in th~ ·State of Utah. (R. 1231 et seq.) Mr. 
Beckste~ad also testified that he \vas familiar with this 
practtce of corporations in the State of Utah. 
The records disclose that very complete and accurate 
acc.ounts were kept of all of this. stock that vvas repur-
chased by the Finance C'orporation. An examin,ation of 
the audits will disclose this tD be true. In the audit of 
1935, Exhibit L-3, at page 5, is found the following: 
'·'As shown on the Balance Sheet a consider-
able portion of the Company's issued capital stock 
is now held in the treasury. Prior to 1935 it was 
the practice upon acquisition of any of the out-
st~anding stock to cancel the certificates brought 
in and reduce thereby the number of shares is-
sued. During 19:3·5, however, all shares of stock 
which had been purchased by the ~Company were 
re-issued in the name ·of the ·Company, s-et up on 
the books as ah investment at the cost price, and 
held for re-sale.'' 
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The audit of 1938, Exhibit 14, at page 4, states as 
fo1lows: 
"
1Some of the·capitalstock of the corpol!ation 
as disclosed by the Balance Sheet, has .from tim~ 
to time been re-acquired by purchase. Shares 
purr based since 1935 have been held as treasury 
stock and either reissued in the na1ne of the Unit-
ed B·ond and Finance·!Corporation or held without 
being cancelled. The .shares so held are listed at 
cost price, namel)T $84,15:8.84. 
''The certifi·cates ·evidencing these shares of 
stock have be~n examined by us. All shares rear-
qui red have been aceoup.ted for and none have 
been sold.'' · 
The audit of 1939, Exhibit 15, at page 4, cont,ains the 
following. statement 'vith respect to this stock: 
''As sho,vn on the Balance ,Sheet, a consider-
able portion of the 'Con1p,any 's issued capital stock 
is nowr held in the treasury. Ptior to 1935 it was 
the practice upon· acquisition of any. of the out-
standing stock to ·Cancel the certificates bought in 
and reduce thereby the number of shares out-
standing. During 1935 and since, howeve~r, all 
shares of stock which have been purchased by the 
·Con1pany have been re-issued in the name of the 
Company, set up on the books as an investment 
at the ·Cost price, and held for re-sale." 
Mr. \Y'. ood testified that the manner of setting this 
stock up on the hooks of the company was in accordance 
with good accounting practice. ('R. 1225) 
Mr. Beckste,ad explained the reasons for carrying 
this stock in this manner. He stated that the first stock 
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~ purchased was carried in ·an investment account. Later 
on the corporation started to retire the stock and the in-
- .come tax people assessed the corporation between $1,-
, 500.00 and ,$1,:800.00 on the difference bet,veen the par 
_ value of the stock and its eost to the c.orporation on re-
- purchase. The Finance ·Corporation had to pay a little 
over $700.00 to compromise the clain1. As a result of 
- this and under the advice of accountants the corpor~ation 
decided it had better carry this stock in an investment 
- account. No attempt has been made to resell this stock. 
_ (R. 1383, 1140) 
At the time this stock was purchased the certificates 
- were indorsed to the Finance Corporation and placed 
in its files. It was not the custom to leave the certificates 
indorsed in blank but at the time they were acquired the 
name of the corporation was stamped on them. The shares 
of the preferred stoek purchased were tra.nsfer,red on the 
books of the company to the Finance Corporation on 
January 9, 19·40, and a certificate issued in the name of 
the Finance C·orporation. The delay in the transfer on 
the books of the company was mainly to secure enough 
shares so that there would not be numerous certificates 
issued to the Finance Corporation. (R. 1274 et seq.) 
Exhibits D-5 and E-5 contain a detailed list of the 
stock, both common and preferred, which was transferred 
on the stock hooks of the .corporation to said corporation 
on January 9, 1940. These E·xhi1bits show the person from 
whom the stock was pur.chased, the person who own~d the 
stock as a matter .of record on the corporate books, the 
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amount ·paid by the corporation for such stock and the 
date the corporation acquired it. 
(·D) DISCUSSION. 
The findings with reference to the alleged practice 
of the 0orporation in the pur·chase of its outstanding 
stock are not definite and 'certain but from a careful con-
sideration of all of them we have construed the findings 
to mean that the Court intended to find that the stook 
was acquired with the use of .corpor,ate money and assets 
for the corp?ration, and that Beckstead personally did 
not appropriate either the stock nor any part thereof, 
nor the money and assets used in its acquisition, such 
:being in ac-cordance with the evidenc~ ~and proof. H·ow-
ever, -certain language found in the findings might lead 
to a different conclusion. 
In Finding No. 19 the Court found that Beckstead 
while dominating the- affairs of the ·corporation and us-
ing it for his -own personal benefit has by various and 
sundry means, directly and indirectly, diverted property 
and assets of the Finance C'orp.ora tion and has used the 
same in attempting to and in freezing out other stock-
holders and acquiring the outstanding stock of s~aid cor-
poration. That he has used upwards of $85,000.00 of 
the assets of the said defendant ,corporation. It is then 
found that the stock has not been cancelled on the books 
of the ·corporation and remains indorsed in blank under 
the c.ontrol of the defendants. The Court does not find 
that Beckstead appropriated this .stock to his own use. 
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Neither does the Court find that the ~inance C'Orpora-
tion obtained the stock. In this particular it is our con-
tention that the finding is uncertain, ambiguous and un-
intelligible, but in any event cannot support the judgment 
and decree of the ·Court. If the Court intended to :find 
that· Beckstead \Yas guilty of wrongful diversion or 
misappropriation of the corporation's assets, then we 
say the finding is ·without the support of any p.roof what-
soev·er. If the ~Court intended to find th,at the purc.ha.se 
of this stock wa.s made for the purpose of perpetuating 
Beckstead in the domination and control of the corpora-
tion and freezing out the stockholders, then we say the 
finding is of no ·effect whatsoever because it is at variance 
with the allegations of pl,aintiffs' complaint and not 
within any issue presented by the pleadings herein and is 
likewise unsupported .by the evidence and P!Oof produced 
at the trial. If the Court intended to find that the cor-
poration obtained the stock, then we say to this Court 
that it wa.s for the benefit and re:dounded to the benefit of 
the remaining stoekholders of the Finance Corporation, 
including the.se plaintiffs and cannot be of assistance to 
them here. 
A eonsideration of the findings generally would 
seem to indicate that the most serious complaint which 
the Court found against the corporation was the practice 
of buying its own stock. The ~Court even found that this 
practice had ·Continued up to the time of the filing of the 
complaint. This, in spite of the evidence which clearly 
indicated that the practice had ceased in 1936, with the 
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exception of a few purchases since then, the la.st of which 
oc~curred in ~October of 1939. The evidence indicates that 
the practice had ce~ased prior to the filing of the com-
plaint entirely. The Court also found that the purpose 
of said stock purchase activities "ras to freeze out the 
stockholders and thait in accomplishing this purpose 
earnings and assets of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation vvhich had been accumulated for the pay-
ment of dividends was used. 
There was no proof whatsoever to support this find-
ing. It is much more rea.sonaible to believe that the real 
purpose behind the ·stoCJk pur·chase plan was to gain pro-
fit for the corporatiOn itself. The only evidence on this 
question is to. that effect. We refer to the testimony of 
Wesley R. Beckstead. This conclusion is further sup-
ported by the undisputed fact that the stock repurchase 
plan has resulted in very ·substantial profit and gain to 
the c.orporation, and of course this conclusion finds fur-
ther support in the fact that the praCJtice was general 
among ·corporations in . this particular territory at that 
time. 
In considering this phase of the -case the Court must 
bear in mind that the corporation at all times was sol-
vent -and that the purchase of this stock did. not in any 
wa.y endanger its solvency or curtail its reg'ular busines~ 
a~ctivities. · 
The practical aspect of this part of the ca.se n1ust 
not b~ lost sight of. · According to the evidence ap-
proximately 907o of this stock was purchased from 
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stockbrokers and stocktraders and \Yas not purchased 
from the stockholders. These stockbrokers are not seek-
ing any remedy at the hands of the C'ourt. They were 
satisfied eYidently with the bargain \Yhich they 1nade with 
the corporation, and as Beckstead remarked to Mr. 
Adair during the course of his cross examination if 
this stock had been allowed and permitted to remain in 
the hands of stockbrokers, no doubt expensive and seri-
ous litigation would have been commenced long prior to 
the filing of the complaint herein. 
That the corporation benefited from these transac-
tions cannot be denied, and for that reason and the added 
reason that there is no evidence of any plan or scheme 
to freeze out stockholders, a finding to the effect that this 
stock repurchased was part of a plan to freeze out stock-
holders is positively unfair and wholly unjust under the 
evidence. We call the Court's attention to the fact 
that the record is void of any testimony whatsoever that 
any stockholder was ever ''squeezed out'' of this Cor-
poration by this or any other plan. 
We submit that the purchase of this stock by the 
management under the ·Conditions sta.ted, and as to which 
there is no dispute, was entirely justified, was advantage-
ous to the. c.orporation and thes-e plaintiffs, and it cannot 
in fairness be branded as mismanagement of corporate 
affairs. 
·The Court's finding that the stock repurchased by 
the company rem.a'ined indorsed in blank and under the 
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control -of defendants does violence to the undisputed 
evidence in this case, and in making this finding the 
·Court was either unmindful of the evidence or wholly 
disregarded it. 
Heretofore we have called the Court's attention to 
all of the evidence in the record on this subject. This 
stock did not remain indorsed in blank, hut was lawfully, 
properly and adequately transferred at the time of its 
purchase to the corporation, and long prior to the com-
mencement of these proceedings, to-wit, January 9, 1940, 
was reissued to the corporation, and the ·old .stock can-
celled. 
The defendants are ordered to account for all money 
and property of the •COrpora.tinn used by the defendal)t 
Beckstead and his associates in the acquisition of out-
standing stock of said corporation in order that upon 
said accounting the ~Court might render such judgment as 
required thereby. 
We say frankly that we have never been ~ble to 
understand the purport of this order. All of the money 
and property so used is fully accounted for in the audits, 
in the books of the company and :by the testimony of the 
witnesses. In fa~ct, the. Court finds in finding No. 19 the 
exact number of shares of stnck which have been pur-
chased and the money which has been used in the acquire-
ment thereof. It ap.ears no1W from this or-dered account-
ing that the Court was not satisfied with its own finding 
and is therefore placing the ·bur.den on appellants of 
supplying the imagined deficiency. 
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We sav to the Court as we did to the trial Court 
"' 
that every detail 'vith respect to these transactions are 
recorded in the books of the ·COrporatiQn. They were 
produced at trial. They "~ere unquestioned and as far 
as appellants "-ere advised were accepted as .complete 
by all parties and the ·Court in this litigation. Needless 
to say, this accounting' in view of the finding and the pro-
ceedings of the trial e.ame as a complete surprise. 
Supposing that upon an accounting it would appear 
that $87,000.00 of the corporation's money had been ns·ed 
in the acquirement of this stoek, what judgment would 
be rendered and against whom 1 
The Court at the conclusion of the evidence had all 
the facts necessary before it to render a judgment on this 
subjeet on the amount of money and property used for 
the purpose of purchasing outstanding stock. If a judg-
ment should be rendered against Beckstead and the other 
individual defendants for, say, $85,000.00, what is the 
Court going to do about the $203,000.00 par value ot 
stock purchased with this money~ Turn it over to Beck-
~tead and his .so-.called assnciates ~ All tha:t in equity 
and .good faith can be ordered is for the corporation to 
be placed in status quo. Finally if a judgment in any 
amount can be rendered on an accounting why did the 
Court when it had all parties before it after it had made 
. definite findings of fact not render a judgment against 
somebody for $85,000.00 ~ 
We again submit to the Court that the findings do 
not suport this ite-m of a.ccounting; that the evidence 
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does not support it, and the pleadings as heretofore 
pointed out were on an entirely different theory than for 
the a.ccoun ting of· this money to the corporation. 
The difficulties with this accounting order further 
appear when it is reealled' that from the record it con-
elusively appears that all this money was used for the 
purpose of acquiring stock f.or the corporation itself, 
and that the ~corporation now owns all of this stock. That 
none of it was ever wrongfully diverted or misappropri-
ated by Beckste-ad, and that there is no elaim or eonten-
tion made that Beckstead personally ever misappropri-
ated or vvrongfully diverted any of the money or property 
used in the a.equirement of this stock. No judgment 
therefore could be rendered against Beckstead personally. 
It is difficult to conceive just what the nature of the 
-corporation's cause of action would be. Certainly it 
could not he based upon any injury or damage suffered, 
because the evidence would conclusively show that these 
transactions resulted in corporate benefits. If the pur-
p·ose of the accounting or.der, as we understand it, is to 
require additional information, then we say that the 
accuracy of the audits and accounts of the corporation 
offered in evidence have never been quest~oned or 
doubted. 
The -complaint is void of any allegation to the effect 
that plaintiffs have ever n1ade any demand upon the 
·Corporation for information -concerning these transac-
tions or for· an accounting. The complaint ·OOntains no 
charge that such information wa.s ever withheld or re-
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fused. There is no allegation in the complaint and no 
proof was offered 'vhic.h \vould indicate in any 'vay that 
any of the personal defendants eYer gain.ed any individual 
profit by these transactions or eYer procured, in their 
own behalf, any of the outstanding stock of the corpora-
tion, and the Court o.f course refused to find that any 
of the personal defendants 1nade any ·gain 'vha t.soever 
a~ a result of the corporation's dealings in its own stock. 
The defendants have by their 'vitnesses and testi-
mony placed before the Court all the information de-
manded by this order, and that evidence and testimony 
stands unquestioned, uncontradicted and unimpeached. 
\Ve respectfully submit that a receivership could not 
be in aid of, ancillary or he1p.ful to this order of ac-
counting-. 
At various times during the progress of the trial 
counsel for defendants demanded and insisted that coun-
sel for plaintiffs state to the Court their position with 
regard to these transactions. 
The plaintiffs have never declared their position 
upon these transaetions, and \Ye believe they never will, 
but we feel in fairness to the ·Court and in fairness to 
appellants, they should state either that they approve or 
disapprove of these transactions. They should tell the 
Court 'vhether they intend to accept the bene.fits of the 
transactions or reje.ct the·m. Regardless of their position 
they are not entitled to an acounting or receivership. If 
the plaintiffs intend to accept the benefits of these trans-
actioJlH, and \Ve believe· they d·o, then they have no gTound 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 
to complain nor grounds for an accounting or receiver-
ship. 
Receiverships are granted to preserve property and 
to prevent waste, fraud and injury, but never on the 
ground that the acts of the directors have resulted in a 
benefit. to the corporation. Now, of course, the plaintiffs 
cannot reject these benefits, and we believe they have no 
intention of so doing. It seems apparent that no Court 
would allow a receiver or permit the corporate officers 
to institute suits against the stockbrokers fron1 whom 
90% of this stock was purchased to bring a1hout a rescis-
sion of the sales, and we confidently assert that no such 
action would lie. Certainly the stockholder who sold 
his stock to the stockbroker ha.s no cause of action 
against the ·corporation, and under no circumstances 
could such original -stockholder~ "Tho had a perfect right 
to sell his stock, mortgage it, give it a\\Tay, or dispose of 
it in any manner to his liking, obtain a rescission as 
against the corporation \vhen his dealings were with a 
stockbroker or trad_er and not \Yith the corporation. We 
confidently assert that the plaintiffs have no intention 
and have never had any intention of rejecting the bene-
fits of the.se transactions. They -cannot rescind the con-
tracts through which the corporation acquired this stock. 
The following interesting language is taken from 
the opinion in Johnson v·. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis 
(Mo.), 127 S. W. 63: 
''As under the scheme of the bill the right 
to an aceounting depends upon the right to a 
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rescission, and goes as a remedy to rehabilitate 
and build up the corporation pulled down, it 
would seem that with the denial of rescission the 
right of a stockholder to an accounting for the 
stocks and bonds of Transit Company alleged to 
be wrongfully converted falls. Clearly plaintiff 
may not repudiate the sale and yet take under 
the sale. He ma.y not run with the hares and hold 
with the hounds. He n1ay not sue in the name of 
Transit Company and get relief to which Transit 
~Company in equity was not entitled.'' 
We respectfully 11rge that this item of accounting, 
in view of the pleadings, the evidence, the findings, and 
the law, cannot be supp-orted, and that a. judgment and 
decree :based hereon should not be sustained. 
6. STocK IssuED BY FINANCE CoRPORATION. 
Item No. 6 of the aceounting order decrees that the 
defendants account ''for any and all stock claimed to 
have been issued by said corporation to the said defend-
ants or any of them.'' 
(~A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The United Bond and Finance c·orporation wa.s in-
corporated .Se·ptember 20, 1927, and W. R. Beckstead 
and ],loyd Bradshaw were among· the incorporators. The 
two named individuals each subscribed for forty share's 
of prefe-rred stock of said corporations, and it is found 
that the only consideration given was a promis.sory note 
iby each for $4t000.00, w'hich notes so it is found w·ere 
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never paid and were later cancelled and destroyed. (Find-
ing No. 2) 
Soon after the organi~a tion ·of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation Beckstead and Bradshaw caused 
two hundred shares of voting stock to he issued to each 
of them, and it is found this w~as done without considerar 
tion. Bradshaw there-after transferred his two hundred 
shares to Beckstead, and Beckstead since said time has 
as-serted ownership of the four hundred shares, and he 
or his wife under his directions, has at all times held 
and exer·cised the voting control of the United Bond and 
Finanee Corporation. (Finding No.6) 
At all tin1es Beckstead has had in his name, or in 
the name of his wife, considerably more than one~half 
of the voting stock, and has at all times controlled and 
dominated the managem·ent and board of direc~ors. 
(Finding No. 14) 
In 1933 Beckstead .caused to be transferred from 
himself to his wife 511 .shares of common voting stock, 
and the certificate therefor was issued and is in the pos-
session and ·Custody qf Beckstead in his safety deposit 
box. (Finding No. 29) 
The total :outstanding stock of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation is 572 shares, and other than the 
3 shares iss~ed to directors and the 511. shares in the 
name of Beckstead's wife, there are 58 shares outstand-
ing, and B-eekstead, his friends and relatives have com-
plete ·control and selection of the offieer.s of the eompa.ny. 
(Finding No. 30) 
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(B) PLEADINGS. 
There is no allegation in the com·plaint \vhatsoever 
that presents any issue on the question of the stockhold-
ings of the defendants, or any of them. The only allega-
tion in the complaint which in any way refers to stock-
holdings or stock ownership is found in paragraph (5), 
wherein it is alleged that Beckstead ever since the or-
ganization of the corporation has been, and now is, assum-
ing to O\vn and control a -substantial amount o.f the out-
standing stock of the said corporation. Nothing· is 
mentioned in the prayer of the complaint \Vhich could 
in any way refer to the stockholdings. 
(C) PROOF. 
The decree does not specifically point out _what stock 
is meant by the Court to be included in this accounting. 
While it appears from the evidence that Beckstead and 
his wife own 512 shares of the .Common Class A Voting 
Htock of the Finance Corporation, the evidence like,vise 
conelusively shows that there has heen transferred by 
the corporation to Beckstead the followi:t;1g stock only: 
:39 shares of Common Class A Voting 'Stock and 40 shares 
preferred stock at the ti·me of incorporation, and 200 
shares of Common Class A Voting Stock \vhich was 
transferred some months after the organization of the 
corporation. (R .. 1875, 19'56) 
Beckstead testified that his promissory note in the 
an1ount of $4,000.00, made payable to the corporation, 
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was given in payment for the stock that was issued to IIIII 
him at the time of the incorporation of the Finance Cor. IIIII 
poration, and that thereafter the stock was placed on the ·IIIII 
market and sold to various subscribers to whom it was 
transferred upon sale. That this stock was all paid for 
and that the payments were made directly to the corpo. 
ration, and as the payments were made the note was 
credited with the amount and finally paid and discharged: 
That all of this stock \vas sold and that none of it now 
stands in the name ·of Beckstead or his wife, and that 
the same was true with respect to the .stock issue to 
F'loyd S. Bradshaw mentioned in the Court's finding. 
('R. 19!5,6) 
Beginning at R. 19~31 the witness, Boyd Evans, com· 
mences rather extensive testimony in connection with 
the matter of handling this stock._ He testified that both 
B'eekstead and Bradshaw re-ceived 40 .share~s of pre· 
ferred stock each, and that he did not find any minutes 
which authorized this transfer of stock to them and no 
records of either of them having paid anything for the 
said 40 shares of stock. 
At R. 1938, Evans testified that he knew the corpora-
tion got all the money that was paid in on preferred 
stocks and knew that all ·common stocks were commission 
stocks. In connection with the preferred stock which 
was held by John L. Wilson and Mayme Wilson i't ap-
peared that it was tra~sferred to them from some of 
these original issues to Beckstead and Bradshaw, and 
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; Evans testi·fied that the corporation received the money 
~ for this preferred stock. (R. 1939) 
Evans at R. 19±0, testified that he kne\v that the pre-
" 
' ferred stock money "rent into the company and not into 
-~ the pockets of Bradsha\Y or Beckstead, and \Vhen asked 
~ bow he knew that, he stated that he had the records to 
- verify it. 
Evans at :&. 1942 was asked whether or not Brad-
- shaw· and Beckstead gave a note for this preferred stock. 
: He said that the records indicated to him that may.be 
: they did give a note, and that as this 40 shares of pre-
ferred Btock was s.old .and the money came in, it was 
: credited on the note and the principal of the note wiped 
out. He then testified that the note 'vould be returned 
_ to them; that the -corporation did not have it. He \vas 
then challenged that he did not have rec.ords to show 
· whether Beckstead and Bradsha'v received the money 
on these transactions relating to the sale of the 40 shares 
of preferred stock, and Evans replied that he could show 
every dollar on the preferred stock. Mr. Evans brought 
two sample cards to ·C'ourt (R. 1943), one of which was 
on the sale of this stock originally issued to Beckstead 
to one, Edwin C. Speck, and the entire transaction and 
records were gone into by the witness. This covers sev-
eral pages of the record, and in brief is to the effect that 
five shares of this preferred stock was s-old to Edwin C. 
Spe-ck, together \vith five shares of -common stock, mak-
ing five units, each unit selling at $125.00. The records 
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indicate that the company received $500.00 for the pre-
ferred stock; that $125.00 \Vent for comn1issions. 
The .39 shares of eom1non stock rece.ived by Beck-
stead and Bradshaw " 7 ere handled in the same manner 
as was the preferred stock except as \vas usual the money 
received for. this stock was used to cover costs of sale, 
including commissions to agents. 
The evidence is uncontradicted that the common 
stock issued to Beckstead was transferred to him for 
services rendered. The evidence is to the effect that the 
defendant Beckstead and his associate, Floyd Bradshaw, 
performed pron1otional services for the corporation in the 
way of preparing the articles of incorporation, advanced 
money and fees, made advances to individual salesmen 
when they went out to sell securities for the corpor-
ation, drew up applications for the sale of stock and 
securities and prepared certain things whi'Ch went along 
with the general line of business to be conducted by the 
corporation, and after the money cam·e in from the sale 
of stock Beckstead rendered services by managing the 
assets and property of the corporation, and Beckstead 
testifie.d that he was spending all the money he was 
making trying to' build the co1npany and the organiza-
tion and that he didn't draw a salary for such services 
but took the co1n1non voting stock for said ·services and 
moneys advanced. This evidence is uncontradic~ed in 
the record and appears time and time again. It appears 
in perhaps more detail at pages 1872 and 1873 of the 
record. Other statements with relation to this matter 
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may be found in the record at pages 1466, 1461, 1420 
and 1558. 
In considering the testimony on this phase of the 
case the Court must not lose sight of the fact that the 
common stock was a service stock. 
At R. 1957, Beckstead testified that the purpose 
of the corporation \Vas to raise capital through the sale 
of preferred stock, and that to prevent a ·capital deficit 
a common stock of no par value was issued and sold 
to cover the sales and operation expenses. He explained 
that if they had sold preferred stock alone and had paid 
a 20% commission the corporation would have received 
only $80.00 and would have had a liability of $100.00 
on each share of stock and that was the reason that 
they issued this no par value common stock, and used 
the money derived through its sale for costs of oper-
ation. 
Throughout the transcript it appears ·conclusively 
that the Class A common voting stock was what might 
·be termed a service stock and the corporation at no time 
received any money for this class of· stock and no part 
of the corporation's capital was raised or procur~·d 
from the sale of it. An examin~tion of the audits in-
troduced in this case discloses. the fact that on the books 
of th~ company no .capital lialbility has been set ·up for 
this ·Class A common voti~g stock. 
At R. 1954 Beckstead testified that immediately 
after the incorporation of the Finance C1orporation the 
matter of the issuance of the common· voting stoc~ was 
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discussed at meeting of the Board of Directors and it wa.s 
decided that there. would ~be no salaries and that the 
directors would receive common stock for services and 
that the issuance of this stock was approved at those 
meetings. 
Beckstead testified that the first salary he received 
from the company was in 19.31, his salary being fixed at 
$200.00 per month. (R. 1'8169, 142'4) That prior to that time 
he managed all the properties and mortgages which were 
procured by the company and that he received no salary 
for that· work. He stated that he put money into the 
corporation and used his own car and re-ceived no com-
pensation for use of hi's car, and that he did not receive 
any money to recompense him for the money he had 
spent. 
(D) DISCUSSION. 
The stockholdings of the defendants assumed a 
position of importance in this ·case for the first time 
when an accounting therefor was ordered in the decree. 
This ·came as a comp'lete sur~pr~se to counsel fior appel-
lants as they had not anticipated· or believed that this 
was an issue in the case. The evidence with respect to 
this matter was received without question and appar-
ently to the satisfaction of Court and counsel. 
The Court's finding that the stock 1originally issued 
to Beckstead and Bradshaw was never paid for is hard 
to understand. There is no evidence whatsoever in the 
record to support such a finding. All of the evidence 
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on the subject is ·contrary to the finding, and from 
this evidence it clearly appears just bow this transaction 
was handled. There can be no question that the stock 
transferred to Beckstead and Bradshaw· was sold and 
was paid for and that the payments were received by 
the corporation, and that the payments were sufficient 
to and did disc barge these notes. There was never 
any disposition op. the part of the defendants at the 
trial 10f this case to 'vithhold any information on this 
subject from Court or Counsel. The records of the cor-
poration 'vere present in Court; fu'll and complete state-
ments with respect to these stoekholdings were given 
both by ioral testimonr and in the form of exhibits. 
Appellants can conceive of no other manner or method 
of accounting for this stock ·except as made during the 
progress of the trial. We .are at a loss to kllJow just 
what information the Court desires that is not contained 
in the records of this cause. Appellants have shown 
what was done with the stock. They have admitted the 
possessiion of the 200 shares that were issued in January 
of 1928, and have stated in full what the consideration 
paid therefor was. The plaintiffs have never sought 
and do not now seek a rescission of this transfer, and 
the Court decrees none. Even though the stock was 
issued to Beckstead without consideration we do not 
understand that the remedy of accounting would cover 
the right or rights of the. plaintiffs. Rather there should 
have been a request for rescission and the return of the 
stoek to the corporation fior ·cancellation. The proof on 
this matter bas heretofore been set out. 
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In view of the undisputed evidence in this record 
there is no doubt whatsoever concerning this stoek inter. 
est. Each share 'Of stock which now stands in the name 
of either Beckstead or his wife was traced during the 
progress of the trial. The Court inquired of Beckstead 
concerning consideration paid. All those matters are 
before the Court. If the Court upon an accounting 
could make any judgiP.ent whatsoever with respect to 
this stock interest the trial Court can now do so. There 
is· nothing to be gained by further hearing or by an 
accounting. B·eckstead can do no more than he has 
already done. The most that he could do is to appear 
and declare to the Court the stock interest of himself 
and "rife; state where and when he purchased the stock 
and under what circumstances and for what consider. 
ation as he did at the t:rial herein. 
There is no need nor necessity, i:ri fact, there is no 
purpose for the intervention of a receiver. 
We submit to the Court that this item of accounting 
is not sustained 'by the pleadings, the findings, nor the 
proof, and that such order is not supported or justified 
under the ·circumstances shown. There is no place here 
fior either an accounting nor receiver. If by any stretch 
of the imagination a j11dgment could be rendered at any 
time on this matter of accounting, certainly such judg-
ment ·could have been rendered by the trial Court which 
had before it all necessary parties. It had before it 
such pleadings as ar~ now before this Court and all 
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the proof that is capable :of be'ing produced on this 
subject. 
~ \Ve have not set forth our com1nent on the matter 
t of laches, but will reserve that for future dis·cussion. 
~ 
The accounting order of the Court, resting as it 
does upon six pillars, no one of which can bear its own 
,- weight 'vhen considered in connection with the plead-
ings, the findings and the proof must likewise fall. 
The authorities which we have heretofore and shall 
hereinafter cite we believe ·conclusively establish the 
proposition that upon a failure of the primary phase of 
_ the cause of action the ancillary and re-ceivership phase 
must likewise fail. We, therefore, earnestly contend 
that the receivership decreed herein must fail with the 
failure of the primary cause for accounting. 
Before leaving this subject we desire t<? demonstrate 
to the Court that no other .accounting order .can be made 
upon the allegations of the complaint and the proof 
produced in the trial of this ·cause, and for that purpose 
- we desire to .c.all the Court's attention to the complaint 
and the proof. 
Paragraph (1) alleges the corporate existence of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation, and the conclu-
sion that it i~ being dominated by Beckstead. 
Paragraph (2) alleges the corporate existence of 
the Beckstead Livestock Company, and conclusion. that 
it was organized to p·ersonally benefit Beckstead. 
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Paragrap·h (3) alleges the ·corporate existence of 
the Investors Thrift Clompany, and the conclusion that it 
was organized for the personal benefit of Beckstead. 
Paragraph ( 4) alleges the compliance of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation 'vith the laws of Montana 
for the purpose 1o.f engaging in business therein. 
Paragraph ( 5) alleges certain -conclusions with re-
spect to the purpose of the organizers of the Beckstead 
Livestock Company, and representations made to stock-
holders with , reference thereto, and that investors in 
Montana paid ·certain sums of money for stock, and 
that certain loans were made by the ·Corporation to resi-
dents of Montana. The establishment of branch offices 
in M1ontana is .alleged. The nature and value of prop-
erty procured by the corporation since its organization 
is alleged. It is alleged that certain p-roperty stands in 
the name of de.fendant Beckstead and his wife, which 
property is the property of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation, and that Beckstead is n'OW engaged in sys-
tematic diversion of the assets of the corporation, and 
that Be·ckstead -controls and dominates the corporation, 
and assumes to own and control a substantial amount of 
the outstanding stock of the ·corporation. These allega-
tions with respect to the diversion of assets by Beck-
stead were denied and proved to be false and no finding 
was made by the Court to that effect. 
Paragraph ( 6) alleges a purp,orted connection be-
tween Pandolfo and Beckstead. 
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Paragraphs ( 7) and ( 8) pertain to stockholders and 
amount of stock issued. 
Paragraph (9) alleges that the corporation agreed 
that it \vonld not diYert property from !1,outana. 
The first nine paragraphs of the complaint contain 
no allegation 'vhatsoever upon "~hich an accounting could 
or should be based. The 1only allegations with respect 
to diversion of assets or property holdings are so gen-
eral as to be wholly insufficient. They have been denied 
and disproved and no finding \Yas made by the Court 
to the effect that these allegati1ons had been proved. 
ParagTaph ( 10) alleges in the first section thereof, 
a plan to dis·courage ~lontana investors in order to bring 
about an exchange of stock for valueless corporate stock 
and other securities, and that Beckstead took and ac-
quired and appropriated for his personal use, stock in 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation so procured 
from Montana Investors. The charges with respect to 
wrongful diversion w·ere denied and proved utterly false 
and no finding was made by the ·Court on these allega-
tions. 
In the second section .of paragraph (10) the Tri~ 
Base Oil deal is set forth, and charges that through these 
transactions Beckstead procured stock of Montana in-
vestors on his own behalf. These charges were denied 
and were proved false and untrue. In fact, there was 
no evidence produced by plaintiff which in any way 
supported these charges. N.o findings were made sus-
taining this allegation. 
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The third secti'on of paragraph ( 10) makes certain 
allegations with respect to the Marks and the Carter 
property in Wyoming, and alleges that Beckstead pro-
cured these properties with funds of the corporation, 
and now owns and controls the stock 10.f the Beckstead 
Livestock Company, to which these properties have been 
transferred. These charges were likewise denied; no 
attempt was made by plaintiffs to prove them, but 
defendants' testimony established that they W·ere false 
and untrue, and that Beckstead personally has never 
held, and does not now hold, any of the property of the 
Beckstead Livesto-ck C·ompany, or any of its stock, but 
that .all of such stock and property is owned by the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation and the pleadings 
are in accordance with this evidence. 
The f,ourth section of paragraph (10) alleges that 
B·eekstead owns 50,000 shares of stock in the Beckstead 
Livestock Company. These charges were denied. The 
plaintiffs made no attempt to prove them, but defend-
ants proved them to he fals·e and untrue. 
By no stretch of the imagination ·could the allega-
tions in the. fifth and sixth secti10ns of paragraph (10) 
be considered as pertinent to or material in an action 
for an accounting. 
In the seventh section of paragraph (10) it is 
al~·eged that Beckstead has diverted income from the 
properties of the corporation to his own use and benefit, 
. and that he has failed to pay expenses and taxes on the 
properties. These allegations are of a general nature, 
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there being no allegation as to 'vhen the diversion was 
n1ade or fro1n "~hat s·ourees it "~as made, nor the amounts, 
nor any other faets or circumstances, the allegation 
being simply that Beckstead has failed to account to 
the corporation for such income. -\~rhat the income was 
is not disclosed. _These alleg·ations are likewise denied. 
~o attempt was made by plaintiffs to prove them, but 
their falsity 'Yas clearly established by defendants' evi-
dence and no finding was made by the Court on these 
charges. 
In the eighth section of paragraph (10) it is charged 
that Beckstead has ~aused numerous sales and transfers 
of real estate and personal property of the said corpor-
ation to be made, and the proceeds to be received by 
others than the defendant. These charges are general 
in nature. The properties alleged to _have been sold 
are not described. The time of sale is ·not indicated. 
The amount received and alleged to have been diverted 
is not stated. These charges were denied. The plain-
tiffs ·who had the burden of proving them, introduced 
no evidence wha.ts·oever in support thereof, but defend-
ants' testimony proved their falsity· and no finding was 
made by the Court on these charges. 
The ninth section of paragraph (10) charges the 
destruction 'Of co1npany books, and is not material or 
pertinent to an action for ac-counting. 
The tenth section of paragraph (10) merely com-
plains of the denial of opportunity to examine the co~~ 
pany's books. · There was no evidence introduced to 
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support this allegation and the Court refused to find 
that there had been such denial. 
The eleventh section of paragraph (10) deals with 
the salary of Evans and Beckstead. The amounts of 
these salaries are all refle-cted on the books of the com-
pany, and the accuracy of the books is not denied. The 
evidence shows that good and valuable consideration 
was given for these salaries, and under no theory ·of 
the law could these salary accounts be the subject of 
an accounting. The findings do not question that these 
salaries were properly paid. 
The twelfth section of paragraph ( 10) is a general 
rehash of the previ1ous sections ; ·charges diversion gen-
erally, without stating any facts or particulars what-
soever, and has no meaning except as connected with 
the other sections. · All these general allegations were 
denied. No a tten1pt was n1ade to prove them, and the 
testimony of the defendants sho"\\ring their falsity stands 
uncontradicted and unquestioned. 
Paragraph ( 11) refers only to insolvency and neces-
sity f9r receiver. It is not pertinent in any way to 
an action of accounting. 
Paragraph ( 12) charges merely a failure to comply 
with the Montana law with respe-ct to the filing of reports 
and is not in any way pertinent or rna terial to an action 
of accounting. 
Paragraph . ( 13) refers to purposes and pending liti-
gations, charges Beckstead with having fraudulently 
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taken large sums as salary and expenses, and realleges 
that Beckstead and his "~ife are now holding large and 
substantial assets of the corporation, and that the com-
pany is employing divers and sundry attorneys. 
It thus appears that if there are allegations Ill 
the complaint which would support an independent ·ac-
tion by the corporation or any interested stockholder 
against Beckstead or any other defendant for an ac-
counting, a proposition which we are not willing to 
admit, then we say that such allegations as there are 
stand in the record either undefended or unproved or 
positively disproved, and that such independent action 
as is alleged stands before this Court with,out any .posi-
tive support "Thatsoever. 
\Ve challenge the Court's attention to the proposi-
tion that not one single allegation in the complaint which 
by any stretch of the imagination could support an 
independent action for accounting, "\Vas found to be estab-
lished as matter of fact by the Court. 
There are no specific allegations whatsoever in the 
complaint charging Beckstead, or any other individual 
defendant, with the wrongful ~or fraudulent diversion 
and misappropriation of any particular p·roperty what-
soever belonging to the Finance Corporation or the 
Beckstead Livestock Company. The general allegations 
eharging misappropriation and wrongful diversion have 
all been denied and have been entirely disproved. 
''r e inquire of the Court and of counsel for respond-
ent, what allegation is there in the ·Complaint, when 
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considered in 'the light of the evidence, upon which a 
finding of. fact could be based, justifying or supp,(}rting 
any decree of accounting whatsoever~ This is an action 
for Receivership only. The pleadings and the findings 
bear out this proposition. The accounting is nothing 
but an afterthought. It is s-ought merely because the 
law will not tollerate an action for the primary purpose 
of obtaining re·ceivership. 
The plaintiffs have wholly failed to establish a cause 
for any relief whatsover to which receivership can be 
ancillary. They seek receivership only. 
The opini1on in the case of· B o·wman v. Gum, Inc., 
et al., (Pa.) 184 Atl. Page 258, contains a precise state-
ment of the law as we understand it: 
''The pleadings determine the relief that may 
be afforded: 'Neither allegations without proof 
nor proof without allegations, nor allegations and 
proof which do not substantially correspond, will 
entitle complainant to relief, unless the defect be 
re1nedied by amendment.' '' 
Under the authorities there are two well established 
principles which in any event will defeat the plaintiffs' 
right to an accounting. In the first plac.e, it is nec-
essary to .~oth allege and prove that a demand has 
been ·made for an accounting· before a. Court of equity 
will d·ecree that a party make such accounting. The 
other principle is that there must be allegation and proof 
that something will be found due from the defendant in 
the accounting suit. This is based upon the fundament~} 
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proposition that a. Court of equity will not do a vain 
thing such as ordering an aecounting when there is 
nothing alleged or proved sufficient to indicate that 
, something will be found to be due if an a-ccounting is had. 
tin relation to the necessity of a. demand as a con-
dition precedent to ·the maintaining of an action for an 
accounting, it is stated in 1 C. J. ~s. ,660, as follows: 
~'·The right to an accounting in e·quity has 
been held to be dependent on a previous demand 
and refusal; but it has also been held that such 
demand and refusal are not necessary 'vhere tbe 
accounting is eomplicated, or where an a'Ccounting 
is merely ancillary to the main purposes of an 
action.'' 
The case at bar obviously did not come within either 
of the exceptions to this rule. 
. French v. C. F. and T. Compa.ny, sup·ra, held that a 
demand for an ac-counting was a necessary condition 
precedent to an action for an a-ccounting. In that case 
the Court held that there \vere no grounds for an ac-
counting because of the failure to make the necessary 
demand, and because of the failure of the plaintiff in 
this respect the .appointment of the receiver was held 
to be ~n ·exces-s of the power of the Court. 
To apply this principle to the case at bar it would 
certainly seem to be a necessary prerequisite that the 
plaintiffs give to the defendant corporation and its di-
l'eetors the opportunity to explain or account for any 
and all matters which the plaintiffs " 7ere entitled 'to 
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know about, and then, upon a refusal of the defendants 
to give this account, or upon their failure to render a 
correct account, the defendants would be advised of the 
claims of the· plaintiffs and would not then be subjected 
to a ''fishing hill,'' as this case developed. 
The other principle which is well established by the 
cases is that there must be something in the hands of 
the defendants belonging to the eorporation or something 
owing by the defendants to the corporation, and the bur-
den of showing this rests upon plaintiffs, who are seek-
ing the accounting. 
In a·ctions for a~ccounting a. common pr-ocedure is, 
:firs·t, to detern1ine whethe-r or not the defendants are 
liable to account, and upon the determination of that 
proposition in favor of the plaintiffs, then the Court will 
go into the various items of the account. 
In the case at bar under the decree the Court has 
ordered tha~t the defendants ac:eount. However, it is 
submitted that there is neither pleading nor proof to 
show that there is anything for which the defendants 
should or can account. 
With respect to this n1at1ter it is stated in Tra·vers 
v. Dyer, Federal Cas. N·o. 14,150, as follows: 
'''The action of account is some·what peeuliar 
in its proceedings, but the peculiarities· will sup-
ply no lack of statement of a cause of action, a~ 
thos-e in the action of 'book account, in the states 
of Vermont and Conne~cticut, do, to some extent. 
The action is for an account by the defendant to 
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the plaintiff for money of the plaintiff received 
by the defendant by son1e privity of authority or 
appointment, or of estate, or of la\Y; and for the 
recovery of the balanee due. There are two judg-
ments in the action-one, that the defendant do 
account "\vith the plaintiff; the other, after the 
accounting, for the balance found due. The plain-
tiffs, in his declaration, n1ust set forth enough 
to entitle him to both judgments. The privity, 
by which he is entitled to an account, and pro-
ceedings under or pursuant to it, raising a halanee 
in his fa YOr to be reocovered, must both appear. If 
a plaintiff has not these he is not entitled to main-
tain the action. If he has them but does not set 
them forth, he does not show himself en ti tied to 
maintain it. These are simple and just rules, by 
which these counts must be tested.'' 
In Oskaloosa Sav. Barnk v .... Mahaska Cownty State 
Bank, (Iowa) 219 N. W. 530, the Court states: 
'' Th_e burden was on the plaintiff to aver and 
prove that there was something due it before it 
\vas entitled to an accounting. 1 C. J. 629; Gould 
v. Barrow, 117 Ga. 458, 43 ~s:. E. 702; C;a.mpbell 
v. C·ampbell, 8 N. J. Eq. 738; Hunt v. Gorden, 5~2 
Miss. 194; In Baker v. Tennent, 108 Wash. 663, 
185 P. 576, that court said: 
" ·''There will be no accounting, without sh·ow-
ing that son1e one, either the appellant or credit-
ors of the p:artnership, are going to be benefited 
by it.' " 
In Bowman v. Chapmatn, (Va.) 175 S. E. 214, the 
Court stated: 
''In a. proceeding to obtain an accounting the 
com'Plainant is not obliged to show how much is 
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due. But the law will not do a vain thing, and 
order an .aceounting, "' .. hen the petitioner does not 
aver facts suffrcient to indicate that somethinO' 
will be :Bound to lbe due to hin1 hy the defendant.'~ 
·To the sa·me effect see Gould v. Barro~v, ('Ga.) 43 
S. E. 702. 
In Sottthworth v. Smith, 27 Conn. 335, 71 Am. Dec. 
72, the C'ourt held that to maintain an action in acc.ount-
ing it is neeessary that the plaintiff allege that the de-
fendant has become lia·ble to account by having in his 
possession property belonging to the plaintiff, or that 
something is due the plaintiff. 
In the case of Childs v. ·Missou.ri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 
(iC. C. A. 8) 2'21 Fed. 219, it was stated: 
'''The allegations in the bill requiring an ac-
counting- are 'v holly insufficient to justify the 
interposition of a court of equity. They are not 
sp~cific, and that part of the bill n1ay properly be 
ealled a 'fishing bill,' which cannot be main-
tained.'' 
It is submitted that there are no allegations in the 
complaint in the case at bar alleging either a demand 
by the plaintiffs for an accounting or a. refusal by the 
defendants, or any of them, to render any requested 
accounting. 
It is further subinitted that there is no allegation in 
the complaint setting forth any particular property now 
in the possession of the defendants for which an acc.ount-
ing can or should be rendered, and there is no allega-
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tion that anything- is due froin the defendants to the 
plaintiffs or to the corporation. Neither is there any 
proof of such den1and, refusal, or of property in the 
possession of the defendants belonging to the plaintiffs 
·Or the United Bond and Finance Corporation, or that 
any money is due from the indiVidual defendant~s ~to said 
defendant corporation.· 
'The rule is well established in the law of this coun-
try that the burden of proof to esta~blish the duty to ac-
~ount and that up<;>n an accounting there will he found 
a balance due from the person against whom the account-
ing is sought rests upon the party who seeks the account-
Ing. 
In the case of Paulm.er v. Manville, (Iowa., 1929) 2'28 
N. W. 20 the Court states: 
"We are ·Of the opinion that the claim of ap-
pellants (plaintiff) has been fully paid, but if 
this is not true, the correct ·balance due is not a.s 
·claimed by him and cannot, with any degree of 
certainty, be as·certained from the evidence. The 
burden was on appellant to prove the aecount and 
to show a balance and the amount due.'' 
In Nichols v. Ma.rtin, 2~27 Mich. 305, ·269 N. W. 183 
(19·36)' the c·ourt states: 
'·'!The proof does not show plaintiff's right 
to an accounting nor the amount to be accounted 
for. The burden of this proof is upon plaintiff. 
Melconia v. F'raan, 265 Mich. 378, 251 N. W. 57 4. '' 
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It was held in the case of La;nk Kidde Company v. 
Keystone Leather, 3'25 Pa.. 5'29, 1'90 A. 910 (19137), that 
it was incumbent .on plaintiff to esta'blis·h duty on the 
party of defendant to account. 
'The case of Fretwell v. Gillette Safety Razor Com~ 
pany, 106 Fed. (2d) 7'28 ( 4 C. C. A. 193:9), was a suit for 
an injunction. Defendant -counterclaimed and prayed 
. for an aecounting. 'The Court stated: 
'''The burden was on defendant to establish 
that there was s-omething due him before he was 
·entitled to an accounting. Oskaloosa Savings 
. Bank v. Mahaska County !State Bank, 205 Iowa 
13'51, 219 N. W. 530, 60 A. L. R. 11204; Gould v. 
B:arrow, 117 Ga. 458, 43 S. E. 702.'' 
In 1 C. J. · 8. 675 .A.caowntmg, Paragraph 39, it is 
stated: 
''Where the right to an ac:eounting is put in 
issue by the answer, th·e burden is on plaintiff 
to p~rove that he is entitled to the relief sought 
and * * * if he fails t.o do so the bill will be 
dismissed.'' 
The ;C'ourt 's attention is called to the fact that every 
allegation in plaintiffs' complaint which could in any 
way furnish grounds for an a'Ccounting was denied by 
defendants in their answer. The burden was on plain-
tiff to allege and prove their cause of action for an ac-
counting, including the burden ·Of alleging and proving 
tha,t there was money due from the pers-onal defendants 
to the Finance Corporation, and that upon an aecount-
ing the amount thereof could be determined. 
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THE RESPONDENTS ARE BARRED BY THEIR OWN LACHES 
FROM OBTAINING THE ACCOUNTING DEOREEID BY THE COURT. 
The Court found in finding No. 48: 
'~·That th~ plaintiffs herein have not been 
fully advised or given any information as to the 
acts, conduct, manipulations and business prac-
tices of \Y-. R. Beckstead and his dummy direetors, 
and until shortly prior to the filing of this action 
did not know of the said practices and things com-
--l{>lained of in their ·complaint, and prior to that 
time could not be ·Charged with knowledge_ or in-
formation sufficient to require them to institute 
or pros·ecute any action to protect their rights.'' 
From that finding the Court made the following con-
clusion of law: 
'''That the plaintiffs herein, or any of them, 
have not been guilty of laches in the assertion of 
their rig~ts and the filing and prosecution of this 
action." 
No issue on this rna tter was raised on the pleadings. 
'The defendants, of course, did not plead laches becaus-e 
they were not advised as to any contention made by plain-
tiffs based on transactions occurring so many years ago 
until the Court permitted plaintiffs over def.endants' ob-
jection to introduce evidence of these ancient transac-
tions. ·The finding is nevertheless contrary to the 
evidence. Rich testified that in 193'5, he, together with 
Art 8mitb, organized the Montana. Stockholders Protec-
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tive Co1nrri.ittee, and from the exhibits in the recovd it 
appears that several of these plaintiffs· were officers of 
this committee. All the stockholders were advised of 
the committee's activities, the purposes of its organiza-
tion and solicited to become rriem.bers, and many of them 
contributed funds to promote its activities. These ac-
tivities consisted largely of circulating, diserediting 
·charges of every kind against the corporation and its 
officers to all of the stockholders. There is no doubt 
but wha't every stockholder was advised of the activities 
of this eommi ttee and were also advised of many matters 
which V\rould naturally put them on notice. · 
We are .aware that the Court in finding ·Of fact No. 
48 finds facts from whi;ch conclusions could be made that 
plaintiffs are not barred by their own laches, but as 
herein pointed out this finding is not based upon the evi-
dence but was m.ade as many other findings, without the 
support of any evidence whatsoever and apparently was 
made for the purpose of supporting the decree regard-
less of the fa!cts. 
The six items for which the defendants have been 
required to aecount have heretofore been set out. We 
will take each one ·Of them in their order and apply to 
them the principles of laches. 
!The first item of account relates to the transaction 
respecting the forfeiture of installment sales, contracts 
or stocks and bonds in investment units of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation. 
I I II 
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As heretofore explained in this brief, this matter 
relates to -bookkeeping en tries 'Y hich \Vere made on the 
, books of the United Bond and Finance Corporation in 
\\Titing off the sales of their investn1ent units and bonds 
where the purchaser failed to make the installment. pay-
- ments as agreed. 
The uiieontradicted evidence in this case is that there 
were no sales of stocks, bonds or investment units after 
1931, either for cash or on installment payments. 'There 
was introduced in ~vidence by the plaintiffs in this case 
- (Exhibit G-4) annual statements which were sent out to 
the stockholders of the company. This Exhibit inc1udes 
those statements sent out for the years 1931-~9~34, in-
clusive. Other annual statements for the years 1933-
1938, inclusive ('Exhibit 27) W·ere introduced ·by the de-
fendants. These also were sent out ea.ch year to the 
stockholders. 
It will be noticed that in the statements for 19:33, 
1934, 1935 and 1937 a statement was made conc.erning 
capital surplus to the effect that it was created. from 
inactive accounts and stock and bond subscription can-
eella.tion. In the statements of other years the item was 
carried on the financial statement as .capital surplus 
without any explanation. The audit for 1935, the audit 
for 1936 to 1938, inelusive, and the audit of 1939 shows 
these caneella tions (Exhibits L-3, 14, and 1:5) and a full 
explanation is made of these items. 
The only thing that we can suggest here is that ap-
parently the contention is that the m·ethod of setting these 
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up is questioned. It a.p.pears that the plaintiffs, and all 
other persons similarly situated, have known of this 
method since at least the year 1933. No complaint has 
been ~made ·Of this, either before the commence·ment of 
this pr.esent .a~ction or during its pendency until the plain-
tiffs .filed their reply brief in the trial Court and the 
Court incorpor·ated this subject in its findings of fact and 
decree. We contend that a mere disagreement on the 
method of bookkeeping is not a ground for an equita-ble 
accounting, but even if it were a delay of at least seven 
years cannot be excused, and a C·ourt of equity should 
certainly consider it a stale claim within the eases here-
inafter to be cited. 
iT he second i tern for aec.ount consists of the ''trans-
actions'' involving the purchase of the insurance agency. 
·The evidence on this ma:tter dis-closes that the insurance 
agency was purchased in November, 1932, by the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation and sold in about a week 
thereafter to the Investors Thrift c:ompany .at a profit 
of $1,500.00 to the Finance Corporation. This involves 
a transaction eight years old, and under no theory of law 
could justify or require an accounting, and if any ques-
tion could :be cast upon it or claim made with reference 
thereto, the claim without doubt is stale and cannot now 
be raised, and as heretofore pointed out in this brief a 
full a.c.count thereof has already been made during the 
trial of this ease. 
The third item for acc.oun ting is the purchase of the 
controlling stock in the Ashton-Jenkins Company. That 
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stock was purchased in N ove:mber, 1'93:2, and the trans-
action was rescinded by February, 1933. Hence plain-
tiffs are here seeking an accounting for a purchase made 
between seven and eig·ht years before the commencement 
of this action, and '"" hich within that time had been fully 
and com~pletely rescinded, and no loss resulted therefrom 
to the corporation. 
'The fourth item contained in the decree requires an 
accounting as to all transactions and money advanced to 
the Beckstead Livestock Company. This of necessity 
must relate to transactions occurring during and since 
April, 19·38. This accounting is between th~ two corpo-
rations, does not involve the individual defendants, and 
requires nothing more or less than 1a sta tern en t of ac-
counts as between the subsidiary corporation, Beckstead 
Livestock Company, and the defendant United Bond a.nd 
Finance Corporation. 
We have heretofore pointed out the reasons why we 
do not think this is a proper matter for an order to ac-
count. We maKe no claim that such transactions are 
stale. 
The fifth item <>f accounting relates to all money 
and property of the United Bond and Finance Corpora-
tion used by the defendant Beckstead· and his associates 
in the acquisition of the outstanding stock of said eor-
portion. 
E·xhibit 16 introdu.ced in this case dis·closes that no 
stock at all has been purchased since 1939 and only 
$975.00 was paid by the ·Corporation for stock in 19;39. 
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We have heretofore set out the reasons why we do 
not believe this matter is one for an accounting. \Ve 
desire, however, in ,connection with the question of laches 
' to call the C.ourt 's a ttentlion that a.t least since the year 
1935 the stockholders have been advised by the annual 
statement o~ the fact that the corporation was purchas-
ing its ·Own stock. We refer to the financial statement 
set out for the year 193~5 wherein it clearly appears that 
certain ·stock of the corp.oration was held as treasury 
stock and set forth as an asset of the company .at cost. 
Beckstead testified that the corporation began to 
purchase its own stock following the com1nencement of 
the opera:ti'On of the Home Owners' Loan Corporation, 
when many of their loans and mortgages were liquidated 
through the acceptance of Home Owners' Loan Corpora-
ti~on bonds. The Home Owners' Lotan Corporation com-
menced to make loans in the late summer or early fall 
of 193,3. 
The sixth item is for a.n accounting of all the stock 
claimed to have been issued hy the United Bond and Fin-
ane~ C'orporation to the defendants. The only stock is-
sued by the ·Corporation to the defendants wtas issued in 
1'9'27 and 1928. This involves a claim which at the com-
mencement of this action was between twelve and thirteen 
. years of age, and was certainly a stale cltaim if there ever 
was one, and espec,ially in view of the fact that there was 
no a.ttempt · m~ade to cancel the issuance of this stock. 
The first issue of stock in 19'2:7 was shown in the articles 
of ineor~poration of the U:nited .S:tates Bond and Finance 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
109 
Corporation, and th~ issnanee of the stock in 1928 to the 
~ defendant Beckstead was placed in the stock hook of the 
company "·hich w·as produced at the time of the trial of 
this ease. It had been open and available for inspection 
during all the years since the stock '\\7'as issued by any 
stockholder of record, including· thes·e plaintiffs. 
So far as other matters "~hich 'vere introduced 1n 
evidence "'~ere concerned the plain tiffs never got any 
eloser thlan the early part of 1936. These matters in-
volved the sale of United Bond .and Finance Corporation 
sto~k by the Hoffmans, \V.ilsons, Jacksons and the Thur-
- rnans \\Thich occurred in 1931 and 1935 ; the purchase of 
the ranch property in ''Tyoming \vhich took place in 1935. 
In connection with this ranch property and the conten-
tion that Beckstead cliaimed to own it, we call the Court's 
attention to the fact that the annual financial statements 
mailed to the sto~kholders of the United Bond and Fin-
ance Corporation from the year 1935 to the year 1937 
show as an asset of the eompany the ranch property, 
li\'estock and equipment. 
In Grange National Barnk v. First Nationa-l Bank 
(~P.a.), 198 Atl. 3'21, the Court states: 
''It makes no differenee that laches were not 
pleaded in defense. When the fact of laches ap-
pears in the ev.idence or ·on the face of the bill 
the court mlflv in its discretion and on its own 
motion deny -~elief on that ground. Sullivan v. 
Portland & K. R. C·o., 94 U. S. 806, 24 L. Ed.· 324; 
Calivad.a Colonization C·o. v. Hays, C. C., 119 F. 
202; Akley v. Bass_ett, 189 Cal. 625, 209 P. 576; 
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:Raytheon Mfg. Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 
286 Mass. 84, 1'90 N. E. 1; Taylor v. Slater, 21 
R .. I. 104, 41 A. 1001. '' 
Certainly the defendants under the circumstances of 
this case should not be required to plead laches in their 
answer, and under the foregoing authorities it is not 
nece'ssary to do so. 
Judge Sanborn in Kelly v. Boettcher, tO. C. A. 8) 
85 F. 55, at page 6:2, has an excellent state.ment as to the 
applica.tion of the doctrine of laches, and it is as follows: 
'''In the application of the doctrine of laches, 
the settled rule is that courts of equity are not 
bound by, hut that they usu.ally act or refuse to 
act in analogy to, the statute of limitations relat-
ing to actions at lal\v of lik~ character. ~ * ~ 
(jCnses e:ited). * * * ·The meaning of this 
rule is that, under ordinary circun1stances, a suit 
in equity will not be stayed for laches before, and 
will be stayed after the tin1e fixed by the analog-
ous statute of limitations at law; but if unusual 
conditions or extraordinary circumstances make 
it inequitable to allow the prosecution of a suit 
after a briefer, or to forbid its maintenance after 
a longer, period than that fixed by the statute, the 
·chancellor mill not be bound by the statute, but 
will determine the extraordinary c;ase in accord~ 
ance 'vith the equities vvhich c.ondition it. * * * 
When a suit is brought within the time fixed by 
the analogous statute, the burden is on the de-
fendant to show, ei·ther from the face of the bill 
or by hi,s answer,: that extraordinary circum-
stances exist which require the application of the 
doctrine of laches ; and, 'vhen such a suit i~ 
brought after the statutory time has elapsed, the 
burden is on the .complainant to show, by suitable 
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averments in his bill, that it would be inequita'ble 
to apply it t~o his ease.'' 
Under this common sense rule it would appear that 
the plaintiffs are under the necessity ·Of showing why the 
doctrine of !taches is inapplicable to the items of account 
relating to the purcha'Se of the insurance agency, the ,pur-
chase of the controlling stock of the Ashton-Jenkins Com-
pany, the stock issued by the corporation to the defend-
ants, the installment forfeitures, and the great bulk of 
the pur.c.hases of outstanding stock. There is neither 
allegation nor proof which would indicate any reason that 
the doctrine of la{!hes does not· bar these alleged items 
of account. 
In the case of Smith v. Smith (Utah), 291 Pae. 298, 
the Court applied the doctrine of laches. It there points 
out that equity may refuse relief even if the time elapsed 
without suit is less than the statute of limitations. 
Foss v. Peoples Ga.s, Coke arna Oil Comparny, 241 Ill. 
238, 89 N. E. 351, holds that laches is a complete defense 
to a bill by a. stockholder to compel! an accounting by 
the corporation. 
The C·ourt also states that a shareholder must use 
diligence in the assertion of his rights to entitle him to 
relief in equity against a 'vrongful diversion of cor-
porate funds or other mis.conduc.t on the part of the com-
pany, and that negligence on his part in instituting pro-
ceedings \vill deprive him of the relief desired. 
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In Childs v. Mo. 'K. T. Ry~, 221 Fed. 219, it was held 
that laches is a defense to an equitable accounting. 
There are two cases which consider the question of 
the cancellation of shares of stock in the hands of an 
officer of a corporation, and where the doctrine of laches 
was held to prevent a requested cancellation. Those cases 
are Ca.ZiV'ada Colonriza1tion Company v. Hays, 119 Fed. 
202, and Kimball, et al., v. Chicago Hydraulic Press Brick 
Comp·arny, 119· Fed. 102. 
We desire to point out that in the action at bar no 
request is made for cancellation of this stock 'vhich was 
issued to the defendant Beckstead in 1·927-1928. This 
stock is-sued in 1927 and 19128 was the only stock tha.t was 
is-sued by the corporation to any one of the defendants 
in this case. Here the plaintiffs and the ·C.ourt want the 
defendants to account for this stock. 
In the Calivada :case the plaintiff filed suit as re-
ceiver against one of the offic.ers of that ·Company to 
cancel his .stock allegedly received without consideration. 
The stock was issued on March 13, 18915, and this action 
was -commenced on July 13, 1901, and the Court held that 
the lapse of tin1e .would prevent relief, and stated: 
"ITo let in ·.such a defense it is not ne-cessary 
tha.t a foundation ·be laid by any averment in the 
answer. .Sullivan v. Railroad Co., 94 U. S. 806, 
24 L. Ed. 324. Where the evidence discloses laches 
on the part of the complainant, a court of equity 
will refuse relief. I d. Nothing can call a court 
of equity into activity but conscience, good faith, 
and reasonable diligence. Hayward v. Bank, 96 
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U.S. 611, 618, 24 h Ed. S55. In Societe Fonciere 
et Agricole des Etats U nis Y. j 1 illken, 135 U. S. 
304, 10 Sup. Ct. 823, 34 L.· Ed. 208, a delay of only 
two yea.rs in eommencing proceeding~s to set aside 
a judgment for usury was held to be laches and 
fatal. In Evers v. Watson, 156 U. '8. ·5'27, 1·5· Sup. 
Ct. 430, 39 L. Ed. 520, the delay of complainants 
for four years to assert their claim w.as acc:ount-
ed g·ood ground for denying relief. In the p.resent 
case there \Yas a. delay of more than six years, 
which was inexcusable under the circumstances.'' 
In the Kimball case the Oourt refused to cancel 
stock issued eleven years before the action was filed. 
In that case plaintiffs contended that the stock had 
been issued unla"rfully and without consideration, and 
for the purpose of the decision their position was ac-
cepted, and the Court then p;ointed out that the question 
arose as to \Yhether they could he heard at that late date 
to complain of that transaction or were they barred by 
laches. The Court :pointed out that the record of the 
issuance of the stock was on the books of the company, 
and that between the time of the issuance of the stock 
and the filing. of the present action, the plaintiffs, or any 
one stockholder, could have found out about the issuance 
of said stock, by the exercise of the slightest d~ligence. 
The Court stated: 
'• No reason is perceived nor is any sufficient 
reason alleged why they did not discover the 
alleg-ed "'Tong at an earlier period, since the bill 
utterly fails to disclose any acts on the part of 
the defendants or either of them which amount 
to an actual concealment of the \Vrong.'' 
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The Court further stated: 
''The case is one, therefore, where the com-
.plainants' want of knowledge ,of the objectionable 
transaction was due to a lack of diligence in in-
quiring into matters in which they were deeply 
concerned; and even if it were true that an 
actual fraud V\ras intended, and that the wrong 
complained of is something more than an ultra 
¥ires act, con1nii tted by the directors of the Chi-
cag.o Company, still it does not appear that the 
wrongdoers concealed the transaction, for such 
facts as are alleged do not amount to conceal-
ment, and cannot be . accepted as an ex-cuse fQr a 
failure to discover the alleged violatiion of the 
statute, or the fraud, whichever it n1ay be." 
The Court then stated : 
''Under these circumstances, it is well settled 
by respected decisions that complainants are 
barred of their right to relief. Courts of equity 
are not disposed to upset business transacti:ons, 
or to disturb titles, that have passed unchallenged 
for years; and they will not do so unless at the-
instance of a suitor who has been diligent and 
persevering in the pursuit of his rights, and who 
can and does show good ~and sufficient reasons 
for not making an earlier application for relief. 
This doctrine is elementary, and has been fre-
quently reiterated and ap~lied, especially by the 
federal courts.'' 
We respectfully submit that because of the length 
of time the accounting for the transaction involved 
in the purchase of the insurance agency, the purchase of 
the eon trolling stock of Ashton-Jenkins Company and 
for the stock issued by the corporation to the defendants, 
are clearly barred by laches, and it would be inequitable 
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for this Court to require an accounting- on these items 
after the length of time above mentioned has expired. 
The iten1s •of account relating to the transactions 
on installm·ents, sales, etc., and on the purchase of stock 
by the corporation should not now be considered qy a 
Court of equity because ·of the _length of time which 
- has expired since the -plaintiffs and all 1other stock-
- holders were notified of the method of the cortporation 
~ in handling the forfeiture of installment S·ales, and the 
fact that the· corporation was purchasing its own stock. 
No complaint was made until the bringing of the present 
suit. 
We· call the Court's attention to the fact that the-re 
is no evidence of any alleged misconduct or mismanage-
ment since December of 19·3~5, no wrongfui acts on the 
part -of the individual defendants are claimed, asserted 
or proved since that time. 
P.OIN·T IV. 
THE PRIMARY OBYIDCT OF THIS SUIT IS RECE:IVERSHIP 
:AND NOT AIOCOU!NTING AN·D FOR THAT R·E~A'SON THE: AOTION 
MUST FAIL. 
We respectfully submit that a fair, candid and rea-
sonable consideration of this accounting order alone 
will clearly reveal and surely convince that this pur-
ported prin1ary remedy is not genuine, is without merit, 
and has no purpose whatsoever in this litigation except to 
supply a. sin1ulated support to this receivership. A consid-
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eration of this accounting order clearly reveals that 
the only purpose of this suit is receivership; that the 
only primary and ultimate relief involved in this action 
is receivership, and that the accounting decreed has no 
other function except to supply, in a fe-eble way, a re-
quirement n1ade necessary by the law. To say that this 
pur·ported accounting is the primary final relief to which 
the plaintiffs are entitled under their pleadings and 
proof, and that in order to effectuate and make effectiv~ 
this primary ultimate relief the appointment of a re-
ceiver is necessary, is to assume a positiiOn which is 
contrary to the facts plead, to the testimony given, and 
to the law of the land. 
The overwhelming weight of authority supports the 
prO'position that receivership will never be granted where 
it is s10ught as the prim~ry remedy. 
A ·concise statement of this principle is found in 
the opinion of the Supreme Court of Montana in Hart-
nett v. St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. of Montana, et al., 153 
Pac. 437: 
"It is also elen1entary, however, that the pri-
mary relief s!ought n1ust he such as will be aided 
by the appoint1nent of a reeeiver. If the object 
of the suit can as vvell be attained without a 
receiver as with one, none should be appointed. 
Forsell v. Pittsburg & Mont. C. Co., 42 Mont. 412, 
113 P'ac. 479. A further analysis of the sugges-
. tions aboiVe set forth is therefore· required, with 
a view to as·certaining whether~ under any of 
then1, a receiver would be justified.'' 
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In the case of Gordon v. Washington, 295 U. S. 30, 
79 L. Ed. 1282, ~lr. Justice Stone of the Supreme Court 
' discussed this proposition and stated: 
"But there is ·no occasion for a court of 
equity to appoint a receiver of property of which 
it is asked to make no further disposition. The 
English chancery court from the beginning de-
clined to exercise its jurisdiction for that pur-
pose. * * * '' 
"\vnenever the attempt thus to extend it, by 
using the receivership as an end instead of a 
means, has been brought to the attention of this 
Conrt, it has pointed out that a Federal -court of 
equity will not appoint a receiver where the ap-
pointment is not ancillary to some form of final 
relief which is appropriate for equity to give.'' 
(Citing numerous authorities * * *) 
''Respondents' bills of complaint not only 
failed to Heek any remedy other than the appoint-
ment of receivers, but they failed to disclose any· 
basis for equitable relief by the appointment of 
recei ~ers iOr otherwise.'' 
Clark in his excellent work on re-ceivers, paragraph 
5, volume 1, states: 
"The purp-ose of the app-ointment of a re-
ceiver after judgment is to satisfy the judgment 
in one ~vay or another * * *. The appointment 
of a. receiv·er is not granted as a matter of right, 
but it is granted as a remedy to effectuate a;nd 
work out the right granted to, the litigant in the 
primary litigation.· 
''The appointment of a receiver by an inter-
locutory decree is, therefore, a temporary expe-
dient, and ,provisional to some other or final de-
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termina.ti1o-n of the matter by the Court. It is only 
ancillary and auxiliary to the main action except 
in the rare cause of lunacy or infancy. It is not 
the office of a court of equity to appoint receivers 
as a mode of granting ultimate relief.'' 
In Central West PUblic .Service Co. v. Craig, (C. C. 
A. 8) 70 Fed. (2d) 427, the Court states: 
'' T'he appointment of a. receiver is an ancil-
lary, incidental remedy ~only; and is not final relief 
nor is it properly the end or ohjeet of the litiga-
tion, but is a remedy allow a hie only in connection 
with a suit pending for some other purpose in 
which theTe is a prayer for ultimate relief which 
the eourt has jurisdiction to grant, and to which 
the appointment of a receiver is an aid. Pusey & 
Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra; Brictson Mfg. Co. 
v. Close, (C. C. A. 8) 280 F. 297; United States 
v. Sloan Shipyards Corp., (D. C.) 270 F. 613; 
Zuber v. Micmac Gold Min. Co., (C. C.) 180 F. 
625." 
The case of Mason v. San-Val Oil & Water Com-
p1arny, ('Cal.) 36 p:ae .. (2d) 616, contains a very splenoid 
illustratiion of this principle. In that case minority 
stockholders sued the corporation, dire-ctors, officers and 
other shareholders, seeking ''an accounting of all the 
corporate transa·ctions from the ~date of incorporation, 
cancellation of stock issued to defendant shareholders, 
removal of the defendant directors and a de-claration 
that their offices are vacant and the appointment of a 
receiver. 
Plaintiff charged failure of consideration for the 
issuance of the stock, misappropriation of funds, fraud 
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and conspiracy to defraud on the part of the defendants 
as direct!ors and other,vise. The Court remarked that 
the allegations are replete with generalities and conclu-
~ions of pleaders, as is true in this case. 
After discussing certain propositions the Court ad-
dressed itself to the question as to 'v hether or not the 
receivership could in any 'yay aid the cause of the com-
- plainants and the corporation in the cancellation of the 
- stock fraudulently issued, and stated: 
'·Finally, if the action be on behalf of the 
corporation to have stock issued to certain de-
fendants declared void and canceled on the ground 
that it V{as not issued in compliance with the cor-
poration commissioner's permit or because of 
failure of considerati,on, assuming such an action 
could be brought by the plaintiffs or by the cor-
poration, no showing is made that it is such an 
action in which the. ancillary relief by appoint-
ment of a receiver is necessary or ·desirabl~ to 
insure to the plaintiffs, standing in the shoes of 
the corporation, the fruits of the equitable relief 
to which the corporation might hecome entitled. 
See Loney v. Consolidated vV a ter Co., 122 Cal. 
App. 350, 353, 9 P. (2d) 888. '' 
Forquer v. Inland Finance Comp·any, (Wash.) 253 
Pac. 1086, is a very interesting case and very similar in 
many respects to the case at bar. In the complaint the 
defendants were charged with fraud, conspiracy, mis-
management, and that the corporation was eontroll~·d 
by a small amount of voting stock. At the close of 
plaintiff's testimony the Court granted a non-suit and 
judgment was entered dismissing the action. An appeal 
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was taken. The Court in affirming the judgment of the 
lower Court stated: 
"The appellant says that the respondent is reek-
ing with fraud, that it was created in iniquity 
that it vvas organized for the benefit of Listn1an' 
who has ·Caused it to be operated in his behalf' 
that it is so organized and has been so developed 
as that, in substance, the minority control the 
1na.jority, and that if a receiver is not appointed 
such of the assets as the company now has will 
be frittered a way and nothing be left. There 
would see1n to he some truth in appellant's 
charge. ·For illustration, under the by-laws the . 
10,000 shares at $1 a share, now held by List-
man and the officers of respondent, can control 
any stockholders' meeting and can practically 
outvote the owners of all the preferred and first 
common stock. In other· vvords, stock of the par 
value ,of $10,000 can outvote stock of the par 
value of $800,000. Under these circu1nstances, 
the people vvho actually put up the large sun1s of 
money to capitalize the respondent have very 
little to say concerning its affairs, provided the 
own·ers of the second common st1ock take advan-
tage of the strong position in which they are 
* :J(:: :J(:: 
' 'If ~lr. Listman has heretofore .controlled 
the company and its officers, as is cla.in1ed by 
appellant, and if there has been fraud, misnlan-
agemen.t, ·or bad judgment, it must be remembered 
that those are things of the past and cannot be 
remedied by the ·appointn1ent of a receiver. R~­
g'a.rdless of the cause or ~causes, the company ts 
in its present financial plight, and we c-annot undo 
what has been done. The appellant is but a ven· 
small stockholder. He is not even a creditor, for 
as such he would be in a stronger position to 
ask for a receiver than merely as a stockhold~r. 
Nor does be seek rescission for fraud or m1s-
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representations. lie only asks that a receiver be 
appointed. The articles of incorporation and the 
by-la\\·s plainly show the character of the organ-
ization, and those who became stockholders had 
an opportunity, of course, to kno\v the structure 
of the concern in \Yhich they were investing. In 
cases of this kind we Inust look more to t.he future 
than to the past.'' 
.Shearer v. Union ltlortgage Company, 28 Ohio Ap-
peal 373, 162 North Eastern 696, was an action by a 
minority stockholder :on behalf of all the stockholders of 
the defendant corporation against the defendant cor-
poration and all of its directors charging the directors 
with malfeasance and misfeasance in ·office. The com-
plaint alleges a diversion 10f corporate assets for private 
use, a payment of dividends out of ca~pital stock, the 
issuance of false financial statements., and that the bus-
iness of the company had been conducted so neglig_ently 
that its property and assets were· insufficient to pay 
its debts or to afford rea8onable security to those who 
might deal with said corporation. A. motion was made 
on behalf of the plaintiffs for the appointment of a 
receiver, which was denied by the Trial C:ourt, and on 
this appeal the ruling ~of said Court· '\Vas affirmed. 
The statutes of Ohio, are similar to those of Utah, 
and the Court relies on H oiles v. Watkins, Supra, as 
sustaining the ruling of the ~ower Court, pointing out 
that the appointment of a receiver is merely ancillary 
to the main cause of action. 
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'' 'l1he ultimate relief sought in the petition 
givi~g it the most lib~ral int~rpretation that may 
be given, and conee-9-~ng what counsel for plain-
tiff claims, is as before observed, first, an in-
junction; second, an acc;ounting; third, a disso-
lution of the corporation. There is nothing in the 
fa·cts pleaded in support of the claim for an 
injunction which in the slightest degree indicates 
any necessity for the s~rvices of a receiver. If 
the trial · court ultimately grants the injunction 
that is the end of that controversy and no further 
~ction would pe necessary on the part of ~ny of 
the parties concerned. The action for an account-
ing is not an acti:on against the defendant coin-
pany, p-q.t an actiqn for its benefit, ang against its 
directors individually.'' 
The Court fp.rtber bold~ that it is. w~ll settled th~t 
A Court of equity has no l>ower to dis.~olve a corpor-
fttion 1or winq -qp its aff~irs and ~equestrat~ its property 
in the absen~e of expre~s statutory aut4ority. Th~re is, 
of co-qr~e, no f3Ucb authority in the Sta:te pf Utah. 
In Arcola Sugar Mills Company v. Burmho;na, 61 
Fed. ( 2d) 981, the Court states : 
~'An account can be had just as well without 
as with the appointment of a receiver." 
One of th~ finest discussions of the pri:pciple that 
A r~·c~iv~rship will 11ever be grant~~ p_nless necessary 
pr beneficial i~ fqp.nq in the Penn~ylvania ~ase of Mc-
Dougla v. Huntingdon & Brp(Jrr}; 'fpp Mt. R. R. & C. Co., 
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143 Atl. 57 4, frpm wllich th~ following i:pt~re~ting lan-
gQ~ge i;s ta.k~n : 
''There is nothing, ho\Yever, \vhich affects a 
~orporation with such serious con~equences as 
does the appointment of a receiver; it is a severe, 
and may be termed an heroic, remedy, and t:P.~ 
conditions that call it into action should be such 
as would, if persisted in, ordinarily be, fatal to 
corporate life. The ap:pointinent is a distress 
sig·nal, and is immeqiately follovved py lowering 
pf financi~l credit ~nd a genera,! readjustment. 
It follows, beca11se of the intense responsibility 
attached to the office, courts will not appoint re-
ceivers where there is well-fiounded suspicion it 
would be followed by serious injustice or injury 
to the rights of all parties interested. The court, 
before any appointment is made, will act with 
the utmost caution. Receivers will not be ap·-
pointed unless · the chancellor is convinced the 
right is free from doubt (Howth v. Coulbourne 
Bros. Co., 155 Md. 107, 80 A. 9~6), the loss irre-
parable, with no adequate legal remedy, and the 
relief sought is . necessary. Receivers are ap-
pointed only in aid of s10n1e recognized, presently 
existing, legal right, and will not be appointed 
where receivership is the sole relief asked. * * * 
''In order words, it must appear vn this, as 
in all other cases, that the appointment of a 
receiver will serve some beneficial purpose to the 
stockholders. Sternberg v. Wolff, 56 N. J. Eq. 
389, 39 A. 397, 39 L. R. A. 762, 67 Am. St. Rep. 
494. '' 
In R'ichardson v. Clinton Wall Trunk Mfg. Co., (1902) 
181 Mass. 580, 6.4 N. E. 400, where minority stockholders 
fJOUght the appointment of a receiver RlJ.d an injunction 
a8'ains~t the officers and. directors of the company, who, 
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it was alleged, had fraudulently used the property and 
franchise of the ·corporation for their private gain, and 
had misappropriated the assets in various w~ys, it was 
held that, although the complainant had showed a proper 
case for equitable relief, necessity for the appointment 
of a receiver was not shown: 
I 
''The appointment of a receiver is not neces-
sary or proper as ancillary to an injunction 
against doing business ultra vires, oT to an order 
for an account of p:voperty misappropriated by 
· directors. Ordinarily a receiver will not be ap-
pointed in actions against directors or officers 
of a ·corporation for a misconduct in its manage-
ment. * * * nor ·will such an appointment be 
made when receivership would amount in effect 
to a dissolution of the corporation.'' 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland Tecognized this 
principle in Polly v. Camden Bldg: & Sav. Ass'n, 175 
Atl. 599, where a suit was brought for receivership, the 
Court ·stating: 
"It is shown by the evidence that dividends 
'vere allowed in one or two years when they were 
not earned, and that their payment tended to 
reduce the capital. This was certainly bad judg-
ment and illegal, and may have given rise to an 
action at law 10n the part of the plaintiff if she 
did_ not receive her portion of the dividends im-
properly paid. But there is no evidence of any 
bad faith or fraud in connection 'vith thes·e pay-
ments. No good purpose would be served by the 
appointment of a receiver in this connection." 
The fact that the 1owners of a majority of the stock, 
holding all of the offices, have .paid themselves larger 
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salaries than they should, and have blended their private 
business \\·ith the business of the corporation, and failed 
properly to account for money of the corporation thus 
comming-led with their O\Yn, is held in Enterprise Print-
ing d5 Pu.b. Co. v. Craig, (1924) 195 Ind. 309, 145 N. E. 
309, rehearing denied in (1924) 195 Ind. 302, 144 N. E. 
542, not .a ground for the appointment of a receiver 10r 
dissolution, as these remedies are not necessary to obtain 
an accounting on behalf of the corpora.ti,on, the business 
being successfully manag-ed. 
In the case of Miller. v. Albertina Realty Compa;ny, 
190 N. Y. S. 407 minority stockholders brought an 
action against the corporati,on and its directors seeking 
a dissolution of the corporation, an accounting by the 
directors, a sale of the p·roperty and distribution of the 
proceeds. Among other things it V\ras charged that the. 
defendant directors ''acting in collusion and conspiracy 
with one another, have misapplied, nrisappropriated, 
and diverted to their own use and benefit, or to the use 
and benefit of other corporati,ons in which the personal 
defendants are interested as stockholders or officers,'' 
the property, money and assets of the corporation, and 
that the said personal defendants acted in had faith 
and in breach ,of their duty as directors and officers of 
the corporation, and for their O\vn personal benefit, 
adYautage and profit, or for the benefit, advantage and 
}Jrofit _of other corporations in \vhich they were pers,on-
ally interested. 
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The Cohft rioted that not a single fact was alleged 
showing any diversion or misappropriation. In the 
case at bar the eighteen hundred pages of the transcript 
df evidence may be searched in vain for any single bit 
of proof shoV.ririg that any of the personal defendants 
have ever mi~appropriated, vvrongfully diverted or taken 
any of the assets of the corporation. 
In the New York case the general charges were 
denied as "rere the charges in this case. The 
defendants in the New York case stateq. by affidavit that 
they had kept true and accurate books of account, and 
that the books had been ·constantly kept in the office and 
accessible to any and all of the stockholders, including 
the plaintiffs. 
Similar testimony was offered in this case and was 
unquestioned~ No suspicion was ever cast by the testi-
mony of any witness upon the accuracy and complete-
ness of the books of this corporation or. their availability 
to stockholders~ 
The Trial Court in the New York case ordered an 
ac:countihg' and appointed a receiver, tliis order was 
reversed. 
Fron1 the ·opinion we quote as follows: 
''Neither in his pleading nor in his affidavit 
has the plain tiff ·ShO\Yli arty evidence of a misa p-
propriation or diversion .of the property ~of. the 
corporation and there were no conflicting state-
ments of fact to 1be determined. Furthermore, a~ 
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we stated in Fenn v. Ostrander, 1:12 App. Div. 
311, 313, 116 X. Y. Supp. 1083: 
·' ',,~hether or not the court should in any 
event, in an action like the present, appoint a 
receiver of the assets of a corporation merely 
upon the ground ·of n1isconduct of the officers or 
direct:ors has been the subject of much discussion 
and some diYersity of opinion. The rule now 
generally aceepted seen1s to be that mere mis-
c-onduct \Yill not justify the .appointment of a 
receiver, unless such an appointment be necessary 
to preserve the property or rights of creditors 
or stoekholders. Phillips v. Sonora Copper Co., 
90 App. Div. 142; 23 Am. & Eng. ~ncy. of Law 
(2d Ed.) 1023. It is also well established that a 
receiver "ill not be appointed up!On loose and 
general allegations of fraud and maladministra-
tion, made on information and belief and unsup-
ported by anything that can reasonably be called 
legal proof, especially when the answering affi-
davits deny the allegations contained in the mov-
ing papers. ' 
''In 1011r opinion it was an abuse of discretid.fi 
for the justice to appoint .a referee. The corpor-
ation is entirely solvent, no good reason appears 
why a receiver should have been app·ointed, and 
the motion should have been denied. ' ' 
We confidently assert that these authorities rep-
resent the overwhelming \veight of authority on the pro-
position stated at the outset hereof. We contend that 
tinder no circumstaneeis could .a receiver beneficially aid 
either the Court or these plaintiffs, or any o.f them, in 
effectuating the accounting as orde~ed, granting Without 
/ admitting that the accounting ordered is in any way sup-
ported by tlie pleadings, proof and findings in this case . 
. A receiver ,could not aid or he beneficial in any acedunt-
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ing based upon the purchase of the insurance agency or 
the cqntrolling stock in the Ashton-Jenkins c·ompany, 
for the simple reason that the corporation has been at 
all ti,me~ willing to supply any and all information on 
these subjects, and the Court has never found, and plain-
tiffs have never intimated, that any of this information 
was being wit·hheld. These transactions hav-e been termi-
nated for many years. A receiver could not in any way 
aid or be benefici'al to an accounting of the forfeiture 
of installment sales for the same reason. It cannot be 
conceived how or in what manner a receiver could aid 
in procuring an accounting on the matter of funds of the 
eorporation used in the procurement of its outstanding 
stock. Even the Court did not find or intimat~ that any 
information .on this matter was being. withheld by the 
·corporation, or that there was any other evidence or 
testimony whatsoever upon this subject which "ras not 
produced at the trial. 
As to the :matter pertaining to the intercorporate 
relationship between the Beckstead Livestock Company 
and its parent, the United B·ond and Finanee ·Corpora-
tion, nothing more or less than a matter of bookkeeping 
is involved. A r·eceiver could do nothing more than bring 
the books and records of these· corporations into Court, 
and the corporate. offi·cers were not only willing, but 
did bring these records to Court and offer full opportun-
ity to examine and full explanation of the various entries 
therein contained. 
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How a rec.eiver could pe of any aid to the Court or 
- these plaintiffs in the Inatter of accounting with respect 
to Beckstead's stock interests, we are at a loss to under-
stand. No information has ever been \vithheld. No 
finding \ras made that such information ''Tas not produced 
.. in Court. It is all here, and the record in this case· dis-
closes eYery detail with respect thereto. The conclusion 
that a receiver cannot in any way aid in effe~tuating .this 
· accounting order is positively inevitable. ·The very fact 
- that this accounting order has and can serve no bene-
ficial purpose whatsoever as herein demonstrated shows 
that the sole and only purpose of his action is .receiver-
ship. 
NO GROUNDS FOR RIDCEIVERSHI'P ARE ALLEGE:D, PROVED 
OR FOUND. 
Having heretofore fully discussed the phase of the 
decree ordering and directing an accounting, and having 
shown we think conclusively that said accounting ~order 
is erroneous and is unsupported by the pleadings, find-
ings and proof, we shall now discuss the phase of the 
case ·pertaining to the cause for receiyership independ-
ent of the accounting o~der, and will demonstrate that 
the cause for receivership as found by the Court is con-
trary to the purported cause for receivership alleged 
in the complaint, and that there is a fatal variance 
between the· cause as found and the cause as alleged, 
and that the material findings as made stand in the 
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record unsupported by pleadings or 1pr;oof, and that no 
findings were made on the material allegations and 
charges set forth in the complaint and we shall further 
show that there is no useful or beneficial pu~pose what-
soever for the appointment of a receiver. 
The Court in its decree after ordering an accounting 
as the primary relief gran ted, then pronounced judgment 
on the ancillary matter and appointed a general receiver 
of all of the property of the defendant, United Bond and 
Finance Corporation, of every kind, nature and descrip-
tion wherever located and by \vhomsoever held or claimed, 
specifically including the carpital stock of the Beckstead 
Livestock Company, and also all of the property, both 
real and personal, of every kind and nature whatsoever 
owned and controlled lby the Beckstead Livestock Com-
pany. There is nothing, however, in the decree from 
which it can be determined how ~or in what manner, th~ 
receivership can be of any aid whatsoever to the ac~ 
counting. 
The receiver so appointed, among other things, was 
/ ' 
authorized to conduct and carry on the business of the 
two defendant ·COrporations; to take charge of the income 
and to ;op·er.a te and manage the business of these con~ 
cerns; to prosecute and defend actions and to do any 
a.nd all things necessary to carry on said business enter-
prises. The corporate officers are .ordered to turn over 
all books artd property of· the corporation in their 
possession ai1d are restrained from iil any W:ay inter-
fering vYith the receivers. It is also ordered that the 
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receiver shall retain possession of said .property aiid 
shall continue to dis-charge the duties of its trust urttil 
further ordered by the Court. 
It does not appear fron1 the decree how or in what 
·manner the accounting and the judg1.nen t to he rendered 
thereon, \Yhen such is made, shall affect the tenure of 
office of the receiver. All that appears from the decree 
is that there shall be an accounting· and that the receiver 
shall take possession of the corporate property and 
handle its affairs. In fact, it does not appear from the 
decree that there is to be any relationship whatsoever he-
tween the accounting· ordered and the receivership 
created. 
This receive.rship must fail for the reason that the 
decree creating and ordering said receivership is nit-
supported by the ·findings, the proof and the pleadings, 
and the receivership is without any useful or 'beneficial 
purpose whatsoever. 
In presenting our argument pertaining to the inde-
pendent cause for receivership we do not 'vant the Court 
to conclude that 've are in any way abandoning our 
position that the receivership here must fail "\vith the 
failure of the primary cause as hereinabove argued. In 
this part of our brief "\Ve desire inerely to direct the 
Court's attention to the phase of this case which is not in 
any way concerned "\vith the accounting for the purpose 
of indicating that said cause consists of general accusa-
tions and charges, and findings which are likewise gen-· 
eral in nature, and unsupported by the evidence and for 
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the further purpose of sho"Ting that this independent 
caus-.e, such as it is, does not in any V\·ay indicate the nec-
essity or need for a receiver. 
The Court will realize that the findings of fact are 
burdened with conclusions and excess verbiage; that they 
overlap in many particulars; that they are in some in-
stances contradictory; that they are ·carelessly and hur-
riedly drawn, and to say the least, confusing. Even 
with a careful analysis and study it is difficult to clearly 
understand either the theory upon which they are based 
or the story they seek to tell. Many. of the findings 
appear to have no materiality or relevancy whatsoever. 
We shall set forth and discuss all ·of these finding·s a.nd 
parts of findings which appear to have any n1ateriality 
at all upon the question of receivership. 
An accurate statement ·of the law governing in nlat-
ters such as we are here ·Considering is found in 53 C. J. 
38: 
''It is a general rule that, in order to obtain 
the appoint1nent of a receiver, applicant must 
show that the possession of the property by de-
fendant "·as obtained by fraud, or that the prop-
erty itself, or the income .arising from it, is in 
danger of loss from neglect, waste, 1nisconduct, 
or insolvency. A si1nilar state1nent is that, aside 
· from statutory provisions, a receiver will not be 
appointed unless it appears that the appoinbnent 
is necessary 'to prevent fraud or to save thP 
property from irijury or threatened loss or de-
struction.'' 
"Receivers should not be appointed * * • 
because a danger has existed in the past; the 
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OCCasion and danger must exist \Yhen the appoint-
ment is n1ade.'' · 
\Ve direct the Court's attention to these general 
statements in order to advise the Court of the point 
- towards 'vhich the discussion W'"hich follows will be 
· directed. 
In presenting our discussion on this phase of the 
appeal we shall refer in the order set forth to the 
following subjects which a.ppelar in the findings of fact : 
1. Discouragen1ent of stockholders in the. United 
Bond and Finance Corl?oration. 
2. Use of corporate funds 1n the acquirement of 
outstanding stock in ·the United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration. 
3. Transactions relating to the Beckste.ad Live-
stock Company. 
4. Beckstead '·s domination of the affairs of the 
defendant ·Corporations .. 
5. Beckstead's financial relations with the defend-
ant corporations. 
6. Stock in the Finance Corporation as obtained 
and held by Beckstead. 
7. Investors Thrift Company. 
8. Ashton-Jenkins Insurance Agency. 
9. Acquiring of controlling stock interests in the 
Asht.on-J enkins Company. 
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10. Cancellation~ o.f partia,ll~ perform~d contracts 
for the purchase of stock and securities on an install-
m~nt plan. 
11. Legal actions pending .against the Finance Cor-
poration. 
12. General charges and findings of misappro~pria­
tion ~of company's assets. 
In the fore&o~ng subje-cts we have attempted tp 
cover all ·of the .rna tters :contained in the ,findings which 
could have any ·possible relation to the claimed mis-
management of the affairs of the defendant corpor-
~ti~ops~ a,nd all rq.~tters which in any WflY pert~in to that 
:phfl~e. -of ~b~ d~Gr.e~ wlH~r~in a rec~~v~r wa~ a:p:ppinteq. 
I. DISCOURAGEMENT OF STOCKHOLDERS IN THE. UNITED 
BoND AND FINANCE OoRPORA'J]ION. 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
It is found that B·eckstead at or prior to September 
2~, 19~1 ~ntered upon fl. s<::4~llH~ of ~(}qUlring the out-
. . . . 
standing stock of the United Bond .and finance Corpor:-
~ti~on at a discount, and in that connection represented, 
or caused to be represented, to .stockholders, that the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation was in the course 
of liquidation and wa~ closing. out its affairs and that 
no dividends would ever be paid and that ~tockholders 
would never receive any returns on their investments. 
That the stockholders believed said representations and 
became dissatisfied and ·disheartened, and Beckstead 
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then enter~d ·tnto the schPme of acquiring United Bond 
and Finance Corporation stock in exchange for stock 
and securities of little or no value, including stock of 
, the Investors Thrift Company, .. A.merican Keene Plaster 
and Cement Company and certi·ficEl,.tes in the Tri-.Base 
, Oil Company, a fictitious entity created :by one, Pan-
dolfo. That Beckstead also caused to be represented 
to the said stockholders that in order to a¥oid a com-
plete loss of the investment to them he had caused 
the company to or had personally acquired other stock, 
including that -of the Investors ·Thrift ·Corporation, the 
American Keene Plaster and Cement Company and whis-
key warehouse receipts, which would he delivered to said 
inve"Stors in eX!change for their stock. It is further found 
that Beckstead has caused sales and brokerage agencies 
to be organized and agents of the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation to be licensed under other agencies 
to ·make effective acquisition of the said United Bond 
and Finance Corporation stock. It is further found that 
Beckstead has represented, and caused to be represented, 
to inquiring stockholders, that the United Bond and 
Finance Corporation was in a failing ·Condition and that 
he had further s-ent out financial statements of the 
~ffairs of the corporation which did not represent the 
complete ·financial condition of the said corporation. 
l.t is further found that Beckstead gave lists .of names, 
f1dQ.resses and amounts of investments of the investors 
in the United Bond and Finance Corporation to his 
a~sociates and agents in orger to carry out this plan 
or scijeme .of acqu1r1n~ ·putstanding ~tock. T:Q.is plan 
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according- to the findings has been carried out throughout 
Utah and elsewhere and investors have relied upon the 
representations and given up their stock. (See Find-
ings Nos. 18, 21, 22, 2··3 1and '26). 
(B) PLEADINGS. 
The. only allegatio~ in eonnection with this matter 
is found in the first paragraph of paragr.aph (10) of the 
complaint, and there it is alleged that Beckstead so 
handled and advertised the business of the Finance 
·Corporation as to discourage the investors, and in so 
discouraging them· induced them to act on representa-
tions and reports and to surrender their stock for 
nominal or no consideration, in exiehange for stock 
in other corporations which Beckstead had caused to 
·be set .up, including the Investors 'Thrift and the Amer-
ican Keene Plaster and ·Ce·ment ~c·ompany, and that Beck-
stead through the use of these means and in exchange 
for these valueless se-curities was able to and did obtain 
the stock of the Montana stockholders for his own per-
sonal benefit and advantage. 
(C) PROOF AND DISCUSSION. 
The direct evidence with respect to discouragement 
of stockholders came from the witnesses Rich, A. 'Y· 
S:mith, Pearce and Petty. It wiH he reoolled that Pearce 
had no ·Connection whatsoever with the ·Corporation prior 
to the late fall of 1935, and that his connection with the 
corporation terminated entirely in the month of January, 
1936, this according to his own testimony. That his 
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1i~7 
activities 'vere confined to contacts w·ith fe'v stockholders 
and former stockholders in the State of Utah. Ac-
eording to the undisputed evidence in thi:s case the 
vast majority of the stock purchased by the corporation 
had been purchased prior to the time when Pearce had 
any connection with the corporatioll: whatsoever. The 
same can be said concerning· Rich and Smith, with this 
exception, that R.ic.h and 1Smith ·both admitted that they 
never "\vere employed by the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation. That they ~acted solely as agents of the· 
Smith Brokerage Company, and that their connection 
with the Smith Brokerage Company terminated prior 
to 'Thanksgiving -of 1935, and that their contacts vvi th 
stockholders of the Finance Corporation up to that time 
had been very limited. Petty testified that in 1934 he 
had a conversation vvith Beckstead and Beckstead ex-
plained that the corporation was not in a ·Condition to 
pay any dividends. That when he transferred his stock 
to Pearce he talked with Beckstead on the telephone 
but no mention was made at that time as to the condi-
tion of the corporation. The better evidence in the 
case would indicate that the reason f.or -so much United 
Bond and Finance Corporation stock being on the mar-
ket was the great depression, and that it was due to this 
depression that the cor.poration could not pay dividends, 
and the general need for ready money caused the stock-
holders to sell and trade their stock for whatever they 
could obtain. 
we submit to the c.ourt, that from all the evidence 
in this case it appear~ that the stockholders who sold 
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their stock ~placed it on the market because of the gen-
eral depression and not because of any campaign car-
ried on for the purpose of discouraging them. It 
appears conclusively from the evidence that there was 
no agreement or understanding betw·een the corporation 
and any of the stocktraders. The stocktraders worked 
independently .of the corporation. and were not repre-
sentative of it in any capacity whatsoever. There is 
no evidence in this record whatsoever of any general 
activity on the part of the corporation or its officers 
carried on for the purpose of dis-couraging stockholders. 
The testimony of plaintiffs' witness, Arthur W. 
Madsen, whose testimony commences at R. page 863, 
exemplifies the manner in which these stocktraders oper-
ated. l-Ie testified that he worked for Pandolfo for 
about three weeks, and that during that time he traded 
certificates in the Tri-Base Oil C.ompany for any secur-
ities that he was able to obtain. He testified that he had 
several lists of stockholders, among which was a list of 
the Finance Corporation stockholders. This witness 
could not remember of any transaction in which he had 
obt~ained any Finance Coflporation stock for these cer-
tificates. This testimony indicates that the stocktrader 
Pandolfo was out to .sell or trade ·certificates in the 
Tri-Base Oil Company for any type of security for which 
he could later receive money. This is the only direct 
evidence in the re-cord fron1 stncktraders or representa-
tives ,of stocktraders. 
Financial statements of the Finance Corporation 
were sent out to its stockholders each and every year. 
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(R.163~-1685-1691) Each of these statements reflected a 
s·olvent corporate c.ondition, and a surplus over and 
above all liabilities. These financial st~atements were 
prepared by certified public accountants. Statements 
covering the years from 1933-1938, inclusive, were in-
troduced in evidence as defendants' Exhibit 27. Beck-
stead sent out circular letters warning the stockholders 
of the Finance Corporation against exchanging their 
stook. One of these letters is Exhibit 23. 
Of one thing there can be no d.oubt as far as the 
evidence in this case is concerned, and that is that if 
there ever was a scheme or plan on the part of the 
officers of the corporation to discourage stockholders 
for the purpose of procuring stock, then that p·1an and 
scheme has long since been abandoned. That no effort 
has been made for several years to purchase this stock, 
and that except for a few instanc.es no ·stock has been 
purchased since 1936, and that there is no present danger 
nor indication of danger that the corp.orate officers will 
engage in this activity in the future. No representations 
to any stockholders have been made since 1935 under 
the evidence in this case which ·could discourage them in 
the continued holding of their stock. 
I1L USE ·OF CoRPORATE FuNDs IN ·THE AcQUIREMENT 
OF OUTSTANDING STOCK IN THE uNITED BOND AND 
FINANCE CoRPORATION. 
The findings, the pleadings and pr.oof on this sub-
Je<;t have been fully set forth under our discussion on 
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the accounting order. So far as this bears on tne 
appointment of a receiver, we call the Court's attention 
to the fact that none of the money used by the corpor-
ation for the purchase of this stock was misappropriated 
or converted by Beckstead or any of the other individual 
defendants. There is no finding that they did. There 
is no pr.oof that they did. The stock which was obtained 
by the use of these corporate assets is now owned by 
the Finance Corporation and fully and accurately ac-
counted for in the records of the Finance Corporation 
introduced in evidence at the trial. The conditions which 
existed at the time the great bulk of this was purchased 
we believe justified the directors of the corporation in 
making the purchase of this stock. 
The case of Pace VJS. Pace Brothers Co., et al., 91 
Utah 132, 59 Pac. (2d) 1, was decided in June, 1935, 
and this case for the first time ·established the law in 
this state that the purchase by a corporation of its 
outstanding stock is prohibited ~by law. Th[s case of 
course was decided after the great majority of the stock 
had been purchased by the corrp9ration. 
We submit that the evidence would clearly indicate 
that prior. to the announcement of the opinion in the 
Pace case that the pra~tice of corporations in buying 
in their own stock was considered lawful and was a 
general practice among corporations doing business 
here at that time. ''T e do not believe this Court, or 
any Court, would hold that directors in the position 
of defendants in this case. who purchased the stock of 
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tue corporation in accordance '"ith a general p·ractice 
or custom \Vere guilty of 1nismanagement. It appears 
conclusiYely from the record that this practice has 
ceased, and that it ceased for all practical purposes in 
1936. Further1nore, we are not prepared to admit that 
the practice as followed by the corporation herein does 
,·iolence to the holding of the Court in the Pace case. 
III. TRANSACTIONs RELATING To THE BECKSTEAD LivE-
sTOCK CoMPANY. 
Heretofore in our discussion with respect to the 
accounting order we have set forth in detail the findings, 
the pleadings and the proof with respect to this phase of 
the case. 
We have called the Court's attention to the fact that 
the -complaint charges Beckstead with the organization 
of the Beckstead Livestock Company for the purpose 
of diverting property of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation to his own use, and that in the ·Complaint 
it is charged that upon the organization of the Livestock 
Company the full stock issue vvas taken by Beckstead 
without consideration and is no'Y held and claimed by 
him, and that there is present danger that it \vill be 
negotiated to bona-fide purchasers for value without 
notice to detriment .of the Finance Corporation. This 
charge is contrary to the finding, in that the Court seems 
to find that the invest1nent of corporate assets in the 
Beckstead T.Jivestock Company was an act of mismanage-
Dlent. The Court found of course, as required by the 
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evidence, that all of the stock of the Beckstead Livestock 
Cornpany has from the outset been owned and is now 
o\vned by the United Bond and Finance Corporation, and 
that all property purchased with Finance Corporation 
assets is now owned, possessed and controlled by the 
Beckstead Livestock Company. 
We subrnit to the C•ourt that if it had been found 
that the directors of the United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration organized this company with fraudulent and 
unlawful intent, then under those circumstances their 
actions would have amounted to mismanagement. There 
is, however, no such finding, and no evidence upon which 
such finding could have been made. 
The only rna tter that can present an 1s·sue, as re-
vealed by the evidence, ls on the question concerning 
the wisdon1 of this investment. No contention was ever 
made to the effect that the ranch property was worth 
less than the consideration paid. The evidence would 
seem to indicate that these investments are good in-
vestments and that there are good prospects for future 
earnings and profits from this venture. 
Courts, without any exception, from the very earliest 
time have denied receiverships even where the judgn1ent 
exercised by the corporate officers was not the best, where 
it was exercised in good faith in corporate matters 
and for greater reasons receiverships are denied where 
there is doubt concerning the wisdom and the judg-
ment which actuated the acts of the corporate officers. 
The only evidence in the record on this question is to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
143 
effe-ct that the eorporate officers in good fa,ith believed 
they 'vere acting for the best interest of the corporation 
in procuring this property. They have managed it 
wisely, efficiently and well. There is no showing that 
a receiver could be of any benefit "\vha tsoever to the 
corporation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs, in tak-
ing over this property. The uniform experience of the 
Courts would indicate that a receiver could not operate 
these pr·operties vvi th the efficiency and economy that 
the board of directors ·can. We say confidently that 
there is nothing connected with the Beckstead Livestock 
Company which would require or justify the Court to 
seriously consider the appointment of a receiver, and 
certainly there is nothing which appears in the proof 
or findings on this subject which could cause anyone 
the slightest apprehension as to the destruction, loss or 
waste .of corporate property. 
IV. BECKSTEAD's DoMINATION OF THE AFFAIRs OF 
THE DEFENDANT CoRPORATIONS. 
Plaintiffs allege and the Court finds that Beckstead 
has dominated the affairs of these corporations since 
their organization. This without ·question is true. 
We believe that the findings truly set forth the result 
of Beckstead's domination and contr.ol of the Finance 
Corporation. It is found that stock in the amount of 
$33'2,000.00 has been sold by the Finance ;Corporation. 
(Finding No. 11) That in the course of the Finance 
Corporation acquiring its outstanding stock $203,000.00 
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of the corporation's stock liability has been discharged 
by the ~se of $85,000.00 of corporate assets (Findings, 
Nos. 19, 22, 36) and that the coJ1loration still has in 
excess of $300,000.00 worth of property (Finding No. 
42) and Beckstead himself is financially irresponsible 
(Finding 35). 
In the complaint it is alleged and charged that Beck-
stead has dominated the ~affairs of the corporation since 
prior to 1931 " 7ith a scheme and purpose in mind of 
unlawfully diverting the assets of the corporation to his 
own use and benefit. The Court finds that the s·cheme 
was not as alleged, but to use the corporate assets for 
the benefit of his stockholdings. Neither the charge nor 
the findings are supported by the evidence. The evi-
dence conclusively shows that from the outset 'Beckstead 
has held the majority of the voting stock and that he held 
such majority prior to the time that one single share of 
the outstanding stock was repur.chased. 
In considering this matter of domination the~ Court 
must have in 1nind the question as to whethet or not 
this domination \vhich can be 1n.ore accurately described 
as manage1nent, has been for the benefit or detriment of 
the corporation itself. That the corporation's property 
has been protected appears clearly from the evidence. 
That its debts, obligations and taxes have been paid 
likewise appears. The plaintiffs were willing to stipulate 
that all of the apartment houses, the ranches, the live-
stock and other properties of the corporation are being 
cared for with efficiency and a high degre.e of care and 
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- skill and at the same time the plaintiffs .produce proof ~ ' 
:- indicating that none of the corporate property had been 
~- diverted to Beckstead personally or to any 1nembers of 
~ 
... 
his family or to any other person 'vhoinsoever. 
From a consideration of the evidence, 'vhich indi-
~ cates that this corporation ca1ne into existence a short 
]I time prior to the great depression; that it survived 
! the depression, and is now in a solvent, flourishing, 
condition, having a large surplus over liabilities of 
any kind, we cannot understand how a C.ourt could 
·- charge the activities of those responsible for this state 
m of affairs with _misn1anagement or with wrongful d.om-
' . t• 1na 1on. 
Every corporation which has ever been organi~ed 
is dominated by those holding a majority of its oustand-
- ing voting stock. Ever:T investor in any corporate enter-
prise understands this to be the rule. Every investor 
in this corporation knew at the ti~me he bought his 
stock whether or not his stock carried voting privileges, 
and if it did, he kn~w and understood that the cor-
-. p.oration would be run and managed by those holding 
a majority of the voting stock. 
r~ These plainti~s are not entitled to a receivership 
, Iuerely because they do not hold a majority of the voting 
~ stock of this corporation. The position of the minority 
b 
stoekholders \vill not lbe made ,m.ore secure by the appoint-
mPnt of a receiver for the .simple reason that immedi-
a tnly upon the discharge of the receiver those holding 
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a majority ,of the voting stock will again take control 
of the management of the corporate affairs. 
V. BECKSTEAD's FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE 
DEFENDANT CoRPORATIONs. 
It is found that 'Beckstead has :r;eceived from said cor-
p·ora tion from 1931 to January 1940, a salary of $100.00 
per week, and that commencing with said latter date he 
has ·Caused his salary to become increased to the sum 
of $6,000.00 per annum, the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation to pay $250.00 a month and the Livestock. 
Company a like sum. It is further found that Beckstead, 
with the consent of the Board of Directors, has caused 
the funds of the Finance Corporation to he invested in 
certain residence property in Salt Lake City which has 
been occupied by Be-ckstead and his family, and that 
inadequate rent is paid therefor. It is further found 
that the said residence property is the third so acquired 
by Beckstead with funds of the Finance Corporation 
for his exclusive use. (Finding No. 34) It is further 
found that Beckstead 1s financially irresponsible. (See 
Finding No. 35) 
The only allegation with respect to Beckstead's 
financial relation with the company is contained in para-
graph (11) of paragraph (10) found on p~age (12) of 
the complaint, vvherein it is alleged that Beckstead and 
Boyd Evans are drawing funds in substantial amounts 
from the United Bond ·and Finance Corporation under 
the guise of salaries or compensation, and without right 
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o-iying· consideration thert•for. There is no findin2· that b '-- L> 
Beckstead reeeiYed money "·ithout legal right or au-
,, 
' thority to do so, and there i~ no finding· that he received 
this money ·without rendering serviees and g·iving con-
sideration therefor. 
The balance of the findings with respect to Beck-
stead's relation \Yith the company relate to the purchase 
of residence property by the Finance Corporation "\vhieh 
were .occupied by Beckstead and his family, and that an 
inadequate rent was paid therefor. There ~s absolutely 
no allegation with respect to this matter, and hence it 
is not an issue in the ease. 
It is difficult to understand how a receiver could 
- be of any benefit to the corporation, its stockholders 
- or these plaintiffs in regard to this matter. We submit 
that if the plaintiffs had 'been of the opinion that the 
rent paid by Beckstead 'vas inadequate they would have 
attempted to plead and prove this proposition. There 
was neither pleading nor evidence offered to show that 
the rent was inadequate. If the plaintiffs had believed 
that the consideration paid B-eckstead for his services 
to these corporations was excessive they should have 
pr.oduced some evidence to that effect. They produced 
none. If it should appear to the Court, regardless of 
the lack of evidence, that the rent is inadequate or the 
salaries excessive, these rna tters can be reached and. 
rmnedied ·by a simple order of the Court which has before 
it all parties and the evidence upon which to act. Surely 
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there is no place here for a receiver, nor any reason 
why one should be appointed. 
VI. STOCK IN THE FINANCE CoRPORATION As OB-
TAINED AND HELD BY BECKSTEAD. 
This matter has been fully discussed herein in con-
nection with our argument on the accounting· order. 
We believe that that discus~ion c~nclusively shows that 
the stock ·Obtained ·by Beckstead was obtained in each 
instance for valuable consideration and was fully paid 
for. In any event, all of this stock was obtained in 1927 
and 1928, between twelve and thirteen years before the 
commencement of the present action. 
In this, as in the other 1natters hereinabove discussed, 
there is 1io place for a receiver, nor any reason why 
one should be appointed. If this stock is held and owned 
by Beckstead in violation of law and as a result of a 
fraud perpetrated upon the corporation, then there 
should have ·been allegations, proof and findings .to that 
effect. There are none, and even if there were, there 
see1ns to be a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law 
or in equity available to these plaintiffs, to-wit, an action 
for the rescission of these transactions. There is no 
such action before the Court and no such relief sought 
nor granted herein. It .cannot be said from the transac· 
tions involving· t4is stock that there is any apprehension 
of loss, destruction or waste of corporate property. 
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'\'II. !NYE5TOn.~ THRIFT CoMPA~Y. 
(.A .. ) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
It is found that \Yhile Beckstead \Yas 1n complete 
control of the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
and acting with three employees of that corporation who 
were controlled by him, and on September 22, 1931, he 
~organized the In,?estors Thrift Company, using as the 
funds of said new corporation (property which was 
wholly owned by the United Bond and Finance Corpor-
ation. It is found that this corporation vvas organ-
ized for the purpose of trading its stock for .stock in 
the United Bond and :finance Corporation, and that its 
stock was so used. It is stated that in furtheranice of 
this scheme of freezing out the stockholders of the 
United Bond and Finance Corporation, that Beckstead 
and Hill, one of the foregoing employees, caused to be 
assigned to them individually and 'vithout coU:sideration, 
as.sets, property and contracts. of the United Biond and 
Finance Corporation which were thereafter assigned to 
the Investors Thrift Corporation, and that for said 
assets there was issued to Hill one share of preferred 
stock and 7,998 shares of common stock in the said 
Investors Thrift, and to Beckstead one share of pre-
ferred stock and 7,999 shares of eo,m•m.on. Hill becal!le 
the President and Beckstead its general manager. It is 
further f.ound that after many stockholders of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation had exchanged their 
stock for stock in the Investors Thrift Company, Beck-
stead and his associates caused the said Thrift Company 
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to be dissolved on July 28, 1938, and that a small amount 
or percentage of the money invested by the stockholders 
in the Investors Thrift C:ompany was returned to them, 
and that the balance of said investment became lost to 
them. Prior to the dissolution practically all of· the 
stock of the Investors Thrift had been acquired by and 
issued to the United B~ond and Finance Corporation. 
It was also found that Beckstead had complete control 
at all times of the Investors Thrift Company. (See Find-
ings Nos. 11, 15 and 31) 
(B) PLEADINGS. 
So far as .the Investors Thrift Company is con-
cerned there is an allegation in paragraph ( 3) that it 
is a corporation of ,the State of Utah, and that it was 
organized and wholly dominated by Beckstead for his 
use and purpose, ''as hereinafter mor~ fully set forth." 
Then in the first paragraph of paragraph (10) it is 
alleged that the Investors \Thrift was a corporation 
which Beckstead had caused to be set up to further 
his purposes of obtaining the stock of stockholder·s in 
the Finance Corporation, .and to enable him to take over 
to himself the assets held by the latter company, and 
that after the stockholders had exchanged their stock in 
the Finance Corporation for the stock in the Investors 
Thrift Company that Beckstead fraudulently caused the 
Thrift Company to be dissolved as .a corporation having 
no assets. 
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(C) PROOF AND DISCUSSION. 
The finding-s in this case do not disclose that there 
was _any nrismanag-ement in the transactions between the 
Investors Thrift C.ompany and the Finance Corporation. 
It appears, that at the tilne of the dissolution of the 
Thrift Company that it \vas almost entirely owned by 
the Finance Corporation. 
There is no finding of fact that the Finance Cor-
poration lost any of the assets which were transferred 
to the Thrift Company. There was no evidence that 
the Finance Corporation lost any of this property. The 
evidence on this subject discloses, and it was uncontra-
dicted, that the Finance Corporation contracted to sell 
hro apartment houses to Hill and .Beckstead. Hill and 
Beckstead then transferred this contract to the Thrift 
Company and received stock in the latter company. This 
transaction occurred in 19'31. In 1933 all of these prop-
erties were re-transferred to the Finance Corp~oration 
and Hill testified fron1 the cards containing a record of 
this transaction, that the Thrift Company paid to 
Finance Corporation a sum which exceeded the total of 
all rents collected during the period of time within 
which the Thrift Company held these apartments under 
the contract aforesaid. This property was not misap-
propriated or diverted. .The Court ordered no account-
ing with respect to it and the books of the company 
were in Court and fully disclosed the transaction. 
These transactions oc-curred from seven to nine years 
previous to the commencement of this action, and ·cer-
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tainly from this past conduct neither the Court nor the 
plaintiffs can feel any apprehension that there will be a 
waste, loss or destruction of any of the corporate assets 
of the Finance Corporation. The evidence is clear and 
undisputed that the Finance Corporation did not suffer 
any loss or detriment as a result of the incorporation and 
operation of the Investors Thrift Company. Evidently 
the trial Court could not say in what way or in what 
manner a receiver could be of any benefit to the corpor-
ation, its stockholders or these plaintiffs in regard to 
these transactions. No accounting was ordered. There 
is no present activity whatsoever, the Investors Thrift 
Company having been disorganized several years ago. 
It furnishes no reason nor support whatsoever for the 
a.ppoint~ent of a receiver. 
VIII. AsHTON-JENKINs IN-suRANCE AGENCY. 
The findings of fact, pleadings and proof on this 
subject have heretofore been fully discussed. The evi-
dence discloses that there wa.s no loss to the corporation 
as a result of this venture. It occurred eight years 
previous to the commencement of this action. There 
is nothing involved in this transaction that can be 
remedied or prevented by a receiver. 
IX. AcQUIRING OF CoNTROLLING SToCK INTERESTS IN 
THE AsHTON-JENKINS CoMPANY. 
This matter has been fully discussed with respect 
to findings, pleadings and proof in connection with our 
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argument on the accounting order, and again we say that 
there is nothing here which can be remedied, aided or 
prevented or in any way affected by the appointment 
of a receiver. This matte.r had occurred and terminated 
eight years prior to the commencement of this action. 
X. CAxcELLATIONS OF PARTIALLY PERFORMED CoN-
TRACTs FoR THE PuRCHASE OF STocK AND SECURITIES ON 
lNSTALLl\IEXT PLA.~ . 
..._\s heretofore pointed out this matter involves a 
question of bookkeeping only. There can he no appre-. 
hension from the manner in which these forfeited pay-
ments "\vere handled that there will be any loss, waste 
or destruction of corporate p-roperty. 
XI. LEGAL AcTIONs PENDING AGAINST THE FINANCE 
CoRPORATION. 
(A) FINDINGS OF FACT. 
In finding No. 22 it is fou,nd that as a result of the 
activity of Beckstead in obtaining this outstanding stock 
that many of the said investors who gave up their invest-
ment certificates upon such representations have sought 
to rescind said transaction, and have demanded a return 
of their investment, and numerous actions have been filed 
in Court for the recovery of said investment certificates 
frou1 the United Bond and Finance Corporation and 
said Beckstead. Beckstead has caused, and continues 
to cause, said eorp:aration to resist the rescissions and 
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to refuse to reinstate said investors 1n the ownership 
of said stock, and by reason thereof has involved the 
corporation in litigation. 
(B) PLEADINGS. 
In paragraph (6) of paragraph (10) of the com-
plaint it is alleged that beeause of the matters therein 
set out, and the imposition upon various stockholders 
under the plan and purpose and conspiracy of Beck-
stead to get control and dominate the affairs of the 
corporation, numerous actions have been filed against 
the corporation and against Beckstead~ 
(C) PROOF AND DrscussiON. 
It is true that at the time of trial certain actions 
were pending against the ·United Bond and Finance 
C~orporation. At page 936 of the record is a stipulation 
stated in the record ·concerning these suits. From the 
stipulation it appears that at that time three suits pray-
ing rescission and which were at issue were then pend-
ing. That a complaint in another suit seeking rescis-
sion had been filed to which· demurrer had been inter-
posed and the demurrer had not been disposed of. 
Three suits for attorney's fees were mentioned in the 
.stipulation. The three latter suits have .now been com-
promised, settled and dismissed. The three suits at issue 
seeking rescission are still pending and have not been 
tried, and the demurrer is still undisposed of in the 
fourth suit. It appears also that Mr. D. A. Skeen, who 
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is one of eounsel in this ac.tion, Is also counsel in the 
three suits at issue praying rescission. These suits 
were mentioned in the cross examination of the wit-
nesses, Hoffman, Jackson, Wilson, Petty and Thurman. 
It appears that these suits have been pending for a 
long period of tin1e. It appears from the evidenec that 
the United B.ond and Finance Corporation has offered 
rescission to the plaintiffs involved in these three S'uits. 
We refer to the testimony of Beckstead beginning at 
page 1651 of the record wherein he related an offer made 
to these plaintiffs for rescission. He stated at page 1652 
in answer to a question by his own counsel: 
"'\\~ell we issued stock certificates and I un-
derstand they \Vanted to rescind, that is what 
Mr. Skeen said. So we took the certificates dovvn 
to Lehi, 2\lr. Evaris and I, and tendered the .certi-
ficates and offered to put them in their original 
position and they said they wouldn't do that 
unless they talked with Mr. Skeen, HO I advised 
them to call Mr. Skeen up and so they agreed to 
call Mr. Skeen up and whatever ~fr. Skeen ad-
vised them to do they would do, but they would 
not accept a rescission at that time. · 
Q. Ha.ve they ever requested a rescission 
·sinee that time ~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you have similar conversations with 
people from Randolph~ 
A .. Yes sir. 
Q. And where did those conversations take 
place' 
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A. They·took place in the office of the United 
Bond and Finance Co~poration in the Mcintyre 
Building. 
Q. And when approximately~ 
A. That was a ·year and one-half ago.'' 
This offer of rescission was again related by the 
witness Beckstead <?n recross examination commencing 
a.t .page 1678 of the record. Similar testimony was given 
by the witness Boyd Evans. (R. 1094-1095 ). Evans testi-
fied, in part, as foll~ows : 
''A. I will have to give. you an explanation 
along with that. These people that you have 
just referred to, the two Thurmans and Hoffman 
and the J acks~on people, were the instigators here 
in a suit brought against the corporation under 
the head of John Wilson and Mayme 'Vilson of 
Park City, Utah. 
Q. For rescission wasn't it~ 
A. For rescission, and these certificates here 
evidenced the willingness of the corporation to 
make settlement with these people ·and rescind 
the transactions and an effort was made and these 
people were contacted ·and an attempt was made 
to place in their hands these certificates and put 
them back in their original position 'vi th the 
United Bond an~ Finance Corporation.'' 
At the time appellants' cause was presented to the 
trial Court on its ·motion for new trial counsel for 
appellants suggested to the trial Court upon authoriza-
tion by their clients that this offer of rescission was 
ori~nally made in good f.aith, had never been withdrawn, 
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and the parties affeeted by the offer were in vi ted to take 
advantage of it at any time they felt so disposed. 
\V e now say to the Court that the offer of rescis-
sion has not been withdra\vn and the parties to \Vhom 
the offer was originally made may still receive its 
benefits. This offer of rescission is a complete 
vnswer to the charge made in the complaint that the 
officers of the corporation were guilty of mismanagement 
in resisting these suits for rescission and spending cor-
porate funds. in an effort to defeat the demands of the 
Etigants. 
It may be pertinent to call the Court's ·attention 
to the fact that this offer of rescission was made long 
prior to the time \vhen the complaint in this case was 
filed. These litigants do not need the aid of_ a Court of 
equity nor of a receiver to become reestablished as 
stockholders in this corporation. It is needless to say 
that no purpose can be served in this respect by the 
appointment of a reeeiver. 
We suggest that the offe·r of re.scission _made in 
good faith to these people has been rejected and the suits 
allowed to remain untried for the purpose of bolstering 
up this action for receivership. 
Again we say that the actions against the corpor-
(:tion, as alleged and found and hereinabove discussed, 
furnish no ground, reason or support to the order ap-
pointing receiver. The only judgment prayed for is 
rescission. Rescission has been offered and for that 
reason there is no possi'bility of any undue ·or unneces-
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sary expenditure of corporate assets in opposition to 
these la"v suits as alleged in the complaint, certainly 
a receiver could do no more. 
XII. GENERAL CHARGES AND FINDINGS OF MISAPPRO-
PRIATION OF CoMPANY's AssETS. 
In finding· No. 46 the Court finds "that since the 
organization of said United Bond and Finance Corpor-
ation the said W. R. Beckstead has taken and received 
in his own name and in the names of other individuals 
and corporations for his o"\vn benHfit, money, property 
and assets of the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
in large and substantial amounts, which amounts can-
not be determined without a full accounting; that no 
legal action has ever been taken by the stockholders or 
directors ·of said corporation authorizing or approving 
said action, and the said W. R. Beckstead has never 
rendered or made any accounting, or accounted to said 
United Bond and Finance ·Corporation, to its stock-
holders and investors for the money, property and assets 
Qf the said United Bond and Finance Corporation re-
ceived and h~ld and ·controlled by him.'' 
It will be noted that this finding is not reflected in 
either the conclusions of law or the decree, there being 
no conclusion to the effect that the corporation is en-
titled to any judgn1ent or any relief based on this finding, 
and the decree -contains no order whatsoever which in any 
way indicates that this finding was considered by the 
Court in making its judgment and decree. It is sub-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
159 
mitted that this finding is the only finding in harmony 
with plaintiff's theory ns reflected hy the complaint. 
By its co1nplaint the plaintiffs attempted to allege a 
cause ·of action based on \Yrongful diversion and rnis-
appropriation of company's assets by ''T. R. Beckstead 
and other defendants. ''rhile the Court finds that Beck-
stead used corporate funds to purchase outstanding 
corporate stock on behalf of the corporation the pleader 
alleges that Beckstead used corporate funds to purchase 
outstanding stock· for himself. In the complaint it is 
alleged that Beckstead has made numerous sales and 
transfers of Finance Corporation properties, and the 
proceeds were received by others_ than the Finance .Cor-
poration, and that· he has caused large sums of money 
to be paid out for his own personal benefit without mak-
ing any accounting. That many books of the corporation 
have been destroyed and additional ones fraudulently 
written up by Beckstead, all for the purpo.se of carry-
ing out the scheme of misappropriation. The astonish-
ing thing in this finding No. 46 is that it is made in the 
face of the fact that no attempt whatsoever was made 
by the plaintiffs to support any of these charging alle-
gations. The record of this case may be searched in vain 
for one scintilla of evidence which in the slightest degree 
estalblishes and supports t_hese charges. ·This finding 
without any question of doubt stands in the record un-
supported by any evidence whatsoever. This Court may 
rest assured that if there had been any sho,ving of the 
taking of any property there w·onlu be a specific finding 
on it. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
160 
This record of 1800 pages may be searched in vain 
· for evidence of any property which Beckstead has taken 
in his own name or that of other individuals or persons 
·other than in legitimate trans-actions wherein the 
Finance Corporation received full consideration for the 
property parted with by it .. We have searched diligently 
to find any bases for this finding. There is none. 
It is significant to note that finding No. 46 is· the 
only finding which would indicate the presence in the 
rec.ord o.f any evidence establishing the charges of 
wrongful diversion and misappropriation by Beckstead 
and the corporate officers, and yet there is no finding 
whatsoever of any particular item of diversion. This 
case "ras before. the Court for several weeks. The widest 
soope on. the matter of proof that can be imagined was 
permitted, and presu1nably the cause was tried on a 
complaint based on the theory of wrongful diversion and 
misappropriation. Yet not one finding in particular was 
made by the Court. 
There are a number of findings which apparently 
are n1ore or less con.clusi·ons from the findings hereto-
fore mentioned. We refer to findings Nos. 39, 42, 43, 
44. It is found that the mismanagement of Beckstead 
and his associates has become systematic and habitual 
and has become interwoven in the general business of 
said .corporation as heretofore and now conducted. It 
is found that the United Bond and Finance Corporation 
has property of a value in excess of $300,000.00; that 
this property is in imminent danger of being lost and 
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destroyed, materially injured and misn1anaged, and that 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation is in grave 
and imminent danger of having its remaining assets 
, dissipated and pern1anently lost to Plaintiffs and others 
similarly situated. All this, according to the findings, 
b will happen unless a receiver is ap;pointed. 
\Y"e submit that these general findings add nothing 
to plaintiffs cause. There n1ust be some evidence and 
some findings justifying the conclusion which is stated 
in such bold terms. 
We have taken up item by item all of the things 
- which could possibly have any bearing at all upon the 
_ subject matter of mismanagement or danger to corpor-
ate assets. \V. e submit that we have conclusively shown 
that the findings and evidence relating to these several 
iten1s do not show mismanagement or imminent danger 
to corporate a:ssets. In connection with this finding 
of systematic and habitual mismanagement it appears 
that the Court in making this finding had in mind the 
alleged plan of discouraging stockholders in order that 
their stock might be purchased by the corporation at less 
than its true value. We submit to the Court that if there 
ever -was any discouragement or plan of disc:ouragement 
it was entirely abandoned in the latter part of 1935, and 
is in no sense habitual, and is not in any way influencing 
the operation .of the corporate affairs at this time. 
'V e confidently assert that a careful and analytical 
c~onsideration of this cause· as shown by the pleadings, 
proof, findings and decree, lead irresistibly to one con-
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elusion, and that is that the record reflects no beneficial 
~or needful purpose for the appoint1nent of a receiver in 
this case. There is nothing which has been made to 
appear in the record of this case which would indicate 
that a receiver could be of benefit or profit to the cor-
poration, its stockholders ·Or these plaintiffs, or that 
such appointment is necessary to prevent fraud or to 
save the property of the -corporation from injury or 
threatened destructi.on. The record would indicate, we 
think that the greatest danger this corporation faces 
is the danger of receivership. The law is well settled 
and established by the overwhelming weight of authority 
that a receiver will not be appointed where it appears 
that receivership will not be of aid, benefit or profit 
to the corpo:ra.tion and its stockholders and is not nec-
essary in order to prevent fraud or save the property 
of the corporation from injury or threaten~d loss or 
destruction. 
The record is devoid of any evidence upon which the 
Court could make a finding that there is any present 
danger whatsoever to the property of this corporation 
or that there is any danger of insolvency or any danger 
that the property will not continue to be managed in 
a highly efficient and profitable manner. There is no 
evidence in this ·record which would support a finding 
that the corporation should be dissolved as a going ron-
cern and its assets liquidated and distributed. There 
is no ·evidence in the reoord from which a Court could 
make a finding that the present management of the 
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corporation is not entirely honest and mindful of the 
welfare and property rights of these stockholders. 
The plaintiffs ha Ye neYer indicated or shown any 
1beneficial purpose for the receivership sought. They have 
,made no effort to enlig·hten the ,Court as to the exact pur-
pose for \Yhich they seek receivership. They have not in-
dicated, and neither has the Court, w--hether the receiver is 
to manage the corporation and operate it as a going con-
cern ~or whether a dissolution and liquidation of the 
corporation and a distribution of its assets among the 
various stockholders is contemplated. No suggestion has 
yet been made as to how or in what manner the receiver-
ship will aid ~or be necessary to the carrying out of the 
accounting order. 
The authorities establish and fully support the fol-
lowing propositions : 
1. To justify the appointment of a receiver it must 
appear that the mismanagement or misdeeds of the 
corporate officers and directors has caused a well ground-
ed apprehension that the corporate assets will be lost, 
wasted or destroyed. 
2. That past mig.conduct or misdeeds do not justify 
an apprehension of loss or destruction of the corporate 
assets and hence cannot support the appointment of a 
receiver. 
3. Receivership must be for some useful pur-
pose and must he in aid of the primary relief sought 
and obtained, and will not be decreed ot?erwise. 
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4. If there is an adequate remedy. in la"· or in 
equity the a.ppointn1ent of a receiver is not justified. 
·Such remedy is g~iven only as a last resort and in ex-
treme cases. 
1. THE MISl\1ANAGEl\iENT MusT BE SucH As To 
CAUSE A JusT APPREHENSION ·OF Loss, WAs.TE OR DE-
STRUCTION OF CoRPORATE AssETS IN ORDER FoR SucH Mis-
I\IANAGEMENT To BE GRoUNDS FoR THE APPOINTMEXT ()F 
A RECEIVER. 
It is stated 1n Section 77:27 of Fletcher's wo1:k on 
Corporation's: 
''It is the general rule that a receiver will 
not be appointed unless it appear that the appoint-
ment is necHssary either to prevent fraud, or to 
save the property from fraud or threatened de-
struction, at least in case of a .solvent corporation, 
and such necessity n1ust be shown to exist. by 
legal evidence, and must also appear in the plead-
ings by clear and unambiguous allegations of 
fact.'' 
We refer the C·ourt .to the quotation from CoTpus 
Juris heretofore set out in this brief which sustains this 
general statement of the law. 
The case of Inscho v. Mid-Continental-Development 
Company (l{an.), 146 p·a,c. 1014, states: 
'·'In no ca·se sh·ould a court take the property 
and 'business of a solvent going corporation out 
of the hands of the hoard · o.f directors and into 
its own hands by the appointment of a re1ceiver 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
165 
at the suit of minority stoekholders unlPss th(? 
right of plalintiff be free from reasonable doubt 
and danger of loss or injury be clearly pToved. '' 
It was held in the ease of IIand v. Dexter, 41 Ga. 
454, that it is only in a strong ca·se w·hen the majority 
are clearly vci.ola ting the chartered rights of the minority 
and putting their interest in imminent .danger, .that a 
Court of equity ,, ... ill at the instance of 1ninority stock-
holders of a corporation interfere with the management 
of its affairs and appoint a receiver. 
It was said in (~ollins v. Willia.1nson, 229 Fed. 59, 
that the rule is too well settled to require citation of au-
thorities that the Courts of equity in the appointment 
of receivers act with great caution in applying that extra-
ordinary remedy and require a clear case of right and 
present necessity to induce their interference. That the 
extreme remedy of takci.ng and keeping property of cor-
porations out of the hands of the managers, chosen by 
the stockholders, except as a last resort, should not be 
applied unleS's considered absolutely neeessary for the 
preservation of the corporation property. 
To the effect that the danger of loss or injury to the 
rights of the stockholders should be clearly proved in 
order to warflant the a,ppointment of a receiver, and 
that the power should never !be exercised in a. doubtful 
ease see Watkins v. National B a;nk ( Kan.) , 3'2 Pa.c. 914. 
In Jones v. VanHeusen~Charles Co. (19~0), 246 N.Y. 
~S. 204, the ·Court held that it was necessary that the stock-
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holders' investment he in jeopardy by the acts of the of-
ficers before a re·ceiver ·could be appointed. 
In Miller v. Albert·ina Realty Comp·a;ny, 190 N. Y. S. 
407, the Court stated: 
'·'!The rule now generally accepted seem·s to 
be that mere mi~·conduct \\rlll not justify the ap-
pointment of a. receiver unless such an appoint-· 
ment ·be necessary to preserve the pr·operty or 
Tights of creditors or stockholders.'' 
This rule is well established as indica ted by the fore-
going authorities, and we have heretofore conclusively 
shown that there is no danger to the asset·s of the cor-
·poration or to the interests of the stockholders and it is 
not necessary to atppoint a receiver to preserve the assets 
of the corp·oration. 
2. A RECEIVER V\TILL NoT BE APPOINTED BECAUSE OF 
pAST MISCONDUCT OF OFFICERS OR DIRECTORS. 
From the f·oregoing discussion it is apparent that all 
of the things of which plaintiffs complain occurred be-
tiWeen five and thir~een ye1ars prior to the commencement 
of this action. Under the arnthorities this conduct is too 
remote upon which to base any apprehension of future 
J:oss or destruction of corporate properly. 
In the case of Kron v. Trenton Autom·otive Col-
lateral Compa.ny (N. J.), 124 Atl. 757, it wa·s shown that 
the past dereliction of the board of directors of the cor-
poration had resuloted in enormous losses to the corpo· 
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ration and that many of these transactions \Yere fraudu-
lent. The directors at the tin1e of the action, with one 
or t"~o exceptions, \Yere directors at the time of the 
wrongful acts Inentioned. The Court found · that the 
losses to the company "~ere in 1arg-e part, if not entirely 
the result of gross negligence on the part of the directors, 
and that they \Yere doubtlessly personally liable. It ap-
peared from the evidence that the directors were at-
tempting to and \Yere carrying· on the business at a profit; 
that the corporation \Yas solvent and that for a year 
prior to the eommencement of the action there had been 
no negLige'nce, fraud nor other mis-c-onduct. The petition 
f.or receivership was di'Smissed :on the ground that the 
receivership \Yas unwarranted, there being no present 
necessity to prevent a wasting or fraudulent diversion 
of the cor'Pora te assets. 
In Kean v. Colt, 5 N. J. Equity 865, it was held that 
to authorize an injunction and appointment of a receiver 
there must be a well grounded apprehension of injury 
about to 'be eomrnitted, and that such relief would not be 
granted where the misconduct alleged occurred, if at all, 
several years previously. That is too long ago to be a 
ground .of apprehension of impending mischief. 
This principle is well stated by Pomeroy at 4 P·om-
el'oy Equity Juris prudence, 1542, as follows: 
''''The prin·ciple must he borne in mind that a 
receivership is a preventative and not a punitive 
measure. Courts do not appoint receivers as a 
punishment for past dereliction nor because of 
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past danger. Receivers are apP'ointed because of 
present conditions and well founded apprehen-
sion as to the future.'' 
Fletcher in Section 7·697, Permanent Edition of his 
work on Private Corporations, states: 
'' Furtfuermore, Courts do· not appoint re-
ceivers for eorporations merely because of past 
acts or derelictions when no present or future 
harm threatens because thereof.'' 
J!t is also stated in S·ection 77~24 of the. Saine work: 
''Where the corporation is s.olvent, a re-
·ceriver will not be appointed bec,ause of past luis-
conduct and a mere apprehension, 'based thereon, 
of future misdoing, where the present situation 
and the prospects of the future are not such a.s to 
warrant a re.eei vership. '' 
We submit that under the principle of the foregoing 
authorities the appointment of a receiver in this 
case was error requiring a reversal of the decree. 
3. A REcEIVER WILL NoT BE APPoiNTED WHERE 
THERE Is No DEFLNITE PuRPOSE INDICATED AND WHERE IT 
DoEs NoT CLEARLY APPEAR THAT THE RECEIVER WILL BE 
OF BENEFIT To THE CoRPORATION ANn T~E SToCKHOLDERS. 
In Section 7728 of ]ffietcher 's work on Private Cor-
porations, if is stated: 
''It i'S .ground for refusal that no good can be 
accomplished by the appointment of a rec.eiv~r. 
* * * And it is highly inequitable to appoint 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
169 
a receiver 'vhere it appears tha.t the ultimate re-
sult "Till be a sarrifice of the assets of the corpo-
ratiJon 'Yholly to the profits ·of counsel and re·ceiver 
and to costs and expenses of such receivership. 
It follows a·s a eorollary, from the foregoing, that 
·because the appointment \Yill.do no harm ''Till not 
of itself warrant the app:ointment, and it has been 
said that 'there is no case in which the court a p-
points a receiver merely be:cause the measure can 
do no hlarm;' a receiver should not be appointed, 
except in cases \Yhere it is evident that such ap-
pointJilent \Yill serve s·ome useful purpose.'' 
We have heretofore dis-cussed the proposition at 
1ength that retceivers are appointed only where it appears 
that the receivership is necesary to or in aid of the pri-
mary remedy decreed by the Court. 
Clark in the .Second Edition of his w·ork on Re·ceivers, 
Volume 1, Pa~agraph 51, P·age 5-8, states: 
'''The purpose ·of the appointment of a re--
ceiver after judgment is to satisfy the judgment 
in •one way or another.'' 
Nothing has been made to appear in this case either 
from the pleadings, the pr·oof, the findings, the conclu-
sions or decree how or in what manner the receivership 
herein decreed can be of :any possi1ble aid to the account-
ing ordered as the primary relief. There has been n~o 
showing \Yhatsoever as to how or in what way the ac-
counting .can be effectuated more ae.cur·ately or more com-
pletely or effectively with a receiver than without. Cer-
tainly the receivershijp cannot in any way 'b~nefit the cor-
poration, its stockholders or these plaintiffs. It appears 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
170 
conclusively that this receivership has no beneficial pur-
pose whatsoever. 
Clark in his work on reeeivers, volume 1, paragraph 
49, states: 
''~There is no case in which the Court appoints 
a receiver 1nerely because the measure can do no 
harm, and a Court will not appoint a receiver on 
the ap:plieation of those who do not require it.'' 
A case whi·ch illustrates the relruct1ance of a Court 
of equity to appoint a receiver for a. solvent going cor-
poration at the instance of a minority stockholder on 
the .ground of mismanagement ·or fraud where no bene-
ficial purpoS"e is ma.de to appear from either the plead-
ings ·Or eVJidence is Miller v. Kitchen, 73 Neh. 711, 103 
N. W. 297. The appointment was sought on the ground 
of fraud and mismanagement on the part of the officers. 
The low·er Court found that the majority stockholder 
had ·eon trolled the affairs of the company for his own per-
sonal interests without regard f.or the interests of the 
other stockholders; that no st·oekholders' meetings had 
been called; that he had leased his own property to the 
corporation for large and extrava~ant rentals; that he 
had :carelessly permitted the hooks of the company t·o 
be lost or destroyed and had failed to keep accurate ac-
counts; that he had received l1a.rge sums of money, for 
which he had not accounted and had ·caused to be con-
veyed to himself real estate of the company f.or a grossly 
inadequate consideration, and had sold to t:he c.ompany 
property belonging to himself at .an excessive price. 
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Complaint "~a·s also made of excessive salary rec.eived by 
said majority stockholder. The Trial Court appointed 
a receiver and the cor-poration and the individual de-
fendant appealed. The act of the Trial Court was re-
versed and receiYer discharg·ed, the Court taking the 
vieiW that \YhateYer wrongs had been suffered by the 
, plaintiff and other stockholdeTs by reason of the wrong-
ful acts of the majority stockholder nlight be as fully 
remedied without the app·ointment of a receiver. as they 
could be if one were appointed, and that the appointment 
- of a receiver \Yould be highly detrimental to the business, 
- which \Yas the operation of a hotel. 
The language of the Court is very pertinent to the 
issues in this case. We quote : 
''If a receiver were appointed as the plaintiff 
prays, for how long should his appointment eon-
tinue "l The petition does not ask for a di~solufion 
of the corporation or the winding up o£ its affairs, 
and the only purp·ose for which the appointment. 
seems to be pra~yed is that the eonduct of the busi-
ness may be taken out of the hands of the officers 
of the corporatio~, who may be elected by a ma-
jority of the stockholders, and kept indefinitely in 
the h1ands of the eourt. Since the defendant holds 
a majority of the stock he has the power to elect 
sueh officers as he may desire to conduct the cor-
porate affairs. This is a right and privilege given 
·him by law, and s·o long as these officers honestly 
and faithfully carry out their trust, neither the 
plaintiff nor any other sto-ckholder has a right 
to complain. If a re-ceiver is appointed, there 
must be an end to the receivership .sometime, and 
whenever that time should come the property 
would inevi taibly go in to the hands of officers 
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selected by the majority stockholders, and the 
plaintiff would be in no better condition then than 
now so far as control of the mana.gHment is oon-
cerned. The ease is not one where the cor·porate 
assets or property is being lost or destroyed. * 
* * In the instant ease, the plaintiff, so far a~ 
now appears, can be gran ted all the relief for 
which he prays, without taking the property into 
the hands of the -court by the appointment of a 
receiver; and it is not clear 'but that the interest 
of the pl~a!intiff, as well as of all the other stock-
holders in the corporatri,on, would be injured by 
the coilr_t wresting from the legally elected of-
fi·cers of the corporation the power of control of 
the eorporate affairs granted them by law." 
In Argenbright v. Phoenix FVnarnce Compritny of 
I ow a (Del.), 187 Atl. 124, the stockholders of several 
cor·porations brought .suit against said corporations, al-
leging that the assets ·Of the defendant corporations had 
been wflongfully sold to the Phoenix Finance Company 
which was also a .corporate defendant. After a full con-
sideration of the allegations of the complaint the Court 
stated: 
"\The bill fails to show any purpose to be 
sought by the appointment of receivers.· Until 
a .CJase is alleged wherein the utility of a receiver-
ship is at least prima facie demonstrated, the 
court ·oug4t not to entertain a. bill for the appoint-
ment." 
In Akers v. Corbett (Fia.), 190 So. 28, an action was 
commenced by a stockholder owning half the stock 
against the -corporation and the managing officer apply-
ing for an aecounting and receivership. It appeared that 
the differences between the plaintiff and defendant were 
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irreconcilable; that the ac.counts were con1plica.ted and 
extensiYe. The Trial Court app·ointed a receiver and 
ordered an accounting. An appeal \Yas taken. The plead-
ings and eYidenee and decree were considered. The 
Court held that the judgment of the Court in ordering 
an accounting \Yas proper, but that there was no show-
" ing or evidence produced \vhich "\vould indicate that a 
~ 
receivership would in .any \vay aid or was neeessary to ~ 
~ the account. Therefiore, the order of the Trial Court 
"' appointing a receiver was vacated and set aside and the 
I~ . 
Court said: 
''Another error assigned is the lack of final-
ity in the final decree. A receiver was appointed 
to take charge of the hotel property, but to what 
end and for \Yhat purpO'se ~ 
''It is said by the authorities that appoint-
·ment of a receiver is to effe:ctua te a right granted 
a litigant and is not in itself a right. Clark on 
Receivers, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, p. 59. 
* * * 
''It is an ancillary act by the court to aid in 
the enforcement of a right granted to a party to 
the cause. High on Receivers, 4th Ed., p. 10. 
'''Being an ancillary, as distinguished from 
a primary, proceeding, it loses its signific.ance un-
less its purpose in relation to the .adjudication of 
the principal issues is established.'' 
~:. In the case of Cook v. Cook (Mass.), 170 N. E. 455 
~ at 458 the Court remarked: 
~ ''The plaintiff has not made out a case for 
~ the appointment of a receiver. * '*' * The ap-
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pointment of a receiver * * * is merely an-
cillary to other relief. * * * Ordinarily a re-
ceiver will not be ,appointed in actions against 
direetor:s or officers of a corporation for miscon-
duct in its management. * * * Nor will such 
an appointment be made when a receivership 
would amount in effect to a dissolution of the cor-
porati,on. Richardson v. Clinton Wall Trunk 
M:anuf. Co., 1S1 Mass. 580, 582-583, 64 N. E. 400, 
401. '' 
And the appointment of a receiver for a solvent 
manufacturing corporati,on, at the instance of a mrinorit~y 
stockholder (\vho was also employed in the lbrusiness), 
on the ground of fraud and mismanagement, was denied 
in S:chuster v. Largman. (1'93,2), 308 Pa. 5·20, }6~2 Atl. 305, 
where the allegations in this regard "\Vere general rather 
than specific, the Court saying: · 
"A re-ceivership and dissolution of the cor-
por,a tion is a radical remedy to be invoked only 
in case of legal necessity. * * * Here the 
complaining party's interest·s are not imperiled 
1by any alleged fraudulent manipulation of the 
assets. (As .in Schipper Bros. C~oal Min. Co. v. 
Economy Do1nestic Coal Co. (19'23), 277 Pa. 356, 
121 Atl. 193) or internal dissension so violent as 
to render corporate action impotent (as in Hall 
v. City Park Brewing C·o. (1'92'8), 2'94 P. 127, 143 
Atl. 58'2). A court of equity cannot intermeddle 
\Vlith the internal manage.ment of a corp.oratio11, 
except under special circumstances. * * * In 
the ea!se before us the c:omplaint charges fraud 
and 1nismanagemen t. The allegations are not of 
that specific nature which w·ould call for the in~ 
terposi tion of a court of equity.'' 
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So, in Carson v .. A.llega·ny lVindow Glass Co., (1911, 
C. C.) 189 Fed. 791, it 'vas held that a receiver should 
not be appointed at the instance ~of a minority stock-
holder of a solvent manufacturing corporation, sought 
not for the purpose of \Yinding· up its affairs, but for 
the purpose ·Of managing the company for. the interest 
of stockholders for an indefinite period, on the ground 
that the majority stockholder, who was also president 
of the company and who was interested in a gas com-
pany, had, through his influence in the manufacturing 
company, secured its approval of an improvident con-
tract made by him with the gas company; since, if the 
contract were un,vise and improper, a receivership -could 
not of itself rescind the same, and was unne-cessary to 
secure redress for the wrongs alleg~e.d, and, if efforts 
to induce th~ company to act were unsuccessful, relief 
could ~be had through proper proceeding·s instituted by 
one or more of the stockholders. 
And in Metzger v. Knox, (1912) 77 Mise. 271, 136 
N. Y. S. 681, affirmed without .opinion in (1912) 153 App. 
Div. 911, 137 N. Y. IS. 112·9, it was held that a case calling 
for the appointment of a temporary receiver at the 
instance of a stockholder of a manufacturing company 
was not shown on the grotmd of waste ~of funds due 
to the improper payment to the president of the com-
pany of a large salary (although the prospectus put out 
by the president had stated that the officers ·Of the 
company were to receive no salary) the leasing by the 
company from the president of lofts in a building owned 
and controlled by him, the permitting of another com-
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pany (the stock ,of \vhich was owned and controlled by 
the manufacturing company) to use part of the factory 
building- and compete in the trade, and a continuing 
breach of contract -contained in the bill of sale of the 
manufacturing business from the president to the com-
pany,-where the corporation was a .prosperous concern, 
paying dividends on both the preferred and the common 
stock, and g-reat injury might result from the appoint-
ment of the receiver. 
And it was held In Frost v. Puget Sownd Realty 
Associates, ( 1910) 57 Wash. 629, 107 Pac. 1029·, that 
subscribers to an investment company ·could not obtain 
appointment of a receiver on the ground of n1isappro-
priation of funds through wrongful payment of com-
missions, where the -corporation was solvent, was care-
fully managed, and there was no probable loss which 
could be av~oided by receivership. 
An excellent statement of the law Is found In 19 
Corpus Juris ·Secundum at pag-e 1168: 
''In the absence of insolvency, or threatened 
insolvency, the courts. are very reluctant to ap-
point a receiver for a corporati~on on the ground 
of fraud or mismanage1nent, and in accordance 
with the general rule already stated in Section 
1461, the appointment of a receiver will not be 
made when it is not necessary for the preserva-
tion. of the .property of the corporation and the 
protection of the rights of the stockholders. At 
least where other adequate remedies exist for 
the acts complained of, the c-ourts will refuse to 
appoint a receiver n1erely because ,of past or pres-
ently continuing or threatened fraudulent acts 
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or n1isn1a.nagement on the part of the officers or 
dirertors of the eorporation, except perhaps in 
cases \Yhere insolvenry has resulted therefrom, 
.or is threatened. * * * '' 
It is not clear. whether or not plaintiffs desire the 
appointment of a liquidating or an operating receiver. 
It is clear, ho\\yever, that the appointment of a. receiver 
means the civil death of this ·corporation. In receiver-
ship its credit \viii be destroyed, and experience is uni.-
f.orm to the effect that the expenses incident thereto 
soon sap the life blood out of such concerns. 
In State ex rel. Hadley v. People's United States 
Bank, 197 1fo. 57 4, 94 S. W. 9·53, it \Vas stated: 
"It is true it has been held that a receiver-
ship does not dissolve the corporation-that the 
corporate entity is left in esse (an empty shell) 
for future use; but such holdings are somewhat 
by w·ay of metaphor, since, reduced to its ultimate 
elements, such a receivership is the civil death 
of the corporation, and nothing less. Hence the 
need of extren1e caution. 
4. A RECEIVER WILL NoT BE APPOINTED WHERE THE 
PLAINTIFFs l~AVE AN ADEQUATE REMEDY EITHER AT LAw 
'OR IN EQUITY.' 
16 Fletcher's Cyc. Corporations, Secti~on 7714, states 
as follows: 
'' :Jfisconduc.t or ·mismanagen1ent ought not 
to be ground for a receiver where there are one 
or Inore other adequate remedies, and the Courts 
so hold where the question has been squarely pre-
sen ted to them.'' 
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The same work at Section 7729 states as follows: 
"A receiver will not be appointed for a cor-
poration where there is another adequate 
remedy. In other words, a receivership should 
not be awarded unless absolutely necessary; and 
there is no necessity where there are other ade-
quate remedies. And a receiver should not be ap-
pointed at any stage of the .pr~oceedings if any 
other remedy will afford adequate protection to 
the party applying therefor.'' 
It is further stated: 
''An adequate remedy lby lis pendens pre-
cludes the appointment of a receiver, as does 
such a remedy by -contempt proceedings, by ac-
counting, by stay of pr~oeeedings, or by attach-
ment or execution, or by an injunction. 
''Refusal to allow stockholders to examine 
books of the company is not ground, since there 
are other adequate remedies, such as lby man-
damus.'' 
The purchase of its own stoek by the United Bond 
and Finance Corporation seems to have been the matter 
of paramount importance with the Court. Regardless 
of its importance, in view of the authorities herein cited 
such practice furnishes no gr~ound for receivership, be-
cause if such practice is detrimental and not to be 
tolerated there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
:by injunction, whi,ch remedy is sufficient to furnish 
the corporation, its stockholders and these plaintiffs 
ample and complete protection. 
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It is stated 1n Section 7722 ~of Fletcher's work on 
Corpo-rations : 
"The n1ere fact that a corporation has acted 
ultra vires is not a ground for a receiver, es-
pecially since there are, ordinarily, other ade-
quate remedies.'' 
In Kahen v ..... -llaska Jttnk Co., et al., 111 Wash. 39, 
189 Pac. 262, 10 A. L. R. 141 (1920) the Court upheld 
an order refusing to grant an application £or the ap-
pointment of a receiver \Yherein the officers and directors 
·were engaged in certain activities which plaintiffs con-
tended were in violation of law~ The Court stated that 
the receivership, at best, is an exceedingly harsh. re·medy, 
and that if a corporation does or threatens to do some 
ultra vires act, the milder remedy of injunction will 
prevent the evil, and cites numerous cases to uphold 
that proposition. 
It was held in Curtiss v. Dean d!; Curtiss, et al., 85 
vVash. 435, 148 Pac. 581, that the fact that. a majority 
stockholder has caused his salary to be increased is not 
a ground for appointing a receiver. If the increase 
is illegal it may be enjoined and book payments may 
be recovered. 
To the same effect see Horejs v. American Plu1nbing 
& Steam Company, et al., (Wash.) 297 Pac. 759. 
Although it appeared that the directors ·of an elec-
tric light company had, by mismanagement and by 
dealings in which some of them were representing their 
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own individual interests rather than the interests of the 
company, involved it in -contracts, partly executed, which 
ought to be set aside either as fraudulent or ultra vires 
' and it was shown that, unless the C-ourt interfered in 
behalf ·Of stockholders, the directors niight, before the 
next election of directors, furt?er involve the company 
in contracts amounting to waste and endangering the 
trust fund, it was held in United Electric Securities Co. 
v. Louis-i.afJta Electric Light Co., 68 Feel. 673, that 
relief by injunction was sufficient, and that a re-
ceiver should be appointed, - especially where the 
financial condition of the company was such that a re-
ceivership would probably result in insolvency,-pro-
vided the directors should satisfy the Court that the 
existing financial difficulties could be_ met under · the 
proposed injunction. 
And in Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., (1895, C. C.) 
70 Fed. 646, the Court refused a 1notion f.or appointment 
of a receiver, sought by a stockholder, but ordered 
an injunction restraining the directors from carrying 
out the plan contemplated, where, over objection by a 
minority, a res·olution was adopted at a stockholders' 
meeting authorizing the board of directors to purchase 
,shares of the company's stock, and it appeared that a 
purchase of the stock was to be made by a transfer of 
nearly all of the assets and property of the corporation 
to a few' favored stockholders, without an equal ex-
·change in value, in fraud ·Of the rights of minority stock-
holders, wl1o protested against such action. 
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It ,,~a~ h8ld in _E~dtcards u. Bay State Gas Co., (1898, 
C. C.) 91 Fed. 943, that a receiYer should not be ap-
pointed for a corporation, at the instance of stock-
holders, in order that the recevier Inig·ht institute legal 
proceeding-s to recover pr·operty of the corporation which 
it \Yas alleg·ed had been wrongfully abstracted by the 
corporate n1anagement, since the stockholders who vvere 
seeking the receivership might then1selves proceed in 
equity for the same purpose by making all of the wrong-
doers, including the offending officers, parties defendant. 
So, where a stockholder in a steel comp·any brought 
an action- against the holders of the majority of stock 
in that and another corporation, alleging that the defend-
ants, through their control of the two -corporations, had 
fraudulently conspired to bring about an agreement 
between the two companies by which the other corpor-
ation was to take over the business of the steel com-
pany, in consideration of a certain. guaranty of divi-
dends; that the plaintiff had been induced to vote in favor 
of this agreement by reason of misrepresentations made 
to· her by the defendants; that the consideration for such 
transfer of property was appropriated by the defend-
ants; and that the terms and conditions of the transfer 
were unfair and inequitable to the steel comp-any and its 
stockholders, and would not have been made except for 
the conspiracy and fraudulent intent alleged,-it wa.s 
held in Devine v. Frankford Steel & Forging Co.~ (1903) 
205 Pa. 114, 54 Atl. 578, that, while an injunction was 
proper restraining removal of machinery, the dismantl-
ing of the plant, or otherwise materially changing its 
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method of operation until final hearing, the appointment 
of a receiver pendente lite was not warranted. 
And in Barrett v. Green River & R. 8. Livestock 
Co., (19·2i2) 28 Wyo. 379, 205 Pac. 742, it was held that 
allegations in a petition by one claiming rights as· a 
minority stockholder, to the effect that if the defendants 
were left in possession of the corporate books, records, 
and .property, evidence would be concealed and the com-
:pany's income used to embarrass the plaintiff in prov-
ing his case, 'vould not justify the appointment of a 
receiver pendente lite; since, if there were danger that 
evidence would be destroyed or concealed, the law pro-
vided other and more appropriate means for its produc-
tion and preservation. The complainant in this instance 
sought the determination of the ownership of the capital 
stock, an accounting, and an injunction, the action being 
brought against persons who claimed to be owners of 
all of the stock. 
The fact that the owners of a majority of the stock, 
holding all of the offices, have .paid themselves larger 
salaries than they should, and have blended their pri-
vate business with the business of the corporation, and 
failed properly to account for money of the corporation 
thus commingled with their own, is held in Enterprise 
Printilng & P;ub. ·C-o. v. Craig, ( 1924) 1915 Ind. 309, 154 
N. E. 309, denying rehearing in (1924) 195 Ind. 302, 
144 N. E. 542, not a ground for the appoint1nent of a 
receiver or dissolution, as these remedies are not neces-
sary to obtain an accounting on behalf of the corpor-
ation, the business being successfully managed. 
·'' .~ 
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It '"as held in JJ arcuse v. (i-ulleftt (iin ~lfg. Co., 
(1900) 5~ La. Ann. 1383, 27 So. 846, that there was no 
necessity f.or the appointn1ent of a receiver to institute 
actions to recover fron1 the officers and directors of the 
corporation, "'"ho held a majority of the stoek, property 
of the eorporation 'vhich a stockholder charged them 
with having illegally diYerted and appropriated to them-
selves as salaries, since the individual stockholder might 
himself bring such an action by making the corporation, 
and the directors against whom relief was sought, par-
ties. And it \Yas held, also, that the stockholder had an 
adequate remedy by an action in his own name, and 
that there was no necessity for the appointment of a 
receiver to obtain relief, where he charged that the 
directors had in bad faith, unjustifiably, and to the 
prejudice of the small holders, devoted its surplus earn-
ings to the extension of its .plant and business, instead 
of declaring dividends, and that they would continue 
to do so. 
So, in Bordages v. Burnett, (1920) Tex. Civ. App., 
221 S. \Y·. 326, it was held that a receiver should not he 
appointed for a corp·oration, at the instance of minority 
stockholders, since an injunction would properly con-
serve their interests, where the .plaintiff sought an in-
junction and the appointment of a receiver ·On the ground 
that the president of the corporation, who owned a 
majority of the stock, had obtained for himself an exor-
bitant salary; that he paid an unreas-onable rent for the 
building occupied by the corporation, which he owned; 
that he continually diverted the funds of the company 
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to invest in stock in another 0orporation; that he pur. 
sued an arrogant and oppressive conduct toward the 
plaintiff, and controlled the corporation throughout in 
his own interests. 
The want ·of merit in plaintiffs' case in view of the 
authorities herein cited becomes at once apparent when 
the various matters found_ by the Court are each con. 
sid~red in eonnection with the time when the act 
took place and its present effect upon the affairs of the 
corporation and the aviliability of adequate remedies 
to prevent any ~ontinuance of the act necessary. 
We confidently assert that there is available to these 
plaintiffs and to all stockholders of the United Bond and 
Finance- Corporation, adequate and sufficient remedies 
at law or in equity to protect them against any practice 
or any sy~stem or scheme of 1nanagement followed by the 
corporation that does not meet with the full approval 
of the Court. 
THERE IS A FATAL VARIANCE. BErrWIEEN THE COM-
PLAINT AND T'HE FIN·DINGS. 
The case plead by the plaintiffs is entirely different 
from the cause as found by the Court. This becomes 
apparent from a comparison of the complaint with the 
findiNgs. By its complaint the plaintiffs attempt to 
allege a cause based on the personal wrong doings of 
\V. R. Beckstead, as a resu~t whereof he has systematic-
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ally diverted and 'vrongfully misappropriated the prop-
erty of the corporation to his own use. 
The Court refused to find that \\'. R. Beckstead has 
been guilty of personal 'Yrongdoing; refused to find that 
he has personally misappropriated or wrongfully di-
verted the assets of the corporation to himself, but finds 
that the corporate assets and money have been used in 
the management of the corporate affairs in such a way 
as to squeeze out stockholders and to secure and perpet-
uate Beckstead in the domination of the corporation. 
The theory upon which the complaint is drawn ap.-
pear& some,vhat in the general allegation which consti-
tutes the first nine paragraphs thereof. 
In the fifth paragraph it is charged generally that 
the corporation acquired and became the owner of 
pr·operty of the value of approximately $500,000.00 "but 
that by schemes and artifices and fraud perpetrated by 
said defendants as more fully is herein.after set out, 
much of the property which is in truth and fact the 
property of the defendant corporation, stands in the 
name of defendant, W. R. Beckstead, and the defendant, 
Stella C. Beckstead, and corporations owned and con-
tr·olled by said W. R. Beckstead and friends and rela-
tives, and by persons dominated by him,'' and that said 
defendant, W. R. Beckstead, is now engaged in. a sys-
tematic diversion of the assets of said corporation into 
the names and possession of corporations controlled 
by him and of friends and relatives and individuals 
dominated by him, and is using the said property and 
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proceeds and income therefrom for his personal use and 
benefit. 
The particular charges of misappropriation are con-
tained in paragraph (10) of the complaint. 
In the first paragraph of paragraph ( 10) it is 
·charged that Beckstead discouraged stockholders, or-
ganized various companies and associations and traded 
stock in these coq}orations and associations so organ-
ized by him for stock in the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation, and ''he, the said W. R. Beckstead, took, 
acquired and appropriated for his own personal use and 
benefit United Bond and Finance C·orporation stock so 
exchanged by Montana stockholders.'' 
In the second paragraph_ of paragraph (10) it is 
-charged that the Tri-Base Oil Company, which was 
neither corporation, partnership nor organization, but 
was a fictitious entity, was organized to carry out and ac-
complish the purposes of Beckstead. That Beckstead 
caused money and property of the defenda~t corpor-
ation in a substantial amount in excess of $100,000.00 to 
be turned ·over and delivered to the organizer of this 
company for use in acquiring the stock of stockholders 
in the United Bond and Finance Corporation, and that 
the stock so acquired "was, is, and has been willfully, 
wrongfully and illegally appropriated to the use and 
boenefit of the defendant, W. R. Beckstead, together with 
the inc-ome therefrom.'' 
In the third paragraph· of paragraph ( 10) it is 
alleged that W. R. Beckstead, with the use of $50,000.00 
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m Finanee Corporation funds and assets procured a 
ranch and certain personal property in \\!yoming, and 
took the title in his O\Yn name, and that he ha.s ever 
since taken and receiYed the rents, issues and profits 
therefrom. That after the procurement of the ranch 
he caused a corporation to be organized under the laws 
of the State of ,, .... yoming known as the Beckstead Live-
stock Company with an authorized capital stock of $50,-
000.00. That the property so wrongfully acquired was 
transferred by Beckstead to the coDporation, and in 
consideration of such transfer 50,000 shares of stock 
was transferred to Beckstead, and that said stock is 
claimed by him as his .own personal property. It is 
alleged also in paragraph (1{!) that the defendant Beck-
stead has caused numerous sales and transfers of real 
estate and personal property of said corporation to be 
made and the proceeds to be received by others than 
the def~ndant, lTnited Bond and Finance Corporation, 
and has wrongfully and fraudulently paid out large sums 
of money belonging to the coDporation for his own 
personal benefit. It is also charged that many ·Of the 
original books and records and papers of the defendant 
corporation have been willfully, wrongfully, deliberately 
and illegally destroyed and other records fraudulently 
written up. 
It is also charged that the defendant Beckstead is 
drawing funds in substantial amounts from the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation under the guise of salary 
or compensation without legal authority. to do so and 
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without rendering service or giving consideration there-
for. 
It was upon thes~ charges and these allegations and 
defendants' denial of each of them that this case was 
tried. The burden was upon plaintiff to prove this cause 
as alleged. 
All of these allegations charging fraud, conspiracy, 
diversion of assets and mismanagement were denied 
under oath, the burden rest~d upon the plaintiffs to 
sustain and prove the charges upon which their com-
plaint was based. 
It was stated inK ratz v. Moser, (Ky.) 65 S.. W. (2d) 
330: 
''The appointment of a receiver is an extra-
·ordinary remedy, and although upon motion for 
such appointment the court may look to the plead-
ings of the plaintiff, it must also look to those of 
the defendant, and if the equitable grounds as-
serted ·in the petition for the app-ointment of a 
receiver are fully denied t4ere is nothing left to 
sustain the motion, and before a receiver can be 
appointed under such circumstances the plaintiff 
must by evidence disprove the answer and sustain 
the grounds asserted by him for the appointment. 
Elkhorn Hazard Coal Co. v. Fairchild, et al., 191 
Ky. 276, 230 S. W. 61." . 
It will be noted that these charges are definite and 
certain with. few exceptions. Yet not one was f.ound to 
have been established by the ·Court. · There is no finding 
of fact indicating that the Court found any of. these 
charges to have been sustained by the proof. In fact, 
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the Court refu~ed to 1nake such finding. The Court made 
findings on the subject 1uatter of each of these charges 
referred to but on a theory entirel~T different' from that 
alleged. ''"'"ith reference to the stock purchased the 
Court found that the stock was purchased with corporate 
funds and \Yas no\Y o'vned by the corporation and there-
fore found that it had not been wrongfully diverted and 
misappropriated by B~ckstead as alleged. 
''Tith reference to the Beckstead Livestock Con1pany 
the Court found that the United Bond and Finance C·or-
poration no\Y O"\vns all of the stock of that corp·oration, 
and of course found in effect that Beckstead did not own 
or claim any of it. While the C·ourt did find that the 
title to the ~larks property was originally taken in 
Beckstead's nan1e, it was found that immediately upon 
the .organization of the Beckstead Livestock Company 
this .pr·operty was conveyed to it by Beckstead, thus 
finding in effect that the allegations of the complaint on 
this matter were untrue. 
No finding was made upon the Tri Base Oil Com-
pany allegations for the very good reason that t~ere was 
no evidence to support the allegati·on. It should be noted 
that the Court after refusing consistently to make any 
findings to the effect that Beckstead was guilty of per-
sonal wrong doings made a general finding to that effect 
in finding No. 46. As heretofore p·ointed out this finding 
is not reflected in either the conclusions nor the decree. 
There is a very good reason for that. The finding is 
contrary to the theory upon ·w·hich the other findings are 
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made and there is no evidence whatsoever to support it. 
While the plaintiffs complained of Beckstead's per-
sonal wrongdoings and of schemes and artifices used 
by him to' misappropriate and divert the property to 
his own name, the plaintiffs having failed to support 
these allegations, the Court found without the support 
of any allegations whatsoever that corporate funds· and 
assets had been used in the scheme to freeze •out stock-
holders and to perpetuate Beckstead in his domination 
of the corporate affairs, and thus made findings 0ontrary 
to and wholly at variance with the cause as alleged. 
POINT VII. 
THE OOURT C.OM1MI·T'TED REVEIRSI:BLE ERROR 'IN FAIL-
I'NG TO F'IN·D ON M.AT:ERIAL I·SSUEiS RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS 
IN THIS CASE. 
The answer of the defendants in this case was a 
general denial of the allegations contained in the com-
plaint. No findings of fact were made upon the great 
majority of material and essential issues thus raised. 
At the trial plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence 
whatsoever on several of these important issues, but 
the defendants after their motion for dismissal had been 
denied introduced evidence entirely disproving the 
charges so made, and upon each of these issues the Court 
made no finding whatsoever. 
If we ·Consider the number of issues raised upon 
1vhich no findings were made it more fully establishes 
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the proposition that the case pleaded was not the ·case 
found and the Court relied upon other and different 
facts than those alleged in making the decree which was 
·_, entered herein. \r e propose to point out the many 
issues raised and upon whir h no finding \vas made. 
In paragraph ( 5) of the complaint at R. 4 it is alleged 
that by schemes and artifices and fraud perpetrated 
by the defendants much of the property which is the 
property of_the Finance Corporation stands in the name 
of Beckstead and his wife, or -corporations owned and 
controlled by Beckstead and friends and relatives and 
-
persons dominated and controlled by him. This allega-
tion was denied but no finding whatsoever was made 
on this issue. 
In paragTaph (6) at R. 5 it is alleged that Egbert 
Pandolfo acted \vith and for the defendant Beckstead in 
carrying out his plans and purposes in the domination 
and control and dissipation of the assets of the Finance 
Corporation, and particularly in dealing with the stock-
holders of the said corporation within the State of Mon-
tana. This allegation was denied and no finding was 
made upon this issue. 
In paragraph (10), R. 7 it is alleged that Beckstead 
''took and acquired and appropriated· for his own p-er-
sonal use and tbenefit United Bond and Finance C'orpor-
ation stock'' exchanged for Investors Thrift Company 
Stock and American Keene Plaster and Cement Com-
pany Stock. This allegation was denied by the answer 
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of the defendants and no finding was made by the Court 
on this issue. 
In paragraph (10) R. 7 it is alleged that the Tri 
Base Oil Company was operated by Pandolfo mainly 
to carry out and accomplish the purpose of Beckstead in 
diverting and converting the assets and income of the 
Finance Corpnration. This allegation was denied and 
no finding made upon the issue. 
In paragraph (10) R. 7 and 8, it is alleged that to 
accomplish the foregoing purpose Beckstead caused 
money· and property of the Finance Corporation in 
excess of $100,000.00 to- be turned over ~nd delivered 
to Pandolfo, and that Beckstead acquired for his own 
personal use and benefit the Finance Corporation stock 
obtained by the use of the Tri Base Oil certificates. It 
is further alleged that the stock and its income was 
I 
appropriate-d to the use and benefit of Beckstead with 
intent to permanently deprive the Montana investors 
of their funds, investment and property. These alle-
gations were denied by the answer and no finding was 
made. 
In paragraph (10) R. 9 it. is alleged that Be-ckste.ad 
entered into the possession of the property in Wyoming 
purchased by the use of corporate assets and appropri-
ated it to his own use and benefit, and that he has taken 
and received the rents, issues and profits therefrom and 
has wholly failed to account therefor. to the Finance 
Corporation. These allegations were denied by the an-
s,:ver and nn finding was made upon the issue. 
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In paragraph (10) R. 10 it is alleged that the Beck-
stead Livestock C·ompany is a subterfuge and a device 
for holding for Beckstead some of the properties of the 
Finance Corporation 'vhich Beckstead had fraudulently 
and illegally diverted from the company to his own 
personal use and benefit. This alleg-ation was denied in 
the answer and no finding was made upon said issue. 
It is further alleged in paragraph (10) R. 10 that 
the title to the ~Iarks p·roperty, the Carter place and the 
\rebb ranch, together with the livestock and personal 
property an:d improvements thereon, has been fraud-
ulently and illegally withheld from the Finance Corpor-
ation. This alleg·ation was denied and no finding made 
upon the issue. 
In paragraph (10) R .. 10 it is alleged that Beckstead 
holds 50,000 shares of &tock in the Beckstead Livestock 
Company and that this stock is sulb.jec:t to being negoti-
ated or transferred and placed beyond the reach of the 
Finance Corporation. This allegation was denied and no 
finding was made upon that issue. 
. 
In many places throughout the complaint, and in 
particular in paragraph (10) R. 10 it is alleged that the 
whole purpose of the officers and directors since the 
f.ormation of the Finance Corporation has been to divert 
and convert the assets and inco1ne of said corporation 
to their ·own uses and benefit. This allegation, as well 
as the others, was denied by the answer of the defend-
ants, and there was no finding whatsoever made upon 
this basic and ilnportant issue. 
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In said paragraph at R. 10 it is alleged that the 
rights of the stockholders of the Finance Corporation 
have been ruthlessly trampled and their demands for 
information and redress ridiculed. This allegation was 
denied by the answer and no finding was made upon this 
ISSUe. 
In paragraph (10), R. 11 it is alleged that the 
property theretofo.re described in the complaint, owned 
by the Finance ·Corporation and held for the benefit of 
Beckstead, has produced a substantial income and Beck-
stead has failed to account to the corporation for such 
income and he has failed to pay the expenses incurred 
in pr~operly looking after said property or to pay the 
taxes thereon, and that he has permitted the taxes on 
said property and other substantial properties owned 
by the Livestock Company to become delinquent and 
said property is now being advertised for sale for taxes, 
and that by reason thereof the property and assets of 
the corporation are in danger of being encumbered and 
lost to the corporation. These allegations were denied 
by the answer and no finding was made upon such issue. 
In paragraph (10) R. 11 and 12 it is alleged that 
Beekstead has ·caused numerous sales and transfers of 
real estate and pers·onal property of the Finance Cor-
poration to be made and the proceeds to be received 
by others than the Finance Corporation, and that Beck-
stead has fraudulently paid out large- sums of money 
belonging to the corporation for his own personal benefit, 
and wholly without making any record or accounting 
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from the Finance Corporation. This is denied by the 
ans\Yer and no finding is n1ade upon that issue. 
In paragraph (10) at R. 1:2 it is alleged that many 
of the original bo-oks, records and papers of the de-
fendant corporation have ,been deliberately and illegally 
destroyed, and that other and additional records have 
been fraudulently written up Qr made by Beckstead or 
at his direction so as to sh{)W ·only such information as 
he desired, and that the Finance Corporation has not 
kept and does not now keep or have complete or accurate 
records ·of its business transactions or of the disposition 
of a large part of its property and assets. These allega-
tions are denied in the answer, and no finding is made 
upon the issue thus raised. 
In paragraph (10) at R. 12 it is alleged that the 
plaintiffs have made numerous attempts to obtain a 
statement or accounting of the business and affairs of the 
Finance Corpo-ration and to obtain access to the books 
and records of said corporation, but they have been 
unable to obtain such state·ment or accounting or to ob-
tain access to such books and records. These allegations 
are denied in the answer and no finding is made upon the 
Issue. 
In paragraph (10) at R. 12 it is alleged that Beck-
stead and Boyd Evans are drawing funds in substantial 
amounts from the Finance Corporation under the guise 
of salaries or compensation without legal right or au-
thority to do so and without rendering or giving consid-
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eration therefor. This allegation is denied by the an-
sv,'er and no finding is made upon that issue. 
It is further alleged in said paragraph (10) at R. 12 
that by reason of the do1nination of the affairs of the 
Finance Corporation the defendant dire·ctors have not 
and are not taking proper or any steps to recover the 
property and assets of the Finance Corporation and to 
protect them from dissipation and loss. This allegation 
is denied in the answer ~nd no finding is made upon 
the ISSUe. 
In said paragraph (10) at R. 13 it is alleged that by 
fraudulent cunningly devised and systematic looting of 
Montana stockholders and other fraudulent schemes, 
the defendants have diverted and distributed the con-
trolling interests in said corporation and the controlling 
stock therein to themselves, and have divested the cor-
poration of much of its assets and distributed the assets 
to themselves individually and to friends and relatives. 
This allegation was denied in the answer and no finding 
was made upon the issue. 
In paragraph (11) at R. 13 it is alleged that the 
Finance Corporation is in grave and imminent danger of 
'insolvency. This \Vas denied by the answer and abso-
lutely no finding ,,~as 1nade upon the very important 
issue thus raised. 
In paragraph (13) at R. 15 it is alleged that Beck-
stead has fraudulently drawn and taken large sums as 
salary and expense allow·ances to himself and those asso-
ciated 'vith him, and has "rholly 'refused to render an 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
197 
accounting therefor to the Finance Corporation. This 
allegation was denied in the answer and no finding was 
made upon the issue. 
In paragraph (13) at R. 15 it is als·n alleg~d that 
Beckstead acting throug-h his wife and other officers and 
associates, is now holding large and substantial assets of 
the corporation by means an-d in a manner unknown to 
the plaintiffs. This matter was denied in. the answer 
and no finding was made upon such issue. 
It was also alleged in paragTaph {13) at R. 15 and 
16 that Beckstead has employed numerous agents and 
attorneys to appear in the name of the Finance Cor-
poration, when in truth and in fact the appearan-ce is to 
protect the said Beckstead in his illeg-al and wrongful 
diversion of the assets of the Finance Corporation, and 
that Beckstead has paid ·out and transferred substantial 
property and assets of the corporation to various · at-
torneys and threatens to ·further transfer property and 
funds of said corporation to said attorneys as apparent 
consideration and compensation for services rendered 
to said corporation, but that said expenditure was for 
his ·own defense and for his. sole use and benefit. These 
allegations were denied by the answer and no finding was 
made upon the issue thus raised. 
In paragraph (14) of the answer ·of the defendants 
at R. 81 it is alleged t.hat the Finance Corporation and 
the Livestock Company were then and at all times since 
their incorporation have been solvent and. going eon-
cerns. 
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The plaintiffs filed a reply R. 85 in which they speci. 
fically deny the allegations of ·said paragraph (14) in 
defendants' answer. Upon the issue thus raised there ID 
was no finding made by the Court. J 
It is submitted that if the allegations upon which 
no findings were made were stricken from the complaint, 
the remaining allegations would be entirely insufficient 
to state any cause of action whatsoever. 
In considering these issues upon which no find. 
ings have ·been made it at once be-comes apparent that the :i~ 
,basic allegations upon which the plaintiffs relied for re· _!r 
lief have not been incorporated in the findings of the _:t 
C'ourt, and as far .as the record herein is concerned have 
been left undetermined and undecided, this shows beyond 
any doubt that the judgment for plaintiffs is not based 
upon the cause as plead. That failure of the Court to 
find on material issues is fatal to the judgment rendered 
i~ supported by Courts generally and the ·Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah in particular. 
In Doe v. Doe,· 48 Utah 200, 1'58 Pac. 781 (1'916), the 
c·ourt states : 
''We have, heretofore, many ti~mes referred 
to the statute requiring s.pecifi.c and direct find-
ings of ultimate facts -on all the material issues 
and a separate statement of eonelusions of law, 
and held that, until there are findings on all the 
material issues raised 'by the pleadings, the find-
ings are insufficient to support the judgment; and 
that the findings should be sufficiently specific and 
certain to ascertain just what is found and de-
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cided, \Yithout resorting to the evidence or the. 
pleading-s.'' 
In Thon1as v. Cla.yton Piano Comp·arn.y, 47 U. 91, 151 
Pac. 543 ( 1913), the :Court states : 
''The court should find the facts upon every 
issue, either affirmatively or ne,ga.tively, as the 
evidence may ·be, and thus give the defeated party 
an opportunity to assail the finding as not lbeing 
supported by the evidence.'' 
In Petty v. St. George Ga.rage Company, 60 U. 12·6, 
206 Pac. 720 (1922), the defendant had filed an answer 
and counterclaim and no findings had been made upon 
the issues raised. The C.ourt stated: 
''The defendant's answer raised a material 
issue, and, unless findings were waived, it became 
the duty of the trial .eourt to make such findings. 
Implement Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Utah 6, 88 Pac. 
670; Erverett v. Jones, 3:2 Utah 489, 91 Pac. 3i60; 
W estminister Inv. Co. v. Mc'Ourtain, 3'9 Utah 544, 
118 Pac. 5·64." 
Mendelson v. Roland, 66 U. 487, 243 Pac. 798 (19·26), 
also holds that findings on material issues are necessary. 
It is a funda~menta1 principle of law recognized by 
all Courts that a judgment is a legal determination of 
those issues which are raised and presented hy the plead-
ings, .and that the judgment rendered must be ·upon and 
within the issues r·aised by the pleadings, and must be 
supported by findings which ·come within the issues so 
raised. 
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In So~ules v. Q,lar~toson, 28 U. 74, 76 Pac. 1067 (1904), 
the ~c.ourt states as follows : 
"·The defendant in an action can oniv be 
called upon to answer the material allegatio~s of 
the com•plaint, and upon such allegations the is-
s·ues are fo~med, and in the absence of any amend-
ment to the pleadings, as in this case, judgment 
must he rendered upon .such issues only. A party 
cannot declare on one thing and re.cover on anoth-
er. Peay v. :Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac. 
206. That in every action the plaintiff must, in 
his eomplaint, give the defendant fair notice of 
what he claims, is an elementary rule of plead-
ing; and if, at th~ trial, he finds a deviation in his 
evidence from his allegatio~s in the complaint, 
· he should amend, if the variance is not such as to 
preclude an amendment, so tha.t when the judg-
ment is announced it will \be secundum allegata 
et probata. A~mong· the reasons for this certainty 
of pleading· is, so that the judgment when ren-
dered, will be a bar to any subsequent suit for 
the same claim. 11 Ency. Pl. and Pr ., 872, 878, 
879; 2~2 Ency. Pl. and Pr ., 602, 603; 1 Chitty, Pl., 
255; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 331, 40 Pac. 
206; Vance v. Whalon, 7 Utah 44, 24 P'ac. 672; 
Idaho Co. v. Insurance Co., 8 Utah 41, 29 Pac. 826, 
17 L. R. A. 586; Turner v. Insurance & Trust Co., 
10 Uta.h 6~1, 3:7 Pac. 9i1; Taylor v. l{eeler, 50 Conn. 
346; Brayton v. Jones, 5 Wis. 117; Eib v. ~1artin, 
5 Leigh 13·2. ' ' 
In Tuckfield v. Crager, 29 Utah 472, 82 Pac. 860, the 
Court states as follows: 
'·'As pl,aintiff made no claim to the 1.8 feet 
of ground in her complaint, nor in any way chal-
lenged defendant's right to maintain his wall 
thereon, he was not. called upon, nor did he have 
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any opportunity, to plead the equitable defenses 
mentioned by Mr. Jones, if any existed in his 
favor. \\!bile these questions are not raised by 
the pleadings, yet the ·court, by· going outside of 
the issues to determine the title to the 1.8 feet 
of ground referred to, has adjudicated them so 
far as they may haYe any bearing on defendant's 
rig·ht to maintain his "~an on his piece of ground, 
and they are here referred to for the purpose of 
inviting attention to the injustice which might be 
done in this as well as in other cases of like 
c.haracter, should any arise, if \ve should affirm 
the judg,ment and thereby establish a practice per-
mitting· a. court to find on issues not raised by the 
pleadings. Besides the rule is elementary that 
the findings and judgment must conrorm to, and 
he within, the issues made 1by the :pleadings. In 
11 En c. Pl. and Pr. 868, the rule is stated as fol-
lows: 
'' 'A court cannot properly put upon its rec-
ord a judgment which is not a proper sequence of 
the pleadings. It is a general rule that the judg-
ment must conform to, and be supported by, the 
pleadings in the case. · A recovery must be had, 
if at all, u.pon the facts alleged, and facts proved 
but not pleaded will not support the judgment.' '' 
In Pug·mire v. Oregon Short Line Ra.ilroad Co_·mpa;ny, 
33 Utah 27 (1907), the Court states as follows: 
"'The very purpose of written pleadings on 
the part of the plaintiff is to advise the defend-
ant of the nature and extent of the claim made 
against him, and thereby give him an opportunity 
to prepare to meet it at the trial if he so desireR. 
This doctrine is well illustrated by Mr. Pomeroy, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
202 
in his work on Code Remedies, at section 554, in 
the following langua.ge: 
'·' 'The very object and design of all plead-
ing hy the plaintiff, and of all pleading of new 
matter by the defendant, is that the adverse party 
may be informed of the real cause of action or 
defense relied upon by the pleader, and may thus 
have an opportunity of meeting and defeating 
it if possible at the trial. Unless the petition or 
complaint on the one hand, and the answer on 
the other, fully and fairly accomplishes this pur-
pose, the ple,ading would be a useless ceremony, 
productive only of delay, and the parties might 
!better he permitted to state their demands orally 
befiore the court at the time of the trial. The re-
quirement therefore that the cause of action or 
the affirmative defense must be stated as it a.c-
tu~ally is, and that the pr:oofs must establish it 
as stated, is involved in the very theory of plead-
ing.' " 
This general rule is ably stated in Volume 33, Q. J., 
·commencing at page 1139, as foll·ows: 
''A .court oannot properly .put upon its rec-
ord a judgment whieh is not a pr'Oper sequence 
to the pleadings. The judgment must conform 
to and be supported by, the pleadings in the c:ase. 
It is a general rule that a recovery must be bad, 
if at all, upon the facts alleged in the pleadjngs, 
a.nd facts proved but not pleaded will not support 
the judgment, although found by verdict or find-
ing, proof of a state of facts different from that 
alleged constituting a variance. A judgment must 
also be sus~ained by the evidence adduced, in con-
nection with facts admitted by the parties in the 
pleadings or otherwise. Facts pleaded but not 
.proved or admitted on the trial will not support 
a judgment. In other words, the judgment must 
·J 
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conform to both the pleadings and the proofs, and 
be in accordance with the theorv of the action 
upon ·w,.hich the pleadings .are fran"led and the C'ase 
was tried. This rule is of universal application, 
and \Yhether the action or suit is at law, in equity, 
or under the code, the judgment must lbe secundum 
allegata 'et prohata.. A judgment inconsistent 
with admitted or c-onclusively established facts 
is erroneous and will be reversed.'' 
This statement is supported by innumerable de-
cisions from the various sta.te and federal ~Courts, in-
cluding our own Supreme Court. 
There can be no doubt or question as to the variance 
between the case a.s plead by the plaintiffs and as found 
by the Court. Neither can there lbe any question of doubt 
whatsoever but that the judgment as made by the ·Court 
is based upon the cause as found by the c·ourt and not 
upon the cause a.s plead by the plaintiffs, there being no 
findings upon the vital issues rai~ed by the pleadings. 
PfOINT VITI. 
THE TRML OOURT COMMITTED R:IDVER'SIBLE ERROR IN 
THE CONDU:CT OF THE TRIAL. 
(a) By reason of the C·ourt 's personal prejudice 
against the Defendants and Defendants' cause, De-
fendants were not given a fair and impartial trial, 
and the said preju-dice of the Court influenced it 
in making and entering its judgment against Defendants. 
(b) ·By o~erruling Defendants' objections t·o ir-
releV'ant, incompetent and immaterial evidence. 
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(c) By denying Defendants' motion to dismiss 
1na.de at the conclusion of Plaintiffs' case. 
(d) By permitting Plaintiffs, over Defendants' ob-
jection, to amend their Complaint. 
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' case defendants n1ade 
a m~otion to dismiss on several grounds, each of which 
appea.rs .from the record, pages 1'217 -12!20. 
At that time there was no evidence in the record 
with respect to any transactions which had occurred sub-
sequent to December, 193'5. The motion to dismiss should 
have been granted upon the grounds and for the reasons 
hereinahove discussed and !briefed in our argument .on the 
proposition that the decree of the Court is not supported 
by the pleadings or the proof and is contrary to law. 
The arguments .made therein are adopted in support of 
this assignn1en t of error. 
We submit that the Court committed reversible er-
ror in ·overruling defendants' ohj.ections to irrelevant, 
incon1peten t and imma teri,al evidence, and in failing and 
refusing to afford defendants a. fair and impartial trial. 
Appellants contend that the Court was personally 
prejudiced against the defend,ants and their cause to 
the extent that he did not fairly and impartially try the 
issues presented and that this personal prejudice of the 
C'ourt prevented him from ruling fairly and impartially 
on moti'Ons and objections interposed during the trial, 
and that the judgment of the Court was affected by thiR 
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personal prejudice of the ·Court against the cause of the 
defendants. 
During· the trial the plaintiffs "·ere pern1itted ~_o in-
troduee much irrelevant, incompetent and imm~terial 
testimony, testimony of eov.ersa tions 'bet,veen persons in 
no \ray connected \Yith the .cause of action, nor with the 
defendants, or any of then1, under the promise that the 
missing links \Yould be supplied and that the testimony 
\Yould be ''·connected up.'' As indicating the li1berality 
with \Yhich the Court permitted plaintiffs to pr·osecute 
their case, \Ye call attention to the record at page 441: 
Mrs. ''Tilson, a \Yitness for the plaintiffs, was asked 
.eoneerning a man by the name of G. A. Paradis, then fol-
lo"~s certain questions and answers '"ith respect to pur-
ported transactions betw·een the witness and Mr. Paradis 
and objections mad~ by defendant, \Yhich objections were 
overruled. 
The follo,ving is taken fron1 the transcript at page 
444: 
"1Mr. Roberts: In eonnection with the con-
versation, your H·onor, she has testified to we 
move to strike out statements allegedly made by 
Paradis, to the effect that Beckstead sent him, as 
being hearsay and incompetent. 
The C·ourt: :I have consistently ruled that 
the conversations made a.t 'this time remain in the 
record, upon the assurance they will be connected 
up. 
Mr. R.olberts: I realize that, your Honor, but 
for the record-
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The Court: You may save your record, but 
the motion is denied.'' 
We shall not burden the Court with the citation of 
the numerous instances .contained in· the record where 
hearsay, incompetent and irrelevant evidence was ad-
mitted over defendants' objections on the promise that 
it would be ·connected up. Defendants were denied simi-
lar privileges, as is shown by the record at pages 636 
and 637. 
One of the ·main witnesses called by the plaintiffs 
was 0. P. Pearce. He testified at length to conversa-
tions between himself and Beckstead and between him-
self and others who were in no way connected with the 
defendants. His testimony as to many of these conver-
sations \\ras objected t·o but allo\ved on the theory that 
these conversH tions \Vere had while he was acting as the 
representative and agent of the United Bond and Finance 
Corporation and of W. R. Beckstead. Beckstead clailned 
that Pearce never \Vas an agent or employee of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation or of Beckstead but that 
P:earce bought stock and investment units on his own 
behalf and then sold these securities to the corporation, 
and that each deal was handled separately. Pearce testi-
fied that he worked ·On a commission basis of $5.00·per 
unit for all United Bond and F'inance Corporation stock 
procured. In the course of Pearce's cross examination 
('R. 636) eounsel for the defendants requested him to 
figure up what ~is com1nission would he on a certain given 
a·mount of United Bond and Finance Corporation stock. 
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The follo,ving- is taken from the record (Pag-e 637) : 
'·' ~lr. Adair: I can't see the purpose of this. 
There is no testimony here that he only a.cquired 
eighty-seven of preferred. 
~tr. Black: There will lbe. 
~Ir. Adair: \\' e are _setting up a set of fig-
ures_here, a stra\Y man, that are Mr. Black's and 
not ours. 
The Court: I am going to sustain the ob-
jection, because I don't think we are getting any-
where 'vith this type of examination. 
Mr. Black: Your Honor, the witness is on 
the stand now, and I want to determine hovv much 
he would have earned on the basis of these figures 
here. 
The Court : You are assuming something 
that is contrary to the record. That may not be 
the record of what he sold, and unless that is 
established as being the record, there is no use 
of computing it. 
Mr. Black: Your Honor, this is the thing, 
there has been a lot of testimony here on the 
promise of connecting it up. I will promise the 
court that I will p-roduce competent evidence to 
compute it. 
Th~ Court: All right, then you may call Mr. 
Pearce back to the stand, and we vvill eompute it. 
The objection is sustained.'' 
Later in the trial and before plaintiffs had rested 
and before defendants had had an opportunity of laying 
the foundation required by the C-ourt, counsel for plain-
tiffs indica ted that Pearce, vvho resided in Richfield, 
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Utah, desired to return home. ( R. 7'51) Thereupon coun-
sel for defendants called the Court's attention to the 
fact that their cross examination of the witness had not 
been completed and that they had not had an opportunity 
to supply the required foundational testimony and stated 
that they were willing to pay the "ritness the statutory 
fees during the time he was required to wait until the 
foundational testimony could be produced but the Court 
ruled that unless defendants would pay this witness his 
fees and expenses that he would not be required to re-
main availa1ble for ·cross examination, and the witness 
was excused. 
An instance of the Court's bias is recorded at page 
618. Pearce had testified that his agreement with Beck-
stead to the effec;t that he would pick up United Bond 
and Finance Company stock for that company at $5.00 
per unit had been made after the time he went to Park 
City and picked up the 'Vilson stock. 
For impeachment purposes the attention of the wit-
ness was called to a deposition taken in Jan nary, 1939, 
wherein he testified that the agreement vvas made before· 
he picked up the Wilson stock. 
The following· is taken from the record a.t page 620: 
'·' Q. After this conversation-
! am now reading from the second 9-
-After this conversation in Mr. Beckstead's 
office, and he gave you a list of those conversions 
to be made in Utah, what, if anything, did you do! 
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A. ,,~ell, I 'vent out and converted them. 
Q. Take each instance separately; where did 
you go first, and 'vho went with you, if anybody' 
... -\... Mr. Beckstead went "~ith me, to Park 
City. 
Q. Did you make those ans,vers ~ 
The Court: Is it necessary to read thiR de-
position, unless it is ror purposes of impeach-
ment'? 
Mr. Black: I want to. kno"\v when they made 
this agreHment. He says now they didn't make 
it until after the deal out" to \\Tilsons. 
Mr. Adair: But this doesn't show-
The c·ourt: Bu,t these questions and answers 
are .merely ~on:firmatory of the testim·ony the wit-
ness has given. 
Mr. Black: N-o. Your Honor, he says they 
didn't make it until after that; in the deposition 
it ·says they made it ·before. 
The Court: Wh.ere does it say that~ 
Mr. Black: I just read it, if your Honor 
was :following me. 
The Court: I was following you, ·but I didn't 
hear that. · 
Mr. Black: I am sure your H-onor will agree 
with me. 
The Court: . I mean this half statement here 
you just read. 
Mr. Black: I just read it to fix the time that 
it was, after the conversation they went to Park 
City. Here he is talking, and to that conversa-
ti·on at B~eckstead 's office, and I called his atten-
tion to that.'' 
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The charge of reading a. ''half statement'' is posi- ~~ 
tively unfair as surely appears fr,om the record. The 
attitude of a trial Court is clearly shown and indicated 
in his rulings on ohj ections made in the course of the ~3l 
examination of Frank ·C. Rich. ~rank C. Rich was called 
as a wit:J?-ess by the plaintiffs. In the fall of 1935 he 
worked for a short time as a representative of the Sn1ith 
Brokerage Company. It appears from his testimony 
that in the latter part of ~October he and his partiner, A. 
W. S:mith, were given $150.00 !by Beckstead and pro-
ceded on their way to Montana, and that they were able 
to pick up one unit of United Bond and Finance 
Corporation stoek. Thereafter they drew drafts, pay-
ment of which was refused by Be-ckstead. It appears 
that at the very time the drafts were being drawn Rich 
and his partner were engaged in ·organizing the Montana 
(Sitockholders Protective Association. This Protective 
Association seemingly was promoted by Rich and Smith 
for two purposes-one to enrich Rich and ~S1nith, a.nd 
the ·other to cause trouble for the Finance .C·orporation. 
The stockholders who joined were invited to pool their 
stock and contribute money to be used by Rich and 
Smith in the pr·~secution of the activities of this group. 
Rich while still engaged in promoting the program of the 
Protective Association became an investigator for the 
Utah Securities Commission for the sole purpose of in-
vestigating the Finance Corporation and its officers, and 
in the trial of this case the Court denied him no op-
portunity whatsoever to tell fully of his investigation. 
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All rules of materiality, competenc-y and relevancy were 
disreg·arded ·by the Court. 
Comencing- at page 7~)2 of the record we find the fol-
lowing: 
dQ. ..~..\nd w·hen you went back to see Mr. 
R.oberts-
A. Yes sir. 
Q. (Continued) \\T ere you given the au-
thority, or 'Yere you assisted to obtain an exam-
ination ·of those books at that time~ Now, wait 
until he makes his olbjection. 
~Ir. R.oberts: I object to that as immaterial, 
irrelevant and ineompetent, and calling for a eon-
·clusion, and leading and suggestive. 
The Court: Read the question again, Mr. 
J ohnso~, please. 
(The question was read by the reporter.) 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. No sir. 
Q. Now, did you have any further visi~ts to 
the county attorney's office~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Of this county, in that connection. Now, 
where next did you go~ With whom-or did you 
.make any further-withdraw that question. Did 
you do anything further about examining the 
bo-oks, or attempting to get access to examine the 
books of the United Bond and mnance, other than 
these t"'"o trips to the rounty attorney's office, 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. What next did you do~ 
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Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being im-
material, irrelevant, incompetent, and not within 
the issues, and we make that objection on behalf 
of each defendant separately. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. I can't state the sequence, but I went to 
the United States Attorney, f can't think of his 
name right now. 
Q. ·Shields, isn't it~ 
A. Shields, D·an B. iShields, to the Postal 
Inspector~ Mansfield, at the Post Office, and to 
Ezra ~Gull at the Capitol. 
Q. And did you lay your complaint before 
Mr. Gull at the Capitol~ , 
A. In its entirety. 
Mr. Rolberts: We object to that as being im-
material, irrelevant, incompetent, and ealling for 
his conclusion. 
The Court : The objection is overruled, and 
the answer may stand. 
Q. Now, 'vha.t, if anything, was done by Mr. 
Gull after you took this rna tter of being refused 
to exa~mine the books up with hin1 ~ 
Mr. R .. oberts: We object to that as being im-
material, irrelevant, incompetent, and no showing 
that this witness was with Mr. ~Gull when he was 
doing vvhatever he was doing, and is leading and 
suggestive. 
The Court: The ·objection is overruled. 
A. Mr. Gull called for Mr. Mansfield and 
me to come there together. 
Q. l\fr. Mans£eld is who~ 
A. United 1Stated Postal Inspector for this 
region. 
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Q. And did you g·o there'? 
.A.. ,,~ e did. 
Q. What ,,,.as done at that time? 
A. ,,~e ·spent an entire day going over the 
affairs, complaints, and S·O forth, in connection 
with the United Bond and Finance, and the In·-
vestors Thrift. 
Mr. Roberts: We move that be stricken of 
this witness. It is relating no conversation of 
any kind. 
A. I will relate conversation. 
Mr. Adair:. Do you want conversation? 
Mr. Roberts: I am making my objection to 
the court. or my motion. 
The ·Court: The objection is really a motion 
to strike. 
Mr. Roberts: It is a motion to strike. 
The Court: · And it will be so regarded, and 
it willlbe denied. 
Q. Now, do you know how many, or approxi-
mately how many complaints there were, of stock-
holders, at that time, that were reviewed by -
don't answer until he makes his objection-that 
were reviewed and gone over by Mr. Gull, Mr. 
Mansfield and yourself at that time? 
Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being im-
material, irrelevant, incompetent, and calling for 
his conclusion, ·and is hearsay. 
The :C'ourt: The objection is overruled. 
A. Many files, there \Vere fifty or more, and 
there were over one hundred in Mr. Gull's files 
that were gone into at the sa1ne time. 
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Q. N·O·W, were you at any time in the e:mploy 
of the-what is it~ 
The Court : 11 think it is the Utah Securities 
Commission. 
·Q. The Utah 1Securities Commission~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Mr. Roberts: We object to that as being im-
material and irrelevant, and make it in the form 
now of a motion to strike. 
The C!ourt: :The motion is denied. 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And when, with reference to the time 
that you and Mr. Mansfield and Mr. Gull were 
going over these matters, "rhen with reference to 
that~ 
A. February 27, 1'9:3'6, im·mediately after Mr. 
Mansfield, immediately after the eonference be-
tween Mr. M'ansfield, Mr. ·Gull and myself. 
Q. And were you assigned by the Utah Pub-
lic ~Service Commission-
·The Court: !Se-curities Commission. 
'Q. Securities Commission, were you as-
signed to any duties in connection with the ex-
amination~ 
A. I was. 
Q. Into the affairs of the United Bond and 
Finance Company~ 
\A. Yes sir. ' 
Q. And the Investors Thrift Corporation. 
Mr. Roberts: We have got to find a chance 
to oibje·c:t to this. 
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The Court: The answer may go out, for the 
purpose of the objection, if there is {)ne. 
Mr. Roberts: Yes,. 've object to it on the 
grounds it is immaterial, irrelevant, incompetent 
and calling for a conclusion and too remote. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. N o"r, 
the question may be answe_red . 
.. A.. Yes sir. 
Q. And in that connection did you talk-in 
connecti{)n with your investigation what persons 
did you interview1 
Mr. R.oberts: We object to this as being im-
material, irrelevant, incompetent, and not within 
the issues, and app·arently----well, we make that 
objection on behalf of each defendant separately. 
The ~Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. 'Several people whose names I have on a 
report which I issued to Mr. GulL" 
The activities of this witness were all antagonistic 
to the interests of the United B:ond and Finance C·orp·o-
ration and Beckstead. He was nevertheless permitted 
to detail conversations ·between himself and others not 
in any way remotely connected with the corporation or 
any of these defendants. 
We call the C·ourt 's attention to the following which 
appears at R. 807: 
''Q. 'Well, what did you say to Mr. ~Jones, 
and what did he say to you at the time you made 
this investigation~ 
Mr. Roberts: We object to that as lbei.ng im-
material, irrelevant and incompetent, and hear-
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say, and not within the issues of this case, and 
we make that ·objection on behalf of each of these 
defendants separately. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. I said, 'Mr. Jones, my name is Rich. I 
am employed 'by the Utah Securities Comn1ission 
as this letter will evidence. I shol}ld like to ask 
you a few questions.' To 'Yhich ·Mr. Jones re-
plied: '\Vhat business have you got asking me a 
few questions~' I said, 'Mr. Jones, there are 
rumors of sales being made of stock of your eom-
pany, to people h9lding stock of the United Bond, 
and Investors Thrift C:o~lpanies, and I am here 
with what I consider to be sufficient authority to 
be answered.' To which Mr. Jones replied, 'We 
will see about that,' and picked up th~ phone and 
called Ezra Gull, to which Mr. Jones replied, 'You 
come back tomorrow.' · 
Q. Did you come back tomorrow~ 
A. I did. 
Q. And what OCC\lrred then o? 
I 
A. 11r. Jones says-
Mr. Roberts: We object to this as being ir-
relevant, immaterial and incompetent, and hear-
say, and not within the issues of this ease, and 
we make that objection on behalf of each of thr 
defendants separately. 
'The Court: ·The 0 1bjection is overruled.'' 
Then follo"\\rs a lengthy answer purporting to relate 
the conversation betwen Rich and Jones. According to 
Rich's own testimony he visited Jones as an officer of 
the American Keene Plaster and Cement Company and 
not as agent, officer or director of the Finance Corpora-
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tion. Jones never purported to speak for or in 'behalf of 
the United Bond and Finance Corporation, but this 
seemed to ·make no difference \vhatsoever to the Court. 
In the cross examination of the \Vi tness Rich, his 
attention \vas called to a letter \vri tten over his signature 
to all stockholders of the United Bond and Finance Cor-
poration. The letter \vas received in eviden~e a.s Exhibit 
10. On redirect examination the following took place 
(R. 950): 
"'Q. Mr. Black has asked you about an ex-
hibit to the stockholders. What occasioned the 
sending out of that exhilbit~ 
Mr. Black: Which exhibit is that~ 
·The Court: D-efendants' exhibit '10.' 
Q. What occasioned it~· 
Mr. Black: That is immaterial, your Honor, 
as to what occasioned it. 
·The Court: The objection is overruled. 
A. The mail has been used by the United 
Bond · and Finance C'ompany-
Mr. Black: This, your Honor, now, is a 
statement of a conclusion, a statement of some de-. 
cision that was reached in the mind of this wit-
ness, and enough has been said to indicate that, 
and I object to it as ·being im·material, irrelevant 
and incompetent. 
Mr. Adair: ;I think, if his investigations dis-
close that-
Yr. Black: They didn't disclose anything. 
The Court: The objection is overruled. 
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A. Mr. Mans~field, the Postal Inspector for 
this region, suggested that I do so on behalf of the 
stockholders of the United Bond and Finance 
Company. 
Mr. Black: Now, your Honor, I move to 
strike out the answer as hearsay; it is incompe-
. tent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
The C'ourt : The motion is denied. 
Q. And had you, at that time, made an in-
vestigation and talked with various stockholders 
in Montana of the United Bond and Finance Com-
pany~ 
A. I had. 
Mr. Black: We object to that as immaterial, 
irrelevant and incompetent. 
'T:he Court: The ohjection is overruled, and 
the answer may stand'' 
The Court's willingness to aid and assist plaintiff 
is illustrated by the following from the examination of tlie 
witness, A. ·w. Madsen. (R. 864) Madsen according to the 
testim-ony at one time was employed by the Tri-Base Oil 
Company or Eg,bert Pandolfo. He was never at any time 
associated with any of the defendants in any capacity 
whatsoever. This testimony was also permitted under· 
the promise of counsel to connect it up. 
'I' Q. And in that connection, did you have, 
or were you furnished any list of investors in the 
United B-ond and Finance Corporation~ 
Mr. Black: ·That is olbj ected to, your l-Ion or, 
as being im·material, irrelevant, incompetent, ~nd 
has nothing to do with any present issue before 
the court, incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial. 
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There i8 no foundation laid. 
No foundation laid. 
Mr. Adair: \V e will have to connect up the 
trading of stock in Mr. Pandolfo's enterprises 
with stock in the United Bond and Finance C·om-
pany. 
The c·ourt: You intend to make that con-
nection'? 
Mr. Adair: \\T e intend to connect up Mr. 
Pandolfo's trading, the merchandise he traded, 
with the ·United Bond and Finance Company's 
stock, and with our list ·of investors. 
The Court: Upon that assurance, I will over-
rule the objection. 
A. I was furnished, by Mr. Pandolfo, a list 
of various securities. 
Q. Did the list include-! mean----Strike that 
all. Were you furnished with names of investors 
in the United Bond and Finance C·orporation ~ 
Mr. Black: We object to that, your Honor, 
on the same grounds. 
The Court: The same ruling. 
A. Well, yes, along w~ th, of course, other 
securities. N·ot just the United Bond and Fin-
ance. 
Q. Did you, while working for Mr. Pandolfo, 
trade or exchange other securities, -or purp.orted 
securities for shares of stock in the United Bond 
and Finance, in Montana~ 
Mr. Black: Just a minute. We. object on 
the ground the question is irrelevant, immaterial, 
ineompetent, and no foundation laid, and no con-
nection is shown between Pandolfo, or this wit-
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ness and any of the defendants before the court T 
It has no bearing on any issue before the court. 
·The 1Court : I will make the same ruling, up-
on the assurance of counsel that the testimony will 
be connected up. 
A. I made some deals and trades for secur-
ities, with Pandolfo, I don ~t remember ·definitely 
whether any of them were United Bond and Fin-
ane~ accounts, or not. We 'vere working on any 
securities that represented a value, and it has 
been so long ago that I don't rememiber any de-
finite deal made through Pandolfo or for Pandolfo 
on United Bond and Finance accounts. 
Q. Well, what sort of n1erchandise were 
you trading, ~or securities were you tradin~f 
A. We were-
Mr. Black: I ohject on the ground it is ir-
relevant, immaterial and incompetent. 
The Court : The objection is overruled. 
A. We were-
Mr. Black: And may I finish my objection 
-and no showing made that any of these tran~­
actions involved the United Bond and Finance, 
or its stock. 
'The Court: ·That objection may appear as 
having been made before the ruling. You may 
answer. 
A. May I have that question again. 
Mr. Adair: Will you read the q~estion? 
(The question was read hy the reporter). 
A. What was known as an oil resale con-
tracts. 
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Q. And in w·hat association or con1pany, or 
name; " .. hat assoc.iation, corporation, or name, 
\\·as it! 
Mr. Black: ''T e object to that question on 
the g-round it is irreleYant, immaterial, incom-
petent, and no sho,ving that it had any ·connection 
"~ith the l:nited Bond and Finance Company, or 
any of the defendants before the court. 
The Court: The ~objection is overruled. 
A. Tri-B·ase, of Montana, that company "\Vas 
known as. 
Q. Tri-Base, and do you kno"\v "\Vhether it 
\\·as a corporation or not·? 
Mr. Black: Just a minute, your Honor. That 
calls for this \Vi tness' conclusion.· 
Mr. Adair: I am asking him whether or not 
he knew. 
~fr. Black: No foundation laid. 
The Court: He may testify to its reputation 
a.s a corporation. 
Mr. Black: He didn't ask him. I object to 
it as being irrelevant, immaterial and incompetent. 
The ·Court: I assume that is what the ques-
tion called for. 
Mr. Black: Just a minute, may I ask a ques-
tion on voir dire ~ 
The Court: You n1ay voir dire the witness. 
V10TR DIRE EXAMINATrON 
(.By Mr. Black): 
Q. Did you ever discuss with an~hody in 
Montana the question as to 'vhether or not the 
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Tri-Base of Montana was a corporation or part:.. 
nership, or any other kind of an association~ 
A.· No. 
Mr. Black: We object on the ground the 
witness himself admits he doesn't have any infor-
mation on the question. 
The ~Court: Did you hear it discussed f 
A. Yes sir. 
The Court: By other individuals f 
A. No sir, nothing definite I remember of. 
·The c·ourt: Did you hear other individuals 
express their opinion, do you know, in respect to 
Tri-·Base Oil~ 
A. As to whether it was a corporation? 
'The Court: Yes. 
A. I don't know that I did, no. 
The Court: Did you hear others-did you 
know its general reputation in the community as 
being a ·corporation or not f 
A. Well, of course, 'I knew it was an or-
ganiz.a ti~on ·of some kind. However, as to whether 
it was incorporated or \vhether it was a partner-
ship, or on what basis it was operated, I don't 
know.'' 
Of course this testimony \vas never connected up 
as promised, in fact no attempt \vas ever made to do s·o. 
In many instances during the progress of the trial 
when plaintiffs were having difficulty developing their 
testimony, the Court took over the witness and proceeded 
with the examination. 
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The Court's attention is directed to the record at 
page 892. The witness C'hristensen was being examined 
by counsel for the plaintiff: 
,., A. I don't know. I didn't know the man 
Paradis. I don't kno\v that I have ever seen him. 
'The fact that his name ,,~as on this card doesn't 
mean much to you. 
Q. Why doesn't it mean n1uch to you~ 
Mr. Black: Y·our Honor, that calls for a 
conclusion, and for his own personal reason, and 
has no materiality. We object to it on those 
grounds. 
The ·Court: Where did you get the informa-
tion that went into the card, with reference to 
agents·~ 
Mr. Black: Your Honor, may our record 
show we object on the ground the witness doesn't 
show he ever made the ·card. Without the founda-
tion being laid, this question is objected to. 
The Court : Very well, the objection will be 
overruled. You can answer. 
A. Y.ou asked me vvhere the information 
came from? 
'The ·C~ourt : That was placed on the card, in 
relation to agents. 
A. I don't know, your Honor. As far as I 
remember, I never made one of these cards. I 
can tell you the general \bookkeeping behind it, 
probably. 
The Court: That is what the question re-
quired. I didn't ask you if you made the cards. 
Where the information rame from placed on these 
cards. 
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Mr. Black: Your Honor, may we have an 
obje-ction on the ground the witness says he 
didn't make the cards, and that there is no in-
dication he was present, or associated with the 
company when they were made, or had anything 
to· do with it. 
'The Court : Well, that is all very well and 
good. The objection doesn't in any way meet 
any information that is required by this question. 
I am asking atbout a method of bookkeeping. This 
man. was secretary and treasurer. You may an-
swer.'' 
It seemed that every damaging inference which 
could possrbly he drawn from the evidence, or lack of 
evidence; against the cause of the defendants was so 
drawn by the ,Court. 
:Exhibit A-4, a letter from one Pogliano to the Fin-
ance Corporation \vas received in evidence. Exhibit B-4, 
a copy of a letter from the corporation to Pogliano was 
also re-ceived. B·oth bear the same date. These exhibits 
were ·called to the attention of the \vitness Boyd Evans, 
and the following took place (:R. 1106) : 
'' Mr. Adair : !Well, the thing is that first. 
a stockholder writes, on October 16th, at Livings-
ton, and oil the same day they write from Salt 
Lake, to Mr. Pogliano, evidently; the two letters 
pass·ed in the mail; the stockholder wants to call 
off the ·deal, and don't want the transfer made, 
but the transfer is made, and the United Bond 
acquired the stock of the stockholder. 
The Court: Isn't it possible to dr~w an in-
ference from ';B-4' that it ma.y have been written 
subsequent to the receipt of 'A-4' ~ 
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Mr ... A .. dair: I think they are both the same 
date. 
The Court: They arc dated the same day, 
but the date may be ·w·rong. 
~Ir. Bla:ck: I don't see ho"· an inference can 
be dra,vn, your Honor, one \Yay or the other. 
The Court: Well, it seems that 'B-4' is in 
response to something; it didn't come out of thin 
air. 
A. \Y. ell, it is in response to this pest, Jack 
Oldroyd, that "'as annoying us about these certi-
ficates." 
During the course of the trial on the order to show 
cause in Sept. 1940, motion was made by plaintiffs' coun-
sel to hold up the payment of certain money on a draft 
which had been received by the Beckstead Livestock 
Company for the sale of its lambs. The Court ordered 
that this money be impounded, and the remarks of the 
Court show that he had apparently made up his mind 
to impound this money before the motion was made, and 
this regardless of the fact that at that time taxes were 
due on the property of the corporation, and the money 
was needed for other corporate purposes. 
:b..,rom the judgment roll it appears that this money 
was impounded for many .months, in fact, until after the 
trial Judge left the ·bench, and after the corporation had 
incurred charges for penal.ty and interest on delinquent 
taxes, and had .been otherwise damaged by this arbitrary 
and capricious order of the Court requiring that this 
money be impounded. These matters were all called to 
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Judge ~Schiller's attention and he refused to have the 
money released in order to save the company the penalty 
and interest on taxes, continually saying "he would de-
cide the case tomorrow.'' 
The positive injustice of this order is further shown 
by the faet that the plain tiff had never shown any dan-
ger, reasonable or otherwise, that any of the money 
would be wrongfully used in any manner whatsover. 
(:R. 1369') 
During the course of the trial questions were asked 
Mr. Beckstead in connection with the transaction in-
volving the purchase of the insurance business or agency 
from Ashton-Jenkins and from Lauren W. Gilbbs. Beck-
stead stated that he did not know where the written con-
tract was. 
At R. 1856 it appears th~t Judge Schiller sent some-
one to the Clerk's office in order to obtain these con-
tracts-this without any request or statement on the part 
of plaintiffs' counsel, and he informed plaintiffs' coun-
sel that he had sent upstairs for these exhibits. In this, 
we submit the Judge vvas playing the part of eounsel 
for· the plaintiffs. (R .. 1586-1'5'90, et seq.) 
·On the redirect examination of Mr. Beckstead, (R. 
1647), he was heing ·questioned a~bout the manner in which 
the American Keene Plaster and Ce-ment Cnrnpany stocJl{ 
had been handled as between the Cement Company and 
the Finanee Corporation. C·ouns·el for the plaintiffs ob-
jected on the ground that it was repetitious to go into 
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this matter again, and the c·ourt in commenting upon 
this objection said that Beckstead had testified on direct 
examination what he did "'"ith the stock ''and his con-
flicting statem'ent has been introduced on cross exami-
nation.'' The objection w .. as overruled and counsel for 
defendants ":-as permitted to go into the matter a little 
more fully; and then at R. 16·48, without any o:bjection, 
the Court makes the voluntHer statement: '',Now, we have 
got three stories in the record with respect to this stock. 
\That is the Court going to believe~'' 
Aside from the fact of show·ing the court's prejud-
ice, we might point out that there "\vas one story 
told and only one in connection with this stock, and the 
Court's volunteer statement shows either that he was 
confused or highly and greatly prejudiced. He grappled 
on to Beckstead's statement that the American Keene 
Plaster and Cemlent ,Company stock "\vas taken to the 
office of American Keene Plaster and ~Ce.ment Company 
as being in direct conflict with previous testimony with 
respect to its stock. This statement was in harmony with 
Beckstead's former testimony and the testi,mony of 
Pearce and Grant Crandall to the effect that the stock 
was delivered to the ~Secretary of the American K~eene 
Plaster and C·ement Company with instructions to issue 
it as directed thereafter. 
At another point in the trial Beckstead was being 
asked on redirect examination a?hout the commencement 
of his transactions with the Ashton-Jenkins Company 
and the Court interrupted and, without any cause and 
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\vithout any objection before him, turned to Beckstead 
and said ('R. 1657, et seq.): "You kne\v at the time you 
rnade that transaction that Ashton-Jenkins was very 
shakey, just on the verge ·of receivership, didn't you Y" 
,Such an accusation coming fron1 the trial Judge 
show··s the utter impossibility of defendants receiving a 
fair ·and impartial trial of their cause before him. 
Another manifestation of the Court's prejudice ap-
pears at R. 1692, et seq. It appeared that the respective 
counsel had completed their examination of ~Ir. Beck-
stead and the Court directed son1e qu·e;stlons to the 
installn1ent payn1en ts on preferred and common stock, 
and the Court asked 'vhy the installments on s·ome of 
these harl ceased, and Mr. Beckstead replied that some 
of then1 ·ceased along in depression times, and then the 
Court asked him why they had ceased paying other than 
because of financial reasons, if he knew. 
The only implication one can draw from this ques-
tion is that the Court !believed in his own nund that there 
were reasons other than the inability of the purchaser 
to keep up his payments, and that these reasons refleeted 
upon the honor, honesty and integrity of the defendants 
to this ~ction. 
He then asked Mr. Beckstead whether he had con-
ferred with the holders of this stock, and Beckstead said 
that people had come into his office on this matter; and 
then after all this the Court said : ''In other words, they 
were unwilling further to perform under these con-
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traets o?'' In accordance with his previous testi1nony all 
that ~lr. Beckstead could do vYas to say that it \Yas not 
necessarily that they w·e re un \villing, but that they \Vere 
financially unable to carry on. 
Commencing- at R. 17 56 is recorded an examination 
of Crandall by the Court on his own motion. Respective 
counsel indieated they had completed their examination 
and abandoning his position as Judge entirely and as-
suming without question the less dignified position of 
counsel for the plaintiff, he examined Crandall a.t some 
length on a subject which had not been mentioned by 
either plaintiffs or defendants's counsel, but was based 
upon some inaccurate information which he, the Court, 
evidently had. He asked Mr. Crandall if he and Mr. 
Jones and the Cement Company had been engaged for a 
number of years in a very extensive litigation over the 
title to the property of the Cement Company. Mr. Cran-
dall acknowledged that there had been some litigation, 
and then the Court by his question, indicated that this 
litigation·was in process at the very time of the exchange 
of the Cement Company stock for the Finance Corpo-
ration stock, and one of his questions was as follows : 
''They claimed that you and Mr. Jones had stolen this 
property, did they not~'' And this from a Judge who is 
trying a law suit. The positive unfairness of this con-
duct on the part of the trial judge we leave for deter-
tnination to this court. 
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The f.ollowing is taken from the record at page 1756: 
''Q. Mr. Crandall, have not you and Mr. 
Jones, and the company you now represent, been 
engaged, for a number of years in very extensive 
litigation over the title to the property in your 
company1 
A. We have had some. 
Q. And wasn't that in process of litigation 
about in 1934 and 19351 
A.· No, I think it was along about 1937. 
Q. ~Tell, the suits had been filed against you, 
had they not, ·claiming that you did not own this 
property~ 
A. Well, let's see. There was one suit filed 
by the, some of the old ·Owners of the property. 
Q. Yes, they claimed that you and Mr. Jones 
had stolen this property, did they not~ That is 
putting it bluntly. 
A. Not me; I wasn't involved in it. 
Q. Mr. Jones, at least, but you we.re in-
volved as a defendant in that action, were you 
not~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was pending about the time 
that this stock, this 6800 sha.res and this 5000 
shares were transferred or issued to Mr. Beck-
stead and the United Bond and Finance Com-
pany~ 
A. Well, I don't remember the exact dates. 
Q. But that was approximately the date, 
was it not7 
A.· Probably so. 
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Q. And there had been several trials had 
there in respect to the ownership of that prop-
erty~ 
A. Just the ·one. 
Q. Hadn't there been a suit filed down In 
Sanpete County~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. ''T asn 't there a suit filed down there 
which was transferred up here~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. In which the Mt. Pleasant Bank was 
involved f 
A. No sir; the State Bank of Sevier. 
Q. \\~ asn 't that filed originally in Sanpete 
County~ 
Mr. Black: Sevier County. 
A. ·Sevier County. 
Q. (By the Court) Sevier County~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. The original owners of this property 
were seeking to recover it about that time~ · 
. A. Well, it was later than that, your Honor; 
19-36, and along in there. 
Q. Well, there were some suits filed~ 
A. Yes, there w,ere some suits filed. 
Q. So that very materially affected the 
worth of this stock at that time. The title to 
your property was in doubt~ 
A. It probably would, yes. 
Q. The reason I know about those matters 
is becaus.e those suits were partially handled in 
my court. 
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~lr. Black: We had better put in the record, 
then, the outcome of the suit, your Honor. 
The C·ourt : Well, I don't know the outcome, 
because I ·didn't decide the suit.'' 
After this -examination by the Court, counsel for 
the defendants asked Mr. Crandall about the outcon1e of 
this litigation, and Mr. Crandall fixed . the date upon 
which the case \vas decided as some time in 1937 or 1938. 
Then again the Court comes forward as adv·ocate 
and stated that he thought the case had been tried once 
and then retried, and asked the question: ''Didn't 
Judge McKinney try it once.'' Crandall stated that had 
been years before and before the American l(eene Plas-
ter and Cement Company had been incorporated. And 
then again in comes the Court and says: ''But it involved 
y;ori and Mr. J·ones ~'' 
Then at R. 1760 the Court stated that he had just 
sent upstairs for the file in which l\1r. Jones and Mr. 
Crandall and others were sued. The Court then states 
that the suit was filed in July, 1935. Thi~ case accord-
ing to the Court was decided in February, 1937, and 
then the Court made this remark: ''It wasn't ever tried 
<>n its merits. It 'vas dismissed upon the motion of the 
.American Cement and Plaster Company with preju-
dice;" and then later he says: ''No, the suit was dis-
missed without prejudice; I was in error. But the one 
year has expired since the time of its original filing.'' 
The American Keene Plaster and Cement C·ompany 
stock was acquired by the United Bond and FinanOf 
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Corporation in 1934 and before this action suggested 
by the court was ever filed. 
The trial Court tried this case in g-reat haste, and 
was continually cautioning counsel against the use of 
time, as of course appears clearly from the whole record. 
A few instances will be cited. Commencing at page 1091, 
the following appears : 
The Court: N O\Y, gentlemen, we have simply 
got to do something about this matter. I have 
got to a point w·here I don't know what we are 
going t.o do. How n1uch more have you got after 
you get through \Yith this witness, Mr. Adair~ 
At R. 1661 the Court again shows his desire to get 
through with the case, and states that the case must 
be completed on the following afternoon, and whether 
counsel would have an .opportunity to argue this matter 
to the Court seemed to be of no concern or importance 
to the Oourt. 
These instances of the Court's anxiety to rush the 
trial of this case are cited in support of the contention 
appellants now make that they did not have a fair and 
impartial trial and could not have a fair and impartial 
trial before the trial Judge, and is significant in con-
nection with an occurrence that took~ p~ace several 
months later. As indicated by the judgment roll and the 
re0ord in this case, the trial Court took this matter 
under a4visement, and thereafter in accor·dance with 
the rules of the Third Judicial District Court, plaintiff 
requested the cause to be set down for trial on its 
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merits, and accordingly the cause was set down for trial 
on its merits for D·ecember 17th. Prior to the· 3rd of 
December the plaintiffs appeared and req:uested a spe-
cial setting for the trial of this caus·e for December 3, 
1940. This request was granted over the objection of 
defendants and the cause was set down for trial upon 
its merits before the Judge, whose anxiety in September, 
on the ground that he had accepted a position with the 
University of Utah, did not permit time f.o·r the proper 
ordinary trial of this cause. 
The trial Court committed reversible and prejudicial 
error in the conduct of the trial by permitting plaintiffs 
over objection of defendants to amend their complaint. 
It appears from the reoo·rd in this case that after 
both parties had rested and after proposed findings of 
fact and conclusions of law had been served upon appel-
lants by plaintiffs and objections interposed thereto, 
and after the arguments on the objections had been con-
cluded, the plaintiffs moved for permission to amend 
their complaint. The motion was obje-cted to and re-
sisted by appellants, but their objection thereto was 
overruled and the plaintiffs 'vere granted permissi,on 
to amend their complaint. 
An ef(amination of the -complaint as originally filed·, 
will indicate that the cause of action was based entirely 
upon the relations between the officers of the United 
Bond and Finance Corporation and the Montana stock-
holders, and the case was tried upon the complaint as it 
was filed. The effect of the amendment was to change 
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entirely the theory as originally presented, and as 
amended the cause 'vas based, among other things, upon 
the relationship bet\Yeen the officers of the Finance Cor-
poration and the stockholders generally. The ainend-
ment could not be justified upon the theory that it was 
permitted in order to n1ake the allegations corresp·ond 
w·ith the proof, nor upon the principle that the .case 
had been tried upon the theory as expressed in the 
complaint as amended. Pla:intiffs attempted to prove a 
cause based on the allegations ·of the ·original complaint, 
and that only. This complaint, changing as it did the 
whole theory of the cause of action and the whole theory 
of the defense, was unfair, unjust and inequitable, and 
appellants submit that the Court was not justified 1n 
permitting this amendment. 
THE. COURT COMMIT·TEU RE;vER:SIBLE AND P:REJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO VACATE 
AND SET ASIDE THID ORDER .AJPPOINTING REICEJV·ER. 
POINT X. 
THE COURT COM;MIT·TED REVERSIBLE: AND PREJ.UDI:CIAL 
ERROR IN OVERULING DEF'EN·DAN·T'S' MOTION FOR NEW TR.IAL. 
The arguments which we have hereinabove set forth 
support and sustain a.pp·ellants in these assignments of 
error, and we shall make no further argument upon 
them. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
236 
CoNCLUSION. 
In conclusion we desire to briefly mention the pres-
ent condition of the Finance Corporati·on in connection 
with the charges of misn1anagement. 
The present condition of the corporation is accu-
rately reflected in the evidence in this cas·e, and par-
ticularly in the audit as of the c}ose of the year 19·39. 
The eo-rporation placed in re-ceivership was organ-
ized just prior to the beginning of the great depression. 
In its very infancy it was forced to face a condition 
which caused numerous well established corporations to 
suffer insolvency . and complete dis·o·rganization. That 
this corporation survived heroically is shown beyond 
question by the audits hereinabove referred to. The 
~orpora.tion, which has been placed in receivership be-
cause of alleged mismanagement, at the time this suit 
was filed had assets in excess ·of the total amount of all 
stock ever sold by it. At that time it ·could have paid 
every stockholder 100 per cent of his investment; could 
have paid all its de hts and obligations of every kind 
and character, and still had a surplus in the neighbor-
hood of $129,000.00. From the evidence it conclusively 
appears, in fact plaintiffs have ~tipulated, that the prop-
erties of the corporation are heing managed with an 
exceptionally high degree of · care and efficiency, that 
there are no outstanding unpaid or delinquent taxes, 
debts or ·other obligations. It is stipulated that com-
petent real estate men in Salt Lake City who are ac-
quainted with the properties of the corporation would 
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testify as to the exceptional care with which these 
properties are being handled. The evidence is to the 
effect that there \Yere no Ya~ancies in the apartments; 
that rents were being collected; and that furniture and 
furnishings are well cared for, and that everything is 
being done that could be done to preserve and ope·rate 
these apartments at a profit. The ranchers from Wyo-
ming who live in the vicinity of the Beckstead Livestock 
property and holdings, and who are well ~cquainted 
with the conditions in that part of the country, testified 
that the ranches were in excellent condition. That 
splendid impr·ovements bad been made upon them since 
their acquisition by the Beckstead Livestock Company. 
They testified that the sheep were of better grade than 
other sheep in that vicinity. That the l~mb crop was 
better than the average. They testified that the finest 
cattle ~n. the country w·ere on the Beckstead Livesto.ck 
Company holdings. Their testimony is to the effect that 
the ranches and the livestock are well cared for, and that 
this pr.operty is being managed and operated with effi-
ciency. This evidence entirely disproves any claim of 
mismanagement or danger o{ loss and destruction to this 
property and indicates, of course, that because of skill~ 
ful management the corporation is now in a. solvent and 
flourishing condition, a condition which fully and com-
pletely protects the investments of every stockholder. 
Surely the greatest present danger to this ·co-rporation 
is reeeivership and not mismanagement. 
In conclusion the appellants respectfully su'bmit that 
the judgment and decree of the trial ·Court appointing 
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a receiver should be reversed and that said decree should 
be vacated, set aside and held for naught, it conclusively 
appearing that said judgment and decree is not sup--
ported by the pleadings nor by the evidence nor by 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which are in turn 
supported by pleadings and evidence, and that said 
judgment is contrary to law; and upon the further 
ground that it .conclusively appears that the findings of 
fact made by the Court, upon which said decree is based, 
are not supported by the evidence nor the pleadings, 
and that there is a fatal variance between the case as 
plead and the case as found, and that the Court failed 
and refused to make findings upon the important ma-
terial issues raised by the pleadings, and upon the fur-
ther ground that the defendants were not afforded a fair 
and impartial trial. 
Respe-ctfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, wALLACE & BLACK, 
BRIGHAM E. RoBERTS, 
Attorneys for the Appellants. 
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